A Panorama of Swiss Society 2020

Migration—Integration—Participation

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Acknowledgements

This new series, *A Panorama of Swiss Society*, is the continuation of the previous Swiss Social Report, which has been published every four years, i.e. five times since 2000. Apart from the new title, the main new feature is that this series is the joint responsibility of the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and the Universities of Neuchâtel and Fribourg. The content of this first issue focuses on the topics 'Migration—Integration—Participation'.

This publication would not have been possible without the support and the contributions from various committees and persons. The editors of this first issue would like to take this opportunity to express their sincere thanks to them.

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Introduction

Denise Efionayi-Mäder, Jürg Furrer, Marcel Heiniger, and Christian Suter

Background

The Swiss Social Report, published every four years since 2000 has a new name, a different format and appears under a new aegis: This new series, *A Panorama of Swiss Society,* is published by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) and the Universities of Neuchâtel and Fribourg and is the joint initiative of official statistics and social science research in the universities. The aim of the publication is to make important findings on key socio-political topics and fundamental trends in Swiss society accessible for public interest.

As in the previous five Swiss Social Reports (see, for example Ehrler et al. 2016), the analyses presented are backed up by facts and reliable data. The indicators are based on representative surveys carried out to the highest of standards. At the same time, the various articles focus on current issues and look for explanations: Specialists present in-depth analyses of selected trends related to the topic of migration, which they seek to interpret and explain. Other features of the former Swiss Social Report have also been maintained, such as its multi-disciplinary (the present publication contains contributions from economics, sociology, political sciences and demography) or multilingual character (German, French and English editions, making discussions available to a wider public and giving the publication an international reach). There are, however, four main new features:

First, all contributions in the new series are available in electronic format and freely accessible.

Second, *A Panorama of Swiss Society*, focuses more closely on specific topics. All articles in the current edition, for example, deal with various aspects of migration.

Third, the Panorama articles focus on the scientific and analytical in-depth examination. This means that—unlike the previous editions of the Swiss Social Report—the indicators are no longer updated and presented from a purely descriptive point of view in this publication. This does not mean, however, that they are less important. On the contrary: Many new indicator systems have been created in recent years, while existing ones have been expanded. The FSO plays a key role in such systems. Today these indicators are constantly updated and available online on the FSO website. In this context it is worth mentioning the Statistical report of the social situation in Switzerland published by the FSO (FSO 2019a). In particular, the indicators in that report cover aspects such as living conditions, social security and the social marginalisation of at-risk groups. Another good example is provided by the integration indicators in the field of migration (FSO 2020). These are examined in detail in this present publication.

The fourth and most important innovation concerns the cooperation between the worlds of science and official statistics. Today the FSO collects a large quantity of relevant data. The development of new registers and the linking of different data sources has brought a new dynamic to the synergy between official statistics and science, driving intensified analyses in specific research projects. Furthermore, new data surveys are conducted in cooperation between official statistics and major stakeholders, in particular in the world of science. The series *A Panorama of Swiss Society* aims to increase the visibility of this growing cooperation between data producers (official statistics) and social-scientific data analysis as well as the gains in synergy thus created.

This first edition of *A Panorama of Swiss Society* deals with the topics of migration, integration and participation. The previous social reports have only touched upon migration. Although demographic and migration-specific indicators are found in all previous social reports, and the phenomenon of migration background has been explicitly identified as a key factor in numerous indicators, it was only in 2004 that a contribution focusing specifically on migration appeared in the social report (Fibbi and Wanner 2004).

Migration establishes itself as a subject for research

A small country in central Europe, Switzerland is a perfect example of a migration country. Over the past 60 years, some 6 million people (excluding seasonal workers) have immigrated to Switzerland. Many have left and others have stayed and become Swiss citizens (Zufferey et al. 2020; Wanner 2014; Piguet 2013). For this reason, behind small states such as Luxembourg and Liechtenstein, Switzerland has the highest population share in Europe of people with a migration background.

Without immigration, many of Switzerland's achievements and developments would have been unimaginable. Just one example is the construction of the Gotthard tunnel (1872–80) at a time when Switzerland was evolving from a country of emigration to one of immigration and had one of the most globalised economies in the world. The overwhelming majority (85%) of the tunnel workers were foreigners and no fewer than 199 of them lost their lives during the construction of this much praised pioneering piece of engineering. But despite, or perhaps because of Switzerland's institutionally enshrined diversity—with its four language regions—a fear of being 'overrun by foreigners' was already shaping the country's politics and its foreign national

legislation. Caught between the conflicting priorities of openness and self-protection, even today public debate can still be dominated by emotionally-charged arguments, sometimes obscuring the facts.

Empirical research on migration, adopting a multi-disciplinary approach, has evolved considerably in Switzerland over the past 25 years, after having long played a minor role—in particular in sociology and ethnology (Wicker et al. 2003). In 1995, the *Swiss Forum for Migration* (SFM) was founded with the launch of the Swiss National Science Foundation's programme *Migration and Intercultural Relations*. Twelve years later it was integrated into the University of Neuchâtel (see Haug and Kreis 2017). In 2014, the Swiss National Science Foundation's nccr – on the move was established to better understand the interaction between migration and mobility and related phenomena. It is coordinated by the head of the SFM and brings together researchers from almost all Swiss universities as well as researchers in the social and economic sciences and law.

Migration research has also been institutionalised, however, thanks to the creation of various professorships, specialised master degrees, part-time continuing education courses in the higher education institutions and individual think tanks. This research also depends increasingly on internationally collected datasets that enable interesting comparisons between EU or OECD states, as shown in at least two chapters (4 and 5) of this current edition.

In comparison with other European countries, Switzerland stands out due to its high level of mobility (immigration and emigration), including that of Swiss nationals. Furthermore, labour migration continues to play an important role, especially from EU states. It has gained in momentum with the gradual entry into force of the agreement on the free movement of persons (AFMP) with the European Union (EU) in 2002 and the complete freedom of movement for EU-15 citizens (with safeguard clause), from 2007. Whereas EU-nationals mainly migrate for professional reasons, citizens of third countries are motivated by family reasons, as economic migration from these countries remains subject to strict quotas (FSO 2019b).

To shed light on the different contexts of migration and the latest trends, this edition focuses primarily, but not only, on research on labour-market driven immigration from EU countries. Other relevant topics such as refugees, undocumented migrants or the migration of students and older people have been deliberately omitted: The dynamics and processes involved in these migrations are different and to include the relevant details would have gone beyond the scope of this edition.

The editors have nevertheless taken care to ensure that the authors, from different disciplines, examine migration backgrounds, characteristics and circumstances from various angles that concern both international and internal migration, integration processes and changes that effect society as a whole. Table T0.1 provides an overview of the publication's chapters.

Summary of chapters **T0.1**

Chapter	Authors	Title
Chapter 1	Florence Bartosik	Population with a migration background: integration prospects and comparisons with the native population
Chapter 2	Philippe Wanner	International migration and integration from a longitudinal perspective
Chapter 3	Sandro Favre, Reto Föllmi, and Josef Zweimüller	Immigration, return migration and integration from a labour market perspective
Chapter 4	Laura Ravazzini, Christoph Halbmeier, and Christian Suter	Household income and wealth among people with a migration background. A comparison of Switzerland and Germany
Chapter 5	Monica Budowski, Eveline Odermatt, and Sebastian Schief	Migrants' participation in the Swiss social security system: social protection for whom?
Chapter 6	Jonathan Zufferey	Internal migration in Switzerland: behaviour and impact
Chapter 7	Marion Aeberli and Gianni D'Amato	Which path to inclusion? Citizenship between institutions and attitudes

Terminology

The International Organisation for Migration defines the term 'migration' according to the generally understood meaning of a change of residence: *'The movement of persons away from their usual place of residence, either across and international border or within a State'* (IOM 2019). In principle this term applies regardless of the circumstances or duration of a person's period of time away from home. It is usually taken to be for a minimum period of one year unless the migration is explicitly described as temporary.

Much more controversial are the terms 'integration' and 'participation', as is the dividing line between the two notions. Although in principle integration implies a progressive development based on reciprocity between the host country and immigrants (Kristensen et al. 2017), public debate in particular, but also research, have tended to place the onus on persons with a migration background and on their differences in comparison with people with no migration background.

From integration as taking part ...

From a scientific point of view, integration refers to the inclusion of groups of people into key areas of social life and activities. With this in mind, our empirical examination of integration is conducted exclusively at an aggregated (collective level).[1] Integration therefore entails *taking part* in our society's economic, social, cultural and political life. In particular this includes labour market

[1] As the term integration has entered the realm of jurisdiction (as the ability to integrate), individual integration pathways are also being examined. These do not however, fall within the scope of this publication.

integration with its corresponding rights and obligations (income, taxes and social insurances), educational integration as well as participation in social networks (associations or voluntary work). The term integration (and conversely, the notion of non-integration) thus refers to complex, multi-level processes that interact and are interdependent on one another.

... to participation as having a part

The term participation goes a step further, regarding society as a whole, and interprets *having a part* in society as a basic right. In this sense, successful integration in all areas of life is achieved only when immigrants and natives both have the same opportunities to participate, regardless of whether they actually make use or wish to make use of this *having a part* in the different areas of life. Unlike traditional portrayals of hospitality, immigrants are not (temporary) visitors who quietly accept the house rules in exchange for food and accommodation. Instead, they are equal members in most areas of society (at least as far as adults are concerned[2]), who work, pay taxes, belong to associations and (can) take part in decision-making. This means that they are not merely part of society but that they also have the opportunity to take part in decision-making processes, to have an influence and even initiate change by participating in political decisions.

It is worth noting that equal opportunities in *taking part* require certain rights to *have a part* in society, in terms of labour market access, for example, family reunification or the education of children and young people. Conversely, certain opportunities for *having a part in society* are only available with *prior taking part* in relevant activities. A person has to have been employed, for example, in order to receive social insurance (ALV, IV, HIA, etc.). The same applies in principle to Swiss nationals. Entitlement to social benefits, however, depends partly on provisions regarding the right of residence or on nationality (social insurance agreement with the country of origin, for example; see also Chapter 5).

As we can see, the notions of *integration* (seen as *taking part*) and *participation* (seen as *having a part in society*), as well, of course, as that of *migration*, are very closely linked, despite their being listed in this introduction separately, for analytical reasons. To conclude this introduction, therefore, some of the key findings and theories from the individual chapters are summarised and commented on in light of the three main aspects mentioned above. Instead of presenting the chapters one by one in the usual manner, we will consider the individual contributions from various angles, making complementary references or remarks of a more general nature. But before briefly addressing the main concepts, we should take a look at the data bases used and the methodology, which have seen considerable developments in the past two decades.

[2] Seen from what is an admittedly different angle (to that of work, taxes, etc.) the right to participate in a pluralistic society should be valid for all people (including the elderly, the disabled, children and migrants with no legal residence, etc.).

Data, methodology and indicators

Overview of data sources

One of the objectives of the *Panorama of Swiss Society* series is to support statements with data whenever possible. Data bases have increased in step with the aforementioned growth in empirical research on migration and the development of the relevant institutions. Since 2000, more data on persons with a migration background have become available. New statistics have been introduced, such as the FSO survey 'Diversity and coexistence in Switzerland' in 2016. Other statistics have collected variables relevant to migration such as the parents' place of birth recorded in the structural survey or SILC (see Table T0.2). The development of empirical research would not have been possible without this increase in data sources. The present publication uses data from the FSO, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM), the nccr – on the move and other sources as well as literature.

It goes without saying that during the collection, analysis and publication of data the strictest data protection requirements are observed at all times. The collected data have been anonymised so that individual persons cannot be identified.

The contributions' main data sources **T0.2**

Data source	Institution	Chapter
Population and household statistics (STATPOP)	Federal Statistical Office (FSO)	1, 2, 3, 6
Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS)	Federal Statistical Office (FSO)	1, 3
Structural Survey, as part of population census	Federal Statistical Office (FSO)	1, 3
Central Migration Information System (ZEMIS); replaced the Central Aliens Register (ZAR) and the computerised registration system (AUPER)	State Secretariat for Migration (SEM)	2, 3
Individual accounts (IA)	Central Compensation Office (CCO)	2, 3, 6
Migration-Mobility survey	University of Neuchâtel: National Centre of Competence in Research *nccr – on the move*	2, 7
Survey on income and living conditions (SILC)	Federal Statistical Office (FSO)	4
Socio-economic panel (SOEP) Germany	German Institute for Economic Research DIW Berlin	4
Diversity and coexistence in Switzerland (VeS)	Federal Statistical Office (FSO)	7
Study by Probst et al. (2019): standardised survey 2017–18 of the cantonal integration delegates, asylum coordinators, heads of civil registry offices and migration authorities in Switzerland	Swiss Forum for Migration and Population Studies (SFM), University of Neuchâtel	7

Methods

Various methodologies were used in the contributions published here. The analyses in Chapters 1, 6 and 7 rely on socio-demographic variables such as sex, age, level of education and citizenship, etc. Chapters 1 and 4 also distinguish between different migration groups and migration generations (1st, 2nd and subsequent generations). The differences observed between these groups are described but not explained by or connected to other factors.

Comparisons between groups, in the sense of cross-sectional analysis, are undertaken in Chapters 4 and 7. Chapter 4 examines the differences in income and wealth of households with and without a migration background. The decomposition method of DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996) is used to examine whether differences in income and wealth can be explained by certain variables, such as age and educational background. Chapter 7 uses logistic regression to look at what cantonal differences exist in the relationship between institutional circumstances in the cantons and the attitudes of the population.

In Chapters 2 and 3, longitudinal analyses are conducted for different migration cohorts and a comparison is made with the population of Switzerland. Chapter 2 considers three cohorts (persons immigrating in 2000, 2005 and 2010) and looks at how labour income has changed in comparison with the total population of Switzerland. In Chapter 3, the authors apply a regression analysis to longitudinally linked individual data, controlling for sex, age, education and region of residence. The professional pathways (employment, unemployment and labour income) of immigrants are thus examined in comparison with those of people born in Switzerland.

The FSO's integration indicators

Data relating to migration have also been incorporated into the FSO's integration indicators. The first results from an indicator-based monitoring of the integration of the population with a migration background were published by the FSO in 2012, following the Federal Council's adoption in 2007 of the 'Integration Measures' report and the subsequent FSO mandate to create a monitoring system (Kristensen et al. 2017, 5). The aim of integration monitoring is to 'measure the integration of various population groups with a migration background at a given point in time or over a certain period of time and to compare it with that of the native population' (FSO 2020). Provided that data are available in time series, this also enables a depiction of change over time.

The monitoring system currently comprises 68 integration indicators (findings are available for 64 of those), focusing on eleven areas of life (see Table T0.3).

Integration monitoring by areas of life **T0.3**

Areas of life	Number of indicators
1. Social assistance and poverty	11
2. Culture, religion and media	6
3. Education and training	5
4. Family and demography	9
5. Language	5
6. Housing	4
7. Labour market	9
8. Politics	7
9. Healthcare	8
10. Racism, discrimination and security	3
11. Crime	1

This indicator system is regularly updated and adapted to incorporate new developments such as some of the findings and results of this publication.

Migration

Migration is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon that can be described by means of various concepts and criteria. The FSO makes a distinction between three typologies of migrants and their descendants, as presented by Florence Bartosik in Chapter 1. The three concepts are based on the following criteria:

- *Foreign population (criterion of citizenship)*: The foreign population includes all persons who at a given moment in time are living in Switzerland but do not have Swiss citizenship (FSO). This population is made up of some 2.1 million people, accounting for 25% of the permanent resident population.
- *Population born abroad (criterion of place of birth):* This criterion does not depend on whether a person is a Swiss citizen or not and comprises some 2.6 million people (30% of the population). Of these, just under a third are Swiss nationals: 600 000 naturalised persons and 99 000 persons born abroad as Swiss nationals.
- *Population with a migration background (criterion of migration status)*: This concept is increasingly used in international debate on migration and integration. A distinction is made between the population with a migration background from the first generation (born abroad) and the second generation (born in Switzerland). In this way, the migration experience of a person's parents is also included. This group is made up of some 2.7 million people (38% of the population aged 15 and over).

These three typologies should enable an adequate understanding of migration, and take into account the diversity of the phenomenon. Depending on the definition used, between 25% and 38% of the population are directly or indirectly connected to migration. The vast majority of immigrants come from Europe, in particular from EU countries. Immigrants from countries outside Europe account for 17% of the foreign population, for 12% of the population born abroad and for 9% of the population with a migration background. The most commonly represented countries of origin are Italy, Germany, Portugal and France.

The role of mixed households

Mixed households are made up of persons with and without a migration background. In the period 2014 to 2016, 12% of households were mixed (see Chapter 1). In Chapter 4, Laura Ravazzini, Christoph Halbmeier, and Christian Suter show that in terms of income and wealth, these households are situated between native and foreign households. From a socio-demographic perspective, they are similar to households with no migration background, from an economic one they are comparable with households with a migration background. This holds true in both Switzerland and Germany, although there is one important difference: In Germany, mixed households are more likely to own their own home than in Switzerland.

Socio-demographic characteristics of immigrants

Observing the migrant population in terms of its socio-demographic characteristics, we ascertain that: The foreign population is on average younger than Switzerland's population as a whole (average age 37 and 42 respectively); persons born abroad and persons with a migration background, by contrast, are older (age 45). The old-age dependency ratio, i.e. the quantitative relation between the not employed population aged 65 and over and the working-age population (age 20 to 64), is lower in all three typologies than in the population as a whole. In Chapter 4, this result is confirmed for Switzerland and also for Germany. Distribution by sex varies by population typology: The foreign population tends to be male, the population born abroad female. The population with a migration background shows a balanced gender distribution (see Chapter 1). It should be noted that gender distribution is influenced by a population's age structure. With regard to the highest level of education completed, Chapter 1 shows that a greater share of people with a migration background have no post-compulsory education than the population without a migration background

The first generation from the population with a migration background are particularly interesting. Compared with the second generation and the population with no migration background, this group has higher shares for both tertiary and compulsory education level. In Chapter 3, Sandro Favre, Reto Föllmi, and Josef Zweimüller also reveal that among immigrants—in comparison with persons born in Switzerland—persons with only compulsory education and those with tertiary level education are overrepresented. Chapter 4 confirms this fact for Switzerland and—to a lesser extent for migrants with tertiary level education—for Germany. Amongst other things, this indicates that immigrants do not form a homogeneous group.

Many immigrants leave

Migration is not always a one-way process; it implies not only immigration but also emigration. This subject is considered in particular in Chapters 2 and 3. According to Favre, Föllmi, and Zweimüller, a third of immigrants emigrate during the year of arrival and half of them stay for more than three years, after which time the percentage of emigrations falls considerably. In Chapter 2 Philippe Wanner shows that 60% of persons who immigrated in 2000 had left Switzerland again within ten years. The percentage of people leaving varies greatly by nationality. Among Portuguese nationals the rate was 34%, among German, French and Italian citizens it ranged from 60% to 64%. In addition to nationality, it is unsurprising to note that a person's residence status also plays a role in emigration. Entitlement to social security can be a major deterrent to migrants considering a return home. Monica Budowski, Eveline Odermatt, and Sebastien Schief examine this subject in Chapter 5. Migrants may decide not to return to their country of origin for fear of losing their entitlement to social security. Social insurance agreements between Switzerland and the countries of origin play an important role here.

Internal migration is common but mostly local

As defined by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) migration is not only movement across international borders. Jonathan Zufferey addresses the subject of internal migration, i.e. migration flows within Switzerland, in Chapter 6. His research shows that every year, 9.2% of the population change their place of residence and that an average person moves 7.5 times in their life. The distances moved, however, tend to be quite short and most people move home within the same commune. Moves of more than 100 kilometres concern only 2.2% of internal migration. Only very rarely do people move across the country's language borders. There are also differences at cantonal level in internal migration: A comparatively small number of moves are made away from cantons with large agglomerations. The main factors influencing internal migration are a person's age and their migration background. Other factors also affect internal migration such as changing family circumstances, education and work. These are more likely to affect younger people and those with a better level of education.

Integration

As mentioned above in relation to the relevant terminology, the term integration is used when dealing with aspects of *taking part* in contrast to participation *as having a part in society*. The following findings on integration are therefore largely limited to the aspect of taking part.

The extent of a group's integration can be described as the situation at a given time or as a process. When describing a situation, we compare the level of integration of various groups of people in a certain area of life in society (e.g. labour market participation). Integration (but also 'disintegration') should, however, not be considered as a situation but more as a process, i.e. a gradual change towards alignment (or growing apart) in a given period of time or in comparison between different cohorts. In this section our focus will be mainly on the *process* of integration.

The 68 indicators of the FSO's integration monitoring system provide initial indications of the degree and evolution of the integration of the population with a migration background. Despite covering a range of topics, divided into 11 areas of life, the indicator-based monitoring system presents certain omissions. The chapters in this publication help, at least in part, to fill these gaps. The monitoring is descriptive in nature and cannot cover all aspects of integration processes. The indicators alone are not able to explain cause and effect, and additional analyses of processes and causality are necessary to complement them. In the first instance, these complementary analyses present the integration process based on longitudinal data on immigration cohorts. As outlined above (see section on data, methodology and indicators), these longitudinal data are needed to obtain reliable findings on integration processes. Today we are able to analyse longitudinal data in the fields of labour market integration and labour income for several immigration cohorts. Other complementary analyses focus on the material standard of living. Although the integration monitoring does include a comparison of the income situation of households with and without a migration background it lacks indicators on household wealth. This publication combines such a complementary analysis with a comparison of the situation in Switzerland and in Germany.

Successful but partly incomplete labour market integration

Migrants are able to gain access to the labour market quickly and to increase their income from employment. Chapter 3 by Favre, Föllmi, and Zweimüller shows that migrants are generally quick to find work in Switzerland and that although their employment rate in the year of immigration is low, it rises the longer they stay. Although their labour participation in the year of immigration is considerably lower than that of persons born in Switzerland, the gap closes over time, without, however, completely disappearing (after 5 years from 16 percentage points to 4 percentage points for men, from 37 to 13 percentage points for women). Labour market integration varies depending on the socio-demographic group considered: Persons born abroad with a low level of education enjoy better and faster labour market integration than migrants with a higher level of education (and than persons born in Switzerland). The region of origin is also important: People from Southern Europe are more quickly integrated than those from Northwest or Eastern Europe or from third countries. Lastly, the unemployment rate, which at the start of immigration is lower among migrants than among persons born in Switzerland, rises in parallel with their labour market integration as the length of their stay increases.

Chapter 2 by Wanner shows that migrants can quickly increase their initially low income from employment (in comparison with the population as a whole) the longer they stay. The gap in average income from employment decreases considerably, especially in the first years following immigration (by approximately 10 to 15 percentage points). This applies to all migrant cohorts. Overall this indicates a successful integration process, borne out by the generally positive assessment of migrants regarding their professional situation. The integration effect tends to diminish, however, especially among men, after a stay of more than five years and the income gap may not be completely closed even after 15 years. However, the chapters by Wanner and by Favre, Föllmi, and Zweimüller also show that there are considerable differences in wage growth (and wage level) depending on the country of origin. This means that with an increasing length of stay, the wage gap between different migration groups increases, for example between (well-paid) Germans, whose income has grown the most and is considerably higher than that of the population as a whole, and employed persons from Italy, Portugal or third countries.

Lower income and wealth in households with a migration background

Chapter 4, by Ravazzini, Halbmeier, and Suter, shows that migrants in Switzerland and Germany have a lower household equivalent income than the population as a whole. Household size is an important factor here: Households with a migration background tend to be larger and have to share their income and wealth with more people than households with no migration background. In Switzerland this is the main reason for differences in household income, whereas in Germany the population with a migration background also has considerably lower household income overall.

Households with a migration background have fewer assets and a low rate of home ownership. This rate is lower in Switzerland than in Germany where socio-demographic characteristics (especially age, education level and household size) and economic factors such as household income and home ownership account for a much larger portion of the differences in wealth between households with and without a migration background than is the case in Switzerland. This suggests that in contrast to Germany, migrants in Switzerland are greatly disadvantaged when it comes to home ownership.

Increase in social integration through voluntary work

In addition to economic integration, a process of increasing social and cultural integration can also be seen. Chapter 2 by Wanner shows that the share of migrants undertaking voluntary work in sport associations and social, political or cultural organisations depends amongst other things on the length of time they have been in Switzerland. Persons who arrived in 2013 or earlier were more likely to be involved in voluntary work than younger migration cohorts.

Participation

According to the law on foreign nationals, migrants are required to familiarise themselves with the social conditions and way of life in Switzerland and, in particular, to learn a national language. In the context of a pluralistic society, this requirement implies 'openness on the part of the Swiss population' and requires that they 'take account of [the] diversity' of the foreign population (Art. 4 and 53 Foreign Nationals and Integration Act). Recognition of diversity (lifestyle, socio-cultural references and facial features, etc.) is an important prerequisite if different groups in society are to get on together. Equally important is fighting discrimination, which can sometimes lead to tensions and defensive reactions as well as undermining what has already been achieved or the existing (power) structure.

Ultimately, dealing with conflict constructively and accepting resistance and tension are what characterise a society as heterogeneous as in Switzerland. It is a question of accommodating political and cultural conflict, of building bridges and finding (institutional) ways of coping with challenges. The country has often, if not always, succeeded in this. Politics and the cantonal authorities, who create the overall framework for everyday participation, are particularly solicited in this regard. In other words, the implementation of migration and integration policy is mainly the responsibility of the cantons, towns and communes with employers, social partners and migrant associations playing an important role. The number of studies discussing migration and integration policies and their effectiveness, however, is still relatively small (see Ruedin et al. 2019)

Population structure influences cantonal migration practices

As shown in Chapter 7 by Marion Aeberli and Gianni D'Amato, the degree of inclusivity in the cantons is closely related to the population's attitudes. The more diverse a population structure is and the broader the population's attitudes towards migration and minority groups, the more inclusive the canton's integration and naturalisation practices are. Politics in the cantons are also important here—in terms of the political orientation of government and parliament but also with regard to the results of popular votes. But the authors also note that 'the path to inclusion is not one-way' and in fact policy frameworks and individual attitudes have an influence one another. These relationships highlight the inextricable interaction between a host society's potential for integration, immigrants and the role of politics. A canton's naturalisation policy, for example, acts as an indicator of its ability to adapt the institutional framework to social change, thus encouraging the participation of new members.

Influence of gender and origin

Several of the chapters bear out the fact that in addition to the overall conditions, the economy plays an extremely important role in the labour market participation and social inclusion of migrants. This applies in particular to persons from EU/EFTA states, who settle in Switzerland primarily for professional reasons, but also to migrants from third countries who are recognised as an important source of skilled labour. In contrast, highly qualified women from third countries seem to have greater difficulty in entering the labour market, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 by Favre, Föllmi, and Zweimüller. The authors suggest that this is because for married women, the decision to migrate is mainly driven by the husband's professional situation. Drawing from the relevant literature, it can also be assumed that should these women experience reduced labour market access due to non-recognition of their qualifications, or discrimination, they possibly do not wish nor have to accept low-skilled jobs in sectors experiencing labour shortages (Jey Aratnam 2012; Riaño and Baghdadi 2007; Sandoz 2019).

Importance of social rights

In principle, since the introduction of the new law on foreign nationals (2008), practically no significant formal barriers exist to hinder the economic participation of migrants, with the exception of asylum seekers, whose numbers are relatively low. The same cannot be said for migrants' participation in social security as shown in Chapter 5 by Budowski, Odermatt, and Schief, based on the example of EU/EFTA citizens. Entitlement to social assistance is very limited in the first year after arrival and receipt of social assistance can lead to the subsequent withdrawal of their residence permit. Social insurance benefits are often only available when contributions have been paid and depending on the agreement with the country of origin may be subject to restrictions. But even when the right to participate in these insurances exists, the complexity of the system and lack of knowledge of the benefits to which they might be entitled leads to migrants not receiving social assistance. The authors also point out that overall, EU/EFTA migrants contribute more to social security than they actually withdraw from it. However, the chapter also states that knowledge about this subject in Switzerland is still sparse and further studies are required. Experience shows that it is easier to calculate costs than benefits, which can often lead to the latter being neglected in the relevant calculations, with biased results.

Participation, socio-economic factors and right of residence

After the Second World War and until the 1990s, in Switzerland the labour market was characterised by a certain class structure, the effects of which are still felt today. With migrants occupying the bottom rung, Swiss nationals had an opportunity to climb the professional ladder. It is barely an overstatement to say that Switzerland's working class was—and still is—largely composed of migrants. The situation has, however, changed in the past 20 years and an increasing number of migrants are to be found among highly qualified managers. In certain corridors of power, there is an over-representation of highly qualified and sometimes highly mobile professionals with a migration background. From a historic perspective this is nothing new but shows that care must be taken when speaking of *the* population with a migration background.

An insight into this phenomenon is given in Chapter 4, which examines not only the overall income and wealth gap by migration status but also looks at significant differences between migrants of different origins. A wide range of varying socio-economic circumstances lies behind the average values given. The authors demonstrate that migrants from former Yugoslavia, Africa and Turkey have considerably lower income and wealth—and as a consequence are at greater risk of poverty—than migrants from other regions. We know that opportunities to take part in society and to become part of it are all the more limited for poor, third country nationals who are confronted in several areas of life with mechanisms excluding them economically and socially as well as affecting their right to residence.

The findings in Chapter 1 on self-rated health are particularly revealing: Experience has shown that this integration indicator is a reliable indicator of the population's mental and physical well-being. Similarly to morbidity and life expectancy, there is a relatively strong correlation between self-rated health and socio-economic status. The author shows that until the age of 40, there is hardly any difference between the population with a migration background and that without. After this age the gap gradually widens to the disadvantage of the first generation. In other words, the latter are much less likely to say they are in (very) good health than people with no experience of migration. These are probably for the most part migrants from Southern Europe (former seasonal workers), the Balkan countries and Turkey who worked in low-skilled, physically demanding jobs. Studies confirm that the length of stay of these persons plays a decisive role in their health. Health disorders increased significantly the longer these migrants stayed, even after controlling for age and sex, compared with recent migrants or persons with no migration background (Guggisberg et al. 2011).

Conclusion and outlook

The data and findings presented here show once again that *the* population with a migration background does not exist in Switzerland. Every chapter demonstrates the considerable diversity of people with a migration background that has grown further in recent decades. Researchers in migration use the term superdiversity to describe populations that are extremely diverse not only in their geographical origins but also in terms of their socio-economic characteristics and backgrounds. Due to Switzerland's two-pronged approach to migration (Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons and the Foreign Nationals and Integration Act), different conditions apply to admission and residence depending on whether a person is an EU/EFTA national or from a third country. As underlined in the articles presented here, this aspect must be taken into consideration in the analyses.

With regard to labour immigration, the majority of immigrants make a relatively swift entry into the labour market. This holds true not only for highly-skilled workers but also for poorly educated workers. On the other hand, depending on a person's nationality and gender, significant differences in labour participation, unemployment rates, income and wealth exist even years after arrival in Switzerland. Analyses are all the more informative, therefore, when they take into account not only the migration background itself but also factors concerning a person's social situation, gender, their country of origin and residence status. When a combination of such characteristics is used, differentiation by migration status can reveal the wide range of integration pathways taken by certain population groups. Analysis based on nationality alone fails to demonstrate this diversity (because not all population groups have the same opportunities for naturalisation, for example). The differentiation between the first and second generation of persons with a migration background opens up a vast research field, as can be seen from the indicator on self-rated health. Further research on the Confederation's strategy on equal opportunities and health will also be valuable.

New multivariate and longitudinal analyses will be useful to gain an understanding of the diversity of the profiles and integration pathways of people with a migration background. Such analytical approaches are better suited to the high level of mobility that characterises labour migration in particular, which is the focus of the chapters presented here. This is an area in which research has hitherto been lacking and the linkage of registry data to the FSO's integration indicator system holds great potential. Another aspect of this mobility is the emigration of migrants or their return home. More than half of immigrants leave Switzerland in the medium to long term.

To complement the analysis of this phenomenon, it would be worth investigating the international and internal mobility of the population without a migration background. This has until now been neglected. Internal migration—which is mainly local in character—is also influenced by the migration background of persons moving. Moves from one language region to another are rare. Today, legislation governing the right of residence imposes hardly any restrictions on the geographic and professional mobility of foreign nationals, with the exception of persons in the asylum

process. To learn more about the latter group's integration processes, multivariate analyses with a long-term perspective would certainly provide a suitable approach. They would also be useful in understanding the integration of migrants' relatives, who for the most part did not migrate in search of work.

In recent decades, the scientific focus on international migration has contributed considerably to a better understanding of migration backgrounds and integration processes. Today, however, more attention is paid to the relationship between the context in which migrants are admitted into Switzerland and migration as a factor in social change overall. Migration is thus increasingly a transversal research subject, spanning economics, education, social policy, health, art and culture. Nevertheless, migration policy will no doubt continue to play an important role between the various policy stakeholders and at different political levels.

As shown in the last chapter of this publication, the cantons are called upon to take the lead in terms of integration and participation. Each canton's practice with regard to migrants is determined not only by its political orientation but also by its demographic structure and the attitudes of the population. Too little is currently known about the mechanisms underlying the practices in place. The FSO's integration monitoring is a valuable tool for the analysis of such interactions, in that it compares and contrasts characteristics and particularities and at the same time enables comparison of the attitudes of the populations with and without a migration background. In addition, further studies are needed to allow a comparison between these aspects and the relevant political indicators (on naturalisation, education, language requirements and cases of hardship, etc.).[3] Choosing the indicators will not be an easy task as the amount of leeway given to the cantons varies depending on whether they are dealing with EU/EFTA nationals or those from third countries.

Ultimately, as far as migration is concerned, the observations made over decades will continue to hold true: International, societal, economic and political change can happen quickly and unpredictably. Official statistics and research—but also politics—will need to be flexible, pragmatic and innovative. Investigations must be backed up by data, and appropriate discussions must involve stakeholders from a wide range of fields and disciplines. *A Panorama of Swiss Society* aims to make a contribution to such discussions.

[3] Currently only three of the integration indicators are directly related to politics (naturalisation rate, foreign nationals' right to vote, probability of obtaining C-Permit).

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1 Population with a migration background: integration prospects and comparisons with the native population

Florence Bartosik

Abstract

This chapter presents three typologies used to describe the population being measured for its integration in Switzerland, i.e. migrants and their descendants. Based on three different selection criteria—nationality, place of birth and migration status—the aim is to show that these typologies do not take into account the same migration experiences and that they in fact refer to different population groups. The system of integration indicators on the 'population with a migration background', developed at the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) is then presented, focussing on the labour market, education and health. The results first show a decline in unemployment rates within the second generation compared with the first generation. The latter, however, has a higher rate of tertiary level qualifications, followed by the population without a migration background. At the same age, people from the population without a migration background are more likely to self-rate their health as good or very good than those with a migration background.

1.1 Three population typologies

Since the end of the Second World War, different migratory flows have shaped Switzerland's population: in 2018, foreign nationals accounted for 25% of the population and Swiss nationals 75%. But who are these foreigners? What has their experience of migration been like? Do they have the same opportunities in various areas of life as Swiss nationals?

Swiss legislation states that integration must enable foreign nationals staying in Switzerland legally and for an extended duration to participate in the country's economic, social and cultural life, even if they do not have Swiss nationality.[1] This process of integration can be examined by comparing the statistical values shown by foreigners and Swiss nationals—tested by certain socio-demographic dimensions—in various areas of life.

The population can be classified according to three typologies related to nationality and place of birth to target the groups whose integration is measured at the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). These three typologies are also used to study migration phenomena in Switzerland:

- population by nationality;
- population by place of birth;
- population by migration status.

The 'foreign population' is a broad concept for which data are available in different registers (population registers, or the Central Migration Information System, etc.). It has been shown, however, that the acquisition of a Swiss passport does not in itself guarantee equal opportunities (see also Chapter 7). Since the end of the Second World War, immigration in Europe has increased constantly and become so diversified that the criterion of nationality is of even less use than before to fully analyse the phenomenon of immigration. In fact, the legal criterion of nationality no longer corresponds to the situation of the population with a migration background (Krekels and Poulain 1996, 267–268). The concept of the 'population born abroad'—whether of Swiss or foreign nationality—is more accurate, but it only takes into account the migration experience of individuals. To find out whether individuals have a migration background, the migration status of their parents should also be taken into account (through their place of birth). This is why the concept of 'population with a migration background', which should be adapted to each country's cultural and historical context, is preferred in Switzerland if the data allow it. It aims to replace the simplistic distinction between 'nationals' and 'foreigners' and is not based solely on the principle of citizenship (or of place of birth) but also takes into consideration the migration experience of individuals and their parents (FSO 2009).

Not all statistical sources used to measure migration and integration, however, enable the migration status of the permanent resident population to be deduced, as they do not all provide the necessary variables for its construction. For this reason it is sometimes necessary to resort to making a distinction by nationality and, if the variable is available, in combination with place of birth.

[1] Ch. 8 Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA): www.admin.ch → Federal law → Classified compilation → Internal laws → 142.20 Federal Act of 16 December 2005 on Foreign Nationals (FNA) (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

1.1.1 Definitions and key figures

Foreign population

The foreign population includes anyone residing in Switzerland at a given time, who does not have Swiss nationality. The permanent foreign resident population is the reference population in statistics on the foreign population. It includes all foreign nationals who hold a residence permit[2] valid for a minimum duration of 12 months or who have resided in Switzerland for a total of 12 months (B/C/L/F or N permit[3] or FDFA permit (international officials, diplomats and members of their family)). The data shown in this section are based on the FSO's Population and Households Statistics (STATPOP) which are part of the annual population census system.

Population born abroad

The place of birth enables a distinction to be made between foreign-born or first generation migrants and subsequent generations (born in Switzerland or second or subsequent generation). This variable, as well as the length of residence in Switzerland, is important when measuring the sedentariness of the permanent resident population of foreign nationals. The data shown below are also based on STATPOP.

Population with a migration background

In international discussions on immigration and integration, the term population with a migration background is used with growing frequency. This concept aims to replace the simple distinction between citizens (or nationals) and foreign citizens (or foreign nationals), which does not take into account whether individuals are themselves immigrants (first generation) or have a direct connection to migration through their parents' migration experience (second generation).[4]

As is the case in many countries, and based on UNECE international recommendations (2006, revised in 2015), in 2009 the FSO developed a population typology by migration status for Switzerland, taking into account not only the nationality and country of birth of individuals, but also that of their parents (FSO 2009, Kristensen et al. 2017). The generation of an individual's parents is the oldest one taken into account and thus determines whether a person has a migration background.

The 'population with a migration background' group as defined by the FSO includes foreign nationals and naturalised persons, except for those born in Switzerland and whose parents were both born in Switzerland as well as Swiss-born persons whose two parents were born abroad.

Typology of the population by migration status **T1.1**

Place of birth	Nationality	Place of birth of the parents		
		2 in Switzerland	1 in Switzerland, 1 abroad	2 abroad
Swiss	Swiss at birth	o	o	II
	Swiss by naturalisation	o	II	II
	Foreigner	o	II	II
Abroad	Swiss at birth	o	o	I
	Swiss by naturalisation	I	I	I
	Foreigner	I	I	I

I Population with a migration background, 1st generation
II Population with a migration background, 2nd generation
o Population without a migration background

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Since 2012, the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) has enabled identification of the population with a migration background and the reconstruction of its different generations. The SLFS's reference population is the permanent resident population aged 15 and older.

Key figures in 2018

More than 2 million foreign nationals live in Switzerland, i.e. 25% of the permanent resident population. This proportion is the result of different waves of migration, a restrictive naturalisation policy, and a strong birth rate accompanied by a low mortality rate[5] among the foreign population.

Almost a third of the permanent resident population were born abroad (2 553 400 people). 68% of the population born abroad are foreign nationals; 32% are Swiss nationals. Almost a quarter of persons born abroad have been living in Switzerland for at least 20 years.

Some 38% of the permanent resident population aged 15 and over is made up of people with a migration background, i.e. 2.7 million out of more than 7 million. More than a third of this population have Swiss citizenship (974 000 people). More than 80% of the population with a migration background was born abroad and therefore belongs to the first generation (2 165 000 persons). The remaining fifth were born in Switzerland and belong to the second generation (521 000). The population

[2] Anyone working during their stay or staying for more than 3 months in Switzerland must have authorisation from the cantonal Migration Offices. Three types of permit are issued to foreigners: short-term residence permit (less than one year, L permit), residence permit (limited stay, B permit) and the settlement permit (unlimited stay, C permit). (SEM: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/themen/aufenthalt.html; last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[3] In the context of asylum, the F permit is issued to persons admitted on a provisional basis and the N permit to asylum seekers. (SEM: https://www.sem.admin.ch/sem/en/home/themen/aufenthalt/nicht_eu_efta.html; last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[4] The grandparents' place of birth is not taken into account as this variable is not available in the data.

[5] Mostly due to naturalisations and returns to the country of origin.

without a migration background comprises mostly Swiss-born but also some naturalised persons and foreign nationals from the third or subsequent generations.

Box 1.1: Persons younger than 15

The SLFS does not enable observation of children under the age of 15 as this survey is targeted at persons aged 15 and over (persons of working age). However, information can be obtained regarding their place of birth in combination with nationality from STATPOP data.

Almost three-quarters of the population aged under 15 are Swiss and were born in Switzerland. The remaining quarter were either born abroad (10%; 8% foreign nationality and 2% Swiss nationality), or born in Switzerland and of foreign nationality (19%).

If we regard foreign nationals under the age of 15 born in Switzerland and born abroad as representing the population with a migration background, in 2018 this amounted to almost 345 000 persons. To this figure we can add the population with a migration background aged 15 and over, which comprises 2 686 000 persons. We can therefore estimate that there are more than 3 million people with a migration background in the total population of almost 8.5 million. In other word, 36% of the permanent resident population have a migration background.

With the exception of Swiss-born persons who have at least one parent born in Switzerland, all persons born abroad are considered as belonging to the first generation (more than 2.1 million persons in the population aged 15 and over in 2018). This group is composed of:

- foreign nationals born abroad (comprising slightly more than 70% of the group, i.e. 1 542 000 persons);
- Swiss-born persons born abroad and whose two parents were born abroad (23 000);
- foreign-born naturalised persons (600 000).

The second generation, i.e. persons with a migration background (via at least one of their parents), but who were born in Switzerland (521 000 persons), is composed of naturalised persons (52%), foreign nationals of whom at least one parent was born abroad (33%) and Swiss-born nationals both of whose parents were born abroad (15%).

Permanent resident population by migration status, 2018 **G1.1**



Source: FSO – SLFS © FSO 2020

We can see in the Graph G1.2 that the population whose migration experience and integration in Switzerland are to be measured, is differently defined in the three population typologies described.[6] This graph confirms the fact that concentrating on nationality alone excludes a part of the population that despite possessing Swiss nationality nevertheless has ties—direct or indirect—to migration. While a quarter of the permanent resident population aged 15 or more are foreign, almost 30% of the people concerned were born abroad and 38% have a migration background.

[6] For persons with a migration background, only those aged 15 or over are included.

Permanent resident population, 2018

By three population typologies **G1.2**



1 aged 15 and over

Sources: FSO – SLFS, STATPOP © FSO 2020

1.1.2 Trends over time

Since 2010, the population of foreign nationals has seen less growth than the population born abroad (+2.7 percentage points compared with +3.5 percentage points). Since 2012, the population with a migration background has increased by 2.8 percentage points.[7] Analysis by generation shows that the proportion of the population with a migration background from the first generation has risen by 2.5 percentage points since 2012. The increase is smaller among the population from the second generation (+0.3 percentage point). The main reason for the increase in the population with a migration background is an increase in the population born abroad.

Trends in permanent resident population, 2010–2018

By three population typologies **G1.3**



1 aged 15 and over

Sources: FSO – SLFS, STATPOP © FSO 2020

7 Data by migration status are not available for years prior to 2012.

1.1.3 Structure by age

The average age in the foreign national population is 37. It is 45 among persons born abroad. The average age in the population with a migration background is 45 as well. In the total population, the average age is 42. It can therefore be seen that the population born abroad and that with a migration background show a lower average age than that of the population of foreign nationals.

The dependency rate of old people is the ratio between the number of the population aged 65 and over, who generally do not work, and the number of the population of working age (aged 20 to 64). There is little variation in the dependency rate of old people between the three population typologies.

The foreign permanent resident population has the lowest old-age dependency ratio. It has 11 persons aged 65 and older per 100 persons of working age (aged 20 to 64).

The permanent resident population born abroad, in contrast, has the greatest old-age dependency ratio. It has 19 persons aged 65 and older per 100 persons of working age. As the population born abroad includes only the first generation, this result could indicate that the first generation living in Switzerland is, on average, older than the second generation.

The old-age dependency ratio in the whole working-age population within the population with a migration background, lies between that of the foreign population and that of the population born abroad (16 persons aged 65 or older per 100 persons of working age).

In the total population, the old-age dependency ratio is 30 persons aged 65 and over per 100 persons of working age.

The population of foreign nationals has a lower old-age dependency ratio than the other population groups because work is one of the main reasons for immigrating. Furthermore, some foreigners become Swiss before reaching retirement age and subsequently belong to the group of older Swiss nationals. Some foreigners leave Switzerland after having worked here for several years. Through the effect of migration flows, they are replaced by younger, newly arriving foreigners (see also Chapters 2.5 and 3.5).

Old-age dependency ratio[1], 2018

By three population typologies **G1.4**



1 Ratio between the size of old-age population, usually economically inactive (65 and older), and the size of working-age population (aged 20 to 64).
It is expressed as the number of persons aged 65 and older per 100 persons aged 20 to 64.

Sources: FSO – SLFS, STATPOP © FSO 2020

1.1.4 Structure by sex

The structure of the permanent resident population by sex varies slightly depending on the population typology chosen. It is important to bear in mind that the structure of the population by sex is influenced by its age structure. Younger populations (for example the foreign population) tend to comprise more males, whereas older populations (for example the population born abroad) tend to comprise more females.

The foreign permanent resident population tends to contain more males. 53% are men whereas 47% are women, i.e. 113 men for 100 women.

There are slightly more women born abroad than men (96 men for 100 women).

Lastly, the permanent resident population with a migration background is divided equally between the sexes (100 men for 100 women). However, in contrast to the other groups, the population with a migration background from the second generation tends to have more men (52%) than women (48%). This result may be explained by the fact that the second generation is on average younger than the first generation and that the number of men is generally higher than that of women among the younger populations.

Within the total population, the sex ratio is 98 men to 100 women.

Number of men per 100 women, 2018

By three population typologies — G1.5



[1] aged 15 and over

Sources: FSO – SLFS, STATPOP © FSO 2020

1.1.5 Structure by nationality

The majority of foreign nationals residing in Switzerland on a permanent basis come from Europe. The 1 416 000 citizens from EU-28/EFTA member countries were the largest foreign community in 2018 (66%). The remaining balance was made up of 730 000 citizens mainly originating from[8]:

- other European countries that are not members of the EU-28/EFTA (17%);
- other countries in the world (17%).

[8] 2300 cases cannot be attributed to a country (0.1%).

With regard to the permanent resident population born abroad, just under half are also members of an EU-28/EFTA member country (45%). Almost one third are of Swiss nationality. The remainder of this population are nationals of a European, non-EU-28/EFTA country (11%) or of a country from another part of the world.

Distribution by nationality group within the population with a migration background is similar to that of the population born abroad. Less than half of the population with a migration background holds a passport from one of the EU-28/EFTA member countries (44%). More than a third are of Swiss nationality. The remainder are either nationals of another European country (11%) or from a country in another part of the world (9%). Distribution by nationality group within the first generation is fairly similar to that of the population with a migration background. In the second generation, more than 65% are Swiss nationals and almost a quarter of them are citizens of an EU-28 and EFTA member country.

Nationalities by political subgroups, 2018

By three population typologies — G1.6



[1] aged 15 and over

Sources: FSO – SLFS, STATPOP © FSO 2020

The most common nationality among the population of foreign nationals was Italian (15%) followed by German (14%) and Portuguese (12%).

Among the foreign-born population, Swiss nationality was the most common (32%).[9] German nationality (11%), followed by Italian (9%) are the second and third most common nationalities.

[9] These are mainly persons acquiring Swiss citizenship by naturalisation.

Swiss nationality is also the most common nationality seen among the population with a migration background (36%), followed by Italian (10%) and German (10%).

Top 10 most frequent nationalities, 2018

By three population typologies **G1.7**



[1] aged 15 and over

Sources: FSO – SLFS, STATPOP

1.2 Household migration status

The FSO's structural survey distinguishes three different household types in the host society according to the migration status of household members. A household's migration status is defined as follows:

- If a single father or single mother or both members of a couple (with or without child(ren)) or any person in a non-family household or other type of household was/were not born abroad or do not have a foreign nationality, the household is not considered to have a migration background.
- If a single father or single mother or both members of a couple (with or without child(ren)) or all persons in a non-family household or other type of household was/were born abroad or have a foreign nationality, the household is considered to have a migration background.
- If one of the two members of a couple (with or without child(ren)) or at least one of the persons in a non-family household or other type of household was born abroad or has a foreign nationality and the others were not or do not, the household is considered to have a mixed migration status. A household comprising a single father or single mother cannot be a mixed migration/no migration household.

In the years from 2014 to 2016, there were more than 3.6 million households in Switzerland, 29% of which had a migration background (more than 1 million) and 12% of which were of mixed migration/no migration. These rates are slightly higher than those from 2011 to 2013 (27% and 12%).

Regardless of migration status, the permanent resident population aged 15 and over mostly live in a household comprising a couple with child(ren) (42%), in a couple household without children (29%) or in a single-person household (19%).

39% of the population without a migration background live in a household comprising a couple with child(ren). Populations from the first and the second or subsequent generations have even higher rates (45% and 59% respectively).

32% of the population without a migration background live in a 'couple without children' household. The population from the second or subsequent generations is twice as unlikely to live in this type of household (15%). With a rate of 26%, the first generation lies between the two population groups.

The rates for single-person households are relatively similar in all migration status groups, ranging from 12% in the second or subsequent generations to 20% in the population with no migration background.

At the same age, the population with a migration background is almost always more likely to live in a household with child(ren) than that with no migration background. This latter group, in contrast, is more likely to live in a couple household without children, with the exception of one age group: In the 15–24 age group, the population without a migration background is slightly more present among couple households with child(ren) than the population with a migration background (75% compared with 73%).

Private households by type of household, 2014–2016

By migration status **G1.8**



[1] incl. persons whose migration status could not be established
[2] incl. foreigners from the 3rd or subsequent generations

Source: FSO – Structural Survey © FSO 2020

1.3 Definition of migration status: international comparison

Apart from a few exceptions, to define a person's migration status, most countries use variables on individuals' nationality and country of birth, but also that of their parents. However, the way in which each country defines migration status and the generation to which an individual belongs depends on its notion of citizenship (e.g. by descent or by place of birth) and on its history.

The examples below show how migration status and generations are defined in two of Switzerland's neighbouring countries, France and Germany.

1.3.1 France

In France, controversy has reigned for more than 20 years in academia, politics and the media concerning the question of whether it is acceptable to produce statistics on ethnicity to analyse social phenomena and to include them in statistical observation tools such as the census (Simon 2014). The French Data Protection Act of 6 January 1978 ('loi informatique et libertés'[10]) forbids the collection and recording of information that discloses, directly or indirectly, a person's racial or ethnic origins or their religious affiliations. In France, statistics are based on a person's current nationality with all 'racial' origin eliminated from official statistics. This means that with the exception of derogations granted to certain research institutes, it is forbidden to compile statistics on Kabyles, Blacks or Jews, etc. This is due to worries that data could be misused or that certain population groups could be stigmatised. In passing the Act on Immigration Control, Integration and Asylum (loi relative à la maîtrise de l'immigration, à l'intégration et à l'asile[11]) of 2007, the French Constitutional Council decided that the collection of anonymous data is allowed solely for studies which need objective criteria related to ethnicity such as skin colour or religion, etc. (such as studies on discrimination).

Several studies, such as the one by Berchet and Jusot in 2010, cross-reference individuals' nationality with their country of birth and that of their parents, in order to distinguish three migration profiles: the French population (81%), the first generation immigrant population (9%) and the second generation immigrant population (10%). The first group are individuals born with French nationality (regardless of their country of birth) whose parents were born in France or born with French nationality abroad. First generation immigrants are those born with a foreign nationality abroad regardless of the nationality and origin of their parents. Second generation immigrants are those born with French nationality in France, at least one of whose parents was born with foreign nationality abroad. This definition is currently used by the French national institute for statistics and economic studies (INSEE) and the national institute for demographic studies (INED)

Meurs and Pailhé (2008) go even further by making a distinction between 'mixed second generation' and the 'second generation'. A distinction is thus made between children born to a couple who are both immigrants and those in which an immigrant parent is married to a non-immigrant parent. The 'second generation' thus comprises persons born in France both of whose parents were born abroad as well as the 'mixed second generation' who are people born in France and one of whose parents was born abroad and the other in France, sometimes also referred to as 'generation 2.5' (Lessard-Phillipps et al. 2017). This means that more than 8% of respondents belong to the mixed second generation. 6% come from the second generation. The remainder (86%) are considered to be French natives. These are people born in France, both of whose parents were born in France (third or subsequent generations).

[10] https://www.legifrance ouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000886460 (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[11] https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/decision/2007/2007557DC.htm (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

1.3.2 Germany

In Germany, an individual's migration status is determined on the basis of migration, nationality and naturalisation. This means that a person is considered as having a migration background if they or at least one of their parents did not have German nationality at birth (Statistisches Bundesamt 2018). In 2018, 24% of the resident population in Germany had a migration background. The population with a migration background comprises:

- foreign nationals (immigrants and non-immigrants);
- naturalised immigrants and non-immigrants;
- ethnic German resettlers ('Spätaussiedler');[12]
- people who have obtained German nationality through adoption by a German national.
- children born with German nationality from the four groups mentioned above.

Germany uses a narrow definition of migration status, i.e. only information about parents living in the same household applies.[13]

Among persons with a migration background, a distinction is made between those who have directly experienced migration themselves ('Personen mit eigener Migrationserfahrung') and those who have not (but who have an indirect link to migration through at least one of their parents: 'Personen ohne eigene Migrationserfahrung'). 16% of the total resident population have direct migration experience, whereas in Germany in 2018, 7% have no direct experience.

The group with direct migration experience can be divided into foreign and German nationals. The latter group can be divided into naturalised German nationals and ethnic German resettlers. Regarding those with no direct experience of migration, a distinction is also made between foreign and German nationals. This group can be further differentiated into naturalised Germans and Germans with at least one parent with a migration background. In Germany, no distinction is made between the second and third generation in the group of people with a migration background born in Germany. This is because their parents may belong to different generations and it is impossible to decide which parent should be chosen to determine the generation.

Persons displaced during the Second World War and their descendants do not belong to the population with a migration background. The same applies to individuals born abroad with German nationality and whose parents have no migration background. These foreign-born people are not considered as having a migration background because they and their parents were born with German nationality.

Switzerland and France use the same variables to determine migration status: individuals' nationality and place of birth as well as the place of birth of their parents. However, although they use the same variables, these two countries differ slightly in how they determine who is considered as having a migration background. Switzerland has a higher rate of people with a migration background than that seen in France (37% and 29% respectively). Germany, on the other hand, uses individuals' nationality and that of their parents to determine their migration status. This country has the lowest rate of persons with a migration background (24%).

1.4 Measuring integration in Switzerland

Swiss legislation states that integration must enable foreign nationals who are residing legally in Switzerland for an extended period of time to participate in the country's economic, social and cultural life.[14] Integration is a slow process requiring input from both the migrants and the host society, aiming to create equal opportunities between Swiss and foreign nationals within Swiss society (Kristensen 2014).[15]

There is no clear definition of the concept of integration. However, three central aspects can be identified (Kristensen et al. 2017). Integration aims to:

- create equal opportunities and ensure equal treatment, giving everyone a fair chance to participate in political and societal decisions and guaranteeing everyone equal access to society's resources;
- reduce the gap in living standards between different groups of society;
- guarantee, as a precondition for equality of opportunity and reducing the gap in living standards, that the host society is welcoming towards the migrant or foreign population.

The fulfilment of the integration process can be measured by comparing statistics relating to foreign nationals in terms of access to various areas of life in our society with those recorded for Swiss nationals in a similar socio-economic and family situation. Gaps between these two sets of data provide an indication of how the integration process is working in Switzerland.

1.4.1 Population by migration status adapted to measure integration

The population with a migration background is slightly modified in order to measure integration and comprises all foreign nationals, including foreigners from the third or subsequent generations who are usually considered as having no migration background according to the basic typology of the population by migration status. Although they and their parents were born in Switzerland, as they are not Swiss, foreigners from the third generation are included here because they do not enjoy the same political and economic rights as Swiss nationals (Kristensen et al. 2017). This population also includes first generation naturalised

[12] These are ethnic Germans who lived in Eastern Europe, in particular in Poland and the Soviet Union and who have returned to Germany to live there permanently.

[13] In contrast, the wider definition of migration status uses all information regarding the parents, regardless of whether they live with their children.

[14] Art. 4 Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA): www.admin.ch → Federal law → Classified compilation → Internal laws → 142.20 Federal Act of 16 December 2005 on Foreign Nationals (FNA) (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[15] Ch. 53 Federal Act on Foreign Nationals and Integration (FNIA): www.admin.ch → Federal law → Classified compilation → Internal laws → 142.20 Federal Act of 16 December 2005 on Foreign Nationals (FNA) (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

Swiss citizens, second generation naturalised Swiss citizens with at least one parent born abroad and Swiss nationals from birth both of whose parents were born abroad. This means that the population with a migration background—and especially the second generation—is slightly larger in this typology adapted for the measurement of integration (37.6%, i.e. +0.1 percentage point) than in the basic typology in 2018.

The population with no migration background can be used as a reference population for the subject of integration. It includes Swiss nationals from birth who have at least one parent born in Switzerland as well as naturalised persons born in Switzerland and both of whose parents were born in Switzerland. This population or the total population can be used to compare statistics relating to the target population whose integration is being measured in order to assess the equality of opportunities obtained in each area of life in society.

1.4.2 The FSO's system of integration indicators

The FSO has developed a system of indicators[16] to measure the integration of the population with a migration background. It comprises 68 indicators divided into the following 11 societal areas.[17]

- Social assistance and poverty;
- Culture, religion and media;
- Education and training;
- Family and demography;
- Language;
- Housing;
- Labour market;
- Politics;
- Healthcare;
- Racism, discrimination and security;
- Crime.

These areas and their importance in the integration process are founded partly on theoretical bases and partly on the principles and goals of the Confederation's integration policy.

The following three paragraphs show the results of three indicators from three different societal areas: labour market, education and health.

It is important to remember that migration status can by no means be considered as the only explanatory indicator for the differences found between various population groups. Other variables, such as level of education, professional status, age, sex, etc., can also explain the differences between these different population groups but also within them. These indicators do not, therefore, constitute a tool by which cause and effect can be analysed. They provide factual information but not a priori causal explanations. They cannot be used, therefore, to evaluate specific policy measures or integration tools. They can, however, be used as a basis for developing suitable policy measures and to study their consequences.

The three indicators shown below are calculated using data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS). Only people aged 15 or over are taken into account. For each of these examples, we first show the indicator's relevance and then the results broken down by migration status. Trends over time will also be presented. Other variables, such as gender, age, level of education and nationality are also included depending on their relevance.

Unemployment rate based on ILO definition[18]

Recommended as an indicator by the European Union (EU), unemployment indicates a lack of integration, of participation in or exclusion from a society's wealth. It can also indicate a person's lack of job-finding skills. This is one of the key indicators for measuring the level of integration. Exclusion from employment is one of the main causes of poverty. Long-term exclusion has negative consequences on almost every aspect of life. A narrowing of the gap between the unemployment rates of different population groups would be a sign that labour market access is tending to become more equal. This trend would also involve the underlying variables such as education, language, recognition of qualifications or risks related to labour market participation.

Unemployment rate as defined by ILO, 2018

By migration status **G1.9**



[1] incl. persons whose migration status could not be established
[2] incl. foreigners from the 3rd or subsequent generations

Source: FSO – SLFS © FSO 2020

In 2018, the unemployment rate based on ILO definition was 5% in Switzerland. The population without a migration background has a rate of 3%; this is nearly 3 times less than the

[16] www.bfs.admin.ch → Look for statistics → Population → Migration and integration → Integration indicators (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[17] In a methodological report on the indicator system for the measurement of integration of the population with a migration background, Kristensen (2014) describes the different stages of constructing the system. The way in which such indicators are calculated, their relevance and a description of the sources used for their construction are also included.

[18] www.bfs.admin.ch → Trouver des statistiques → Education et science → Intégration sur le marché du travail → Degré tertiaire - Hautes écoles → Taux de chômage au sens du BIT (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

population with a migration background (almost 8%). The first generation has a rate of 8%, the second or subsequent generations 6% (see also Chapter 3.3.1).

Between 2012 and 2018, no statistically significant change can be seen in the unemployment rates of the different population groups observed.

In the population without a migration background and in the second or subsequent generations, the difference between male and female unemployment levels is not significant. Unemployment among women in the first generation, however, is significantly more common than among men (+1.8 percentage points). The higher unemployment rate among the first generation can, therefore, be partly explained by the higher unemployment rate of women in this population group.

Although unemployment rates are higher in the youngest age groups, the gap between the different population groups widens with age. Persons from the first generation aged 15 to 24, for example, have an unemployment rate that is twice as high as that of persons of the same age without a migration background. In the age groups older than 55, the ratio rises to three times as high.

Lastly, the unemployment rate of persons whose highest level of education is compulsory education is on average twice as high as for those having completed upper secondary level or tertiary education (8% compared with 5% and 4% respectively). In contrast, when comparing persons with the same education level from the population without a migration background and from the first generation, the gap is widest between tertiary degree holders. In this group, the first generation is three times more likely to be unemployed than persons without a migration background, whereas this ratio is less than 2 : 1 between persons with a compulsory education diploma.

Regardless of the generation to which individuals belong, EU-28 and EFTA citizens have lower unemployment rates than citizens of other European countries[19] or countries from elsewhere in the world. However, the gap between the unemployment rates of the first and second or subsequent generations shows almost no variation by the nationality group to which they belong. The only significant difference can be observed among citizens from other European countries, where first generation citizens have a higher unemployment rate than those from the second or subsequent generations.

Highest completed educational level

Recommended by the EU, this indicator shows the distribution of educational resources among the different population groups living in Switzerland. It is an essential indicator for structural integration and equality of opportunity in the education system. The level of education a person completes forms the base for their future participation in the education system and on the labour market. In most circumstances, the chances of integrating are reduced if no education has been completed. The higher the level of education completed, the better the other opportunities for structural integration. It is worth noting that many people aged between 15 and 30 are still in education and have therefore not yet reached their highest level of education.

Level of education, 2018

By migration status **G1.10**



[1] incl. persons whose migration status could not be established
[2] incl. foreigners from the 3rd or subsequent generations

Source: FSO – SLFS © FSO 2020

The first generation has the highest percentage of people with no post-compulsory education (27%). In second place are those from the second or subsequent generations (22%), followed by those with no migration background (14%). In respect of upper secondary level, people with no migration background and those from the second or subsequent generations have similar rates (52% and 51% respectively). The first generation has a lower percentage (35%). Around a third of persons with no migration background and from the first generation have completed tertiary level education (34% and 38%).[20] The second or subsequent generations has a lower percentage (28%).[21]

The share of people with no post-compulsory education fell significantly for all groups between 2013 and 2018. Regarding upper secondary level, the population as a whole, the population without a migration background and the first generation showed significantly decreasing rates between 2013 and 2018. With regard to tertiary level, an increase in rates can be seen in the majority of the populations observed.

[19] For the second generation, the difference between the unemployment rates of EU-28 and EFTA citizens and those from other European countries is not significant.

[20] The majority of migrants (first generation) are highly qualified (Wanner and Steiner 2018; see also Chapter 3.1.1).

[21] This percentage can be explained by the fact that the second generation is, on average, younger than the other population groups. Persons under the age of 25 constitute almost a third of the second generation. This age group accounts for 13% of the population without a migration background and 7% of the first generation. It has not yet had time to attain their highest level of education (cf. analyses broken down by age group).

The distribution of the different levels of education within the different population groups is more or less the same in each nationality group considered.

In contrast, whereas almost half as many women with no migration background hold a tertiary level diploma than men with no migration background (27% compared with 42%), the share of women with a migration background who hold a tertiary level diploma, regardless of their generation, is almost the same as that of men with the same migration status (35% compared with 37%).

At the same age, the population with a migration background from the first generation are twice as likely to have no post-compulsory education as the people without a migration background (27% compared with 14%). In the age groups ranging from 25 to 54 (25–34, 35–44 and 45–54), this ratio is almost three times greater. Persons from the first generation aged 35 to 44, for example, are conversely around seven times as likely to have no post-compulsory education as persons with no migration background (20% compared with 3%). For holders of a tertiary level diploma in the age groups beyond age 45, no significant difference can be seen between people of the second or subsequent generations and those with no migration background or between persons from the second and first generation.

Self-rated state of health

Recommended by the EU and included in the MEHM (Minimum European Health Module, a module incorporated into European health surveys), this indicator is very well-known and used by academia as well as national statistics offices. It covers various areas concerning health (physical, mental and social). Many longitudinal studies have shown that it is a very good predictor of mortality or serious illness (Kristensen 2014). It is thus a good synthetic indicator of the population's health. Its subjective nature reflects the overall quality of life of individuals.

Good to very good self-rated health, 2018

By migration status **G1.11**



Confidence interval (95%)

[1] incl. persons whose migration status could not be established
[2] incl. foreigners from the 3rd or subsequent generations

Source: FSO – SLFS

The proportion of people saying they are in good or very good health varies by migration status. Persons with a migration background from the first generation have the lowest rates (81%), followed by those without a migration background (85%). With a rate of 88%, the population from the second or subsequent generations was more likely to say that they were in good or very good health.

From 2012 to 2018, the proportion of persons who said that they were in good to very good health increased in most population groups. This increase was not significant in the population from the second or subsequent generations. The largest increase can be seen in the first generation (+2.9 percentage points).

The second or subsequent generations being more likely to say it is in good or very good health can partly be explained by the fact that this population is younger than the population with no migration background or the first generation. For this reason, results here are shown for people belonging to the same age group.

Among persons aged 15 to 24 and 25 to 39, the second or subsequent generations was less likely to say they were in good or very good health than persons with no migration background. In the second age group (25 to 39), the second generation was also less likely than the first generation to say they were in good or very good health. In these two age groups, the self-rated state of health of the first generation is identical to that of the population with no migration background. In the age groups of 40 to 54-year-olds and 55 to 66-year-olds, however, the first generation is less likely to say they are in good health than the population with no migration background or the second generation. The differences between the second generation and the population with no migration background are not, however, significant in these two age groups. In the age group 65 and older, the population with a migration background, regardless of generation, shows worse self-rated state of health than the population with no migration background.

It can also be seen that self-rated state of health does not seem to deteriorate with age to the same extent among the population groups. Starting with fairly similar health levels, the largest decline can be observed in the first generation (– 35.7 percentage points between the youngest and oldest age groups), followed by the second or subsequent generations (– 28.9 percentage points) and the population without a migration background (– 23.1 percentage points).

The percentage of women with good or very good self-rated state of health is lower than that of men regardless of the population group observed. However, when considering men and women separately, the differences between the different migration status groups are the same as those calculated for both men and women together.

Self-rated state of health increases with educational level in all population groups. Among persons with tertiary level education, however, the differences between the population groups disappear.

The differences in the proportion of people with good or very good self-rated state of health are the same in the different nationality groups as those seen in all nationality groups considered together.

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter looks at the three population typologies used to identify and describe the migrant population and its descendants whose integration is measured by the FSO. Differences have been shown to appear in the age, sex and nationality structure of these three population groups depending on the variable or variables chosen to define the population observed (nationality, place of birth or migration status).

It has also been demonstrated that the way in which each country defines migration status and the generation to which an individual belongs depends on its notion of citizenship but also on its history. France, for example—with its concept of birthright citizenship—has its specific way of defining migration status. The same can be said for Germany, in particular regarding its concept of ethnic German resettlers.

The system of indicators on the integration of the population with a migration background developed at the FSO has been presented with a focus on three societal areas: the labour market, education and health. Although the population with a migration background is more likely to be unemployed than the population with no migration background, a decline in unemployment rates can be observed from the second generation onwards. With regard to the level of education, although the first generation has the highest rates of people with no post-compulsory education, it also has the most tertiary level diploma holders. When looking at self-rated state of health, the second or subsequent generations is the population group most frequently rating its health as good or very good, followed by people with no migration background and those from the first generation. However, migration status alone cannot explain the differences between these population groups. Other variables such as sex, age and level of education must also be taken into account. The fact that second or subsequent generations is more likely to say it is in good or very good health, for example, can partly be explained by the fact that this population is younger than the population with no migration background or the first generation. Although migration status cannot provide a direct explanation of differences between the population groups it does highlight differences within these groups that may lead to inequalities in different areas of life.

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2 International migration and integration from a longitudinal perspective

Philippe Wanner

Abstract

In a context of continuous international migration, it is important to have the appropriate tools to measure the social and structural integration of populations with a migration background. Measuring integration makes all the more sense when approached longitudinally, i.e. from the moment migrants arrive in Switzerland and for the whole length of their stay here. Today, existing data enable such descriptions to be made and this article discusses three longitudinal measures relating to integration. First, the development of professional status, as expressed by wage differentials in relation to the whole population, reveals a gradual but incomplete integration of persons with a migration background, with substantial differences depending on their origins. Next, social integration as expressed by three indicators, shows, in particular, the influence the length of stay has on the level of interaction between Swiss natives and migrants. Finally, the different patterns of migration coexisting in Switzerland can be identified by analysing international mobility and returns home.

2.1 Introduction

The last few decades have been marked by globalisation and the gradual opening of national borders. This has led to the growing mobility of goods, capital and people. Many new developments (better access to job opportunities abroad, the specialisation of regional and national economic activities and the subsequent need for international skills and improved mobility within the European Union) have maintained migration flows between European countries. Migratory movements from the rest of the world towards Europe have remained high in the wake of international conflicts. This situation has helped focus the attention of policy makers, the media, the public and researchers on the phenomenon of migration. Means of action have been gradually put in place, often to limit or control migration flows, but sometimes also to recruit foreign labour and routinely to encourage the integration or inclusion of migrants[1] in the host society.

During the 20th century, the States thus gradually adopted integration policies designed to manage the flows of migrant workers, families and refugees after their arrival. The European States' statistical offices have equipped themselves with modern tools to monitor and measure population movements and the living conditions and integration of different groups of foreign nationals. The measurement of the integration levels of migrant or foreign populations really gathered momentum in the last twenty years of the 20th century, when international organisations (such as Eurostat, OECD or the European Council) or national ones gradually began to address the matter. The growing interest in the latter can be explained in part by the effects of the 1973 oil crisis in Europe, which profoundly changed migration flows: migrations for longer periods of time and less closely linked to work gradually increased, replacing migration that had been dominated by workers arriving alone in the hiring countries, usually for a limited period of time. As the reasons for migration became more complex, it proved necessary to measure the consequences on both the host society and the migrating communities.

Today in Switzerland we have data allowing us to measure the phenomenon of migration almost instantaneously (see monthly statistics from the State Secretariat for Migration)[2] and, despite certain limits due to its complexity, the integration of people with a migration background (e.g. FSO integration monitoring developed at the request of the Federal Council)[3]. The approach used to measure migration flows and social or structural integration is usually a transversal one: arrivals and departures are documented, the number of migrants living in the country are measured, while the economic or social situation of a specific group of people is described on a particular date without taking account of their length of stay or what took place prior to the date of data collection.

This cross-sectional approach undoubtedly provides important information but does not take account of the fact that migrant populations evolve according to arrivals, departures and natural population change (births and deaths). For this reason, it is difficult to analyse changes in behaviour over time (on the labour market, for instance) of a group of migrants if this group changes every year depending on natural change and migrations. For example, for a group of foreign immigrants arriving in Switzerland, skills in the host region's language will certainly improve the longer they stay. This improvement is one of the indicators most used in measuring social integration. But if this group is renewed due to arrivals and departures, the standard of language skills will be influenced and weakened by the presence of new immigrants

[1] This chapter focuses on foreign nationals who arrive in Switzerland in their lifetime. Below we use the term 'foreign (im)migrants' to qualify these persons.

[2] www.sem.admin.ch → Publications & services → Facts and figures → Foreign Population Statistics (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[3] www.bfs.admin.ch → Look for statistics → Population → Migration and integration → Integration indicators (last accessed on 14.05.2020; see also Chapter 1).

and the return of former ones. It would be wrong to conclude that the group is poorly, or not at all integrated linguistically, as this would fail to take into account the group's average length of stay in Switzerland. Longitudinal measurement of processes, especially integration processes, takes the length of stay into account. This is essential in order to avoid erroneous interpretations.

The approach adopted in this chapter follows, where possible, immigrant cohorts defined by the year of their arrival in Switzerland in order to shed light on the processes of integration. This article focuses on three ways of describing these cohorts. After an introduction, it first describes integration into the labour market (known as structural integration) of different migrant cohorts in Switzerland. The notion of structural integration is important in a country where most migration is related to the labour market; it indicates people's ability to integrate efficiently into the labour market and subsequently to make a success of their migration.

Structural integration is a component of social or socio-cultural integration, which covers in more general terms the interactions and exchanges between migrants and the host country (see for example Alba and Nee 1997). For this reason, the second part of this article addresses some specific aspects of social integration, referring to Swiss natives' and foreign immigrants' ability to coexist, and more broadly to interactions between the latter and the host country. The third part will analyse the experience of the pre-defined cohort groups, by considering three possible outcomes: status quo (remaining in Switzerland as a foreigner), obtaining Swiss citizenship, or leaving Switzerland. The conclusion compares and contrasts the main results obtained.

2.2 Data[4]

Information on the arrival of migrants in Switzerland and on the monitoring of the period after their migration can be gathered from various sources. As part of its research on migration, the National Centre of Competence in Research (nccr — on the move) has compiled a longitudinal database in cooperation with the FSO (Steiner and Wanner 2015). This database links the Central Aliens Register (ZAR, subsequently ZEMIS, 1998–2010) with STATPOP (2010–2016) and the Central Compensation Office registers (CCO, individual accounts 1998–2016). It enables foreign migrants to be monitored from their arrival and documents their economic experience. Three cohorts are considered here: foreign nationals who immigrated in 2000 (i.e. just before the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the EU came into force), in 2005 (i.e. just after) and in 2010. Persons migrating to Switzerland under the asylum process were not included in the analysis. The results presented in this chapter refer to changes in immigrants' income from employment in comparison to the reference group, i.e. the total population of Switzerland. They are descriptive in that no variables were controlled for that could influence the level of income (such as age, level of education or number of years in the profession). The analysis studies trends in the divergence observed between migrant groups and the reference population.

The three cohorts represent three periods in which immigration levels differed greatly: in 2000 there were some 80 000 arrivals in the permanent resident population, in 2005, 100 000 and in 2010, 140 000. These figures, although obtained from official statistics, underestimate the actual number of arrivals as they are based only on the permanent resident population (defined as persons holding a residence permit valid for at least one year). If persons without permanent residence are included (people arriving with a seasonal, in 2000, or short-term permit), the 2000 cohort had 177 000 arrivals, the 2005 cohort 164 5000 and the 2010 cohort 202 000 arrivals. These are the numbers that were taken into account for the analysis. German, Portuguese, French and Italian citizens were the four main national groups immigrating to Switzerland, representing roughly 50% of the population that immigrated to Switzerland in the three years observed (see also Chapter 1.1.5). Men were in the majority and in 2000 accounted for 59% of immigrants. This proportion was 56% in 2010.

We should mention a restriction due to the methodology for the 2000 and 2005 cohorts. Only persons who remained in Switzerland up until 2008 were attributed a 13-digit OASI number (AHVN13), which was used to link the different registers. For this reason, we have no labour-market status for foreigners who left Switzerland before 2008 (or those who obtained Swiss citizenship prior to that year). We can, however, document changes to their status (departure, mainly, sometimes naturalisation).

The Migration-Mobility survey is the second source used. This is a survey organised by the nccr — on the move, amongst a sample of foreign nationals (Steiner and Wanner 2019). The first wave took place in autumn 2016 (5973 foreign immigrants interviewed), the second in autumn 2018 (7740 participants, of whom 2023 made up a panel responding for the second time after 2016). The survey concerned persons born abroad, of foreign nationality, aged 24 to 64 in 2016, and holders of an L, B, C, Ci or FDFA permit, who arrived in Switzerland in 2006 or after at the age of 18 or over. During the first wave, the sample concentrated on 11 nationality groups responsible for the main migration flows towards Switzerland. All nationalities were included in the second wave.

The survey gathers original source information on people's migration history, their professional and social life in Switzerland, their experience of migration and their hopes concerning the outcome of that migration. In this chapter, we use the results from two waves of the survey (2016 and 2018), by comparing where necessary the answers from 2018 with those from 2016 in order to obtain a longitudinal view of integration.

[4] Longitudinal data used in this chapter were provided by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO). The Migration-Mobility survey is run by the National Centre of Competence in Research, nccr — on the move, and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF).

2.3 Integration in professional life

Social insurance data (CCO registers) provide information on the income subject to contributions, which allows measurement of the development in the migrant cohorts' income from employment (Graph G2.1). For the male cohort that arrived in 2000, median income rose from CHF 42 000 for the year following arrival to CHF 70 400 in 2015. This represents an increase of 58% (women 54%). Income rose at the same pace for the 2005 and 2010 cohorts. These trends bear out the hypothesis of gradual integration into the labour market, which assumes that upon arrival in Switzerland, some migrants accept wages that are low in relation to their qualifications, anticipating that they will then make rapid progress on the labour market (Sicherman and Galor 1990, Grunau and Pecoraro 2016). Nevertheless, the gap between the median income of migrants and that of the whole labour force in Switzerland (reference population indicated in red in Graph G2.1) remains wide. The migrant population as a whole is unable to close the gap initially observed between itself and the Swiss average.

Median income from employment, 2001–2015

By cohort of arrival and gender — G2.1



Note: includes income from employment, self-employed or agricultural work. Persons aged 18 to 49 at time of migration. Total: employed population aged 18 to 49 in 2000.

Sources: FSO – STATPOP; SEM – ZAR, ZEMIS; CCO – IA © FSO, author 2020

Female migrants, on the other hand, rapidly close the gap between themselves and the reference population. However, it is not possible to make meaningful statements about these results as no data on weekly hours worked are available. These hours can vary considerably depending on factors such as age, family situation or country of origin.

Compared to the total population, the median income from employment of the male immigrant cohorts shows a shortfall that can be expressed as a percentage of the median income of the reference group. Calculated for each successive cohort and taking into account the length of stay, the difference narrows, indicating gradual structural integration. Despite this reduction, the gap never closes completely and stabilises at around 15% (Graph G2.2).

Gross wage shortfall of male foreign national immigrants

By length of stay and cohort of arrival, in % — G2.2



Note: includes income from employment, self-employed or agricultural work. The comparison group is the employed population aged 18 to 49 in 2000. The shortfall is expressed as a percentage of the median income of the comparison group.

Sources: FSO – STATPOP; SEM – ZAR, ZEMIS; CCO – IA © FSO, author 2020

The persistence of this gap can be explained by several factors, such as a lack of training and qualifications, the presence of immigrants in low pay sectors, the difficulty in transferring to the host country professional skills obtained in the country of origin, problems in obtaining recognition of qualifications acquired abroad or mismatched employment that can sometimes be linked to discrimination. Compared to other industrialised countries, Switzerland has relatively low rates of mismatched employment, according to the OECD (Quintini 2011). Among certain migrant groups, however, the phenomenon remains common (Pecoraro and Wanner 2019), leading to income disadvantage.

These general tendencies conceal situations that vary greatly, depending on the nationality. Among male foreigners arriving in Switzerland in 2000, German nationals have incomes higher than that of the reference population. This difference is apparent upon arrival and continues to increase (Graph G2.3). French citizens and those of other EU/EFTA countries gradually draw level with the reference median income and even overtake it at the end of

the period, implying successful professional integration. Italian and Portuguese citizens as well as third-country nationals only partly make up the income shortfall in relation to the reference population. This is largely due to the fact that this population is active in low pay sectors. Graph G2.3 also illustrates the fact that German nationals, with high incomes, showed the most spectacular increase between 2001 and 2015. This contributed to the narrowing of the gap mentioned in Graph G2.2 between the total population and immigrants. The relative gap between immigrants belonging to lower paid communities tends to increase over time.

Median income from employment of the population of foreign nationals who arrived in 2000

2001–2015, by nationality **G2.3**



Note: includes income from employment, self-employed or agricultural work.
Total: employed population aged 18 to 49 in 2000.

Sources: FSO – STATPOP; SEM – ZAR, ZEMIS; CCO – IA © FSO, author 2020

The Migration-Mobility survey provides further information about migrants' structural integration. It first reports on migrants' self-rated satisfaction with their employment. More than half (53%) of employed persons interviewed in 2018 rated their professional situation very positively (on a scale of 0 (completely dissatisfied) to 7 (completely satisfied) they indicated a 6 or 7), whereas only 3% said they were deeply unsatisfied (a 0 or 1). Furthermore, 79% of employed persons confirmed their professional situation had improved due to migration (Graph G2.4). Although more than 60% said they were satisfied with the progress in their professional situation, employed persons in the second half of their working life (aged 45 and over) and persons arriving in Switzerland for family reasons had a less favourable opinion, as did women compared with men.

Current professional situation, compared with that prior to migration, 2018

By sociodemographic characteristics **G2.4**



Source: nccr on the move – Migration-Mobility Survey 2018 © FSO, author 2020

In addition, a large majority of persons interviewed for the survey said that their work made rather or very good use of their skill set.[5] Certain groups, however, said that their skills were only moderately well-used: this includes young migrants, those who came to Switzerland for non-professional reasons (e.g. for family reasons), those holding secondary education qualifications (often employed in low-skilled work in Switzerland), as well as those from the region 'rest of Europe' (mainly from the Balkan countries) or from the African continent (Graph G2.5). These overall positive results can be partly explained by the fact that a large number of migrants (almost half) arrived in Switzerland with a signed employment contract, i.e. they had a relatively good idea of what to expect when they accepted to come to Switzerland to work. Persons arriving in Switzerland for family reasons or due to factors encouraging them to leave their country of origin did not, of course, have this opportunity. Their situation is not quite as positive because their professional integration began only after their arrival and certain migrants will have been obliged, for purely financial reasons, to accept work that gives them no satisfaction.

[5] The question was worded as follows: 'On a scale of 0 (not at all) to 7 (to a very large degree), how well is your skill set put to use in your current job? By skill set we mean your formal education and training as well as the skills that you have acquired at work (training and on the job).'

Self-declared level of use of professional skills, 2018

Employed immigrants, by sociodemographic characteristics **G2.5**



Note: Answers were given on a scale of 0 to 7, the values 0, 1 and 2 (poorly used), 3 and 4 (moderately used), and 5, 6 and 7 (quite well used) have been grouped together.

Source: nccr on the move – Migration-Mobility Survey 2018 © FSO, author 2020

The various professional integration indicators for migrant cohorts highlight the contrasting results: income gaps are observed in relation to the reference population. For certain nationalities, these differences do not seem to reduce over time. Furthermore, for women and migrants arriving for reasons not related to work, professional integration is sub-optimal. However, the self-rated use of migrants' professional skills on the labour market is quite good. Migrants also indicate an improvement in their professional situation following migration. The following section analyses the extent to which professional integration contributes to successful social integration.

2.4 Integration in social life

Social integration is broader than professional or structural integration and is also more complex to measure or translate by means of indicators. This concept reflects the level of interaction between migrants and the host society, and their capacity to participate in social and collective life. Indicators of language, social networks and inter-ethnic marriage are often used to measure migrants' social integration (see Vigdor 2008, for example). The Migration-Mobility survey investigates three aspects of this integration: command of the host region's language, interest in news and current affairs in Switzerland and in the country of origin, and participation in voluntary activities.

2.4.1 Linguistic integration

When asked about comprehension and their ability to express themselves in the local language, migrants who were interviewed in 2016 and 2018 produced the following results in 2016: 51% said they understood the whole of a conversation, 23.5% almost everything, 13.5% parts of a conversation and 12% little or nothing. Around 31% also said they could speak the local language fluently, whereas 26% were able to utter only a few words or nothing at all. Interviewing the same persons after a two-year interval enabled migrants' progress in language skills to be identified during the two years covered by the survey. Among those who said there were gaps in their skills in 2016, 36.5% said in 2018 that they understood the language better than in 2016 and 33% said they had improved their speaking skills. The remaining 63% (67%, respectively) said there had been no progress, or in a few rare cases, rated their language skills less highly. An improvement in understanding of the local language (first column in grey in Table T2.1a and T2.1b) was significantly more frequent among migrants arriving in Switzerland for professional reasons and aged from 45–54. It was less frequent among migrants who came to Switzerland for reasons other than professional ones, as well as among those aged 55 and over. The ability to express oneself improved more often for people of African origin, those aged under 35 and those with lower secondary level education. This improvement was seen less often among people with tertiary level education and among the oldest people. Contrary to general expectations, the relationship between the level of education and acquisition of the host region's language is reversed. This is possibly due to the fact that highly qualified migrants, often English speakers, are able to live in Switzerland and use English. They do not feel the need to learn the local language as much as those whose mother tongue is Spanish or Portuguese or those with a lower level of education, for example.

Migrants' self-assessed language skills, changes between 2016 and 2018

Understanding a conversation

T 2.1a

	Improved	C.I. 95%	Stayed the same	C.I. 95%	Worsened	C.I. 95%	N
Gender							
Male	37.4	+/−3.7	57.6	+/−3.8	4.9	+/−1.7	650
Female	35.3	+/−4.0	57.0	+/−4.1	7.8	+/−2.2	558
Origin							
EU/EFTA	36.6	+/−3.9	57.7	+/−4.0	5.7	+/−1.9	597
Other European countries	41.0	+/−17.9	55.6	+/−18.1	3.4	+/−6.6	29
Africa	42.3	+/−12.2	52.9	+/−12.3	4.9	+/−5.3	63
North America	33.9	+/−11.3	58.9	+/−11.8	7.2	+/−6.2	67
South America	31.8	+/−5.6	59.7	+/−5.9	8.5	+/−3.3	268
Asia/Oceania	42.7	+/−7.1	**49.5**	+/−7.2	7.9	+/−3.9	184
Education							
None/Lower secondary level	30.2	+/−11.0	59.3	+/−11.8	10.5	+/−7.3	67
Upper secondary level	35.4	+/−5.5	58.4	+/−5.7	6.2	+/−2.8	286
Tertiary	38.4	+/−3.3	56.4	+/−3.3	5.2	+/−1.5	855
Reason for migration							
Professional	**40.6**	+/−3.8	**53.5**	+/−3.9	5.9	+/−1.8	644
Family	34.0	+/−4.9	61.4	+/−5.0	4.6	+/−2.2	362
Professional and family	31.6	+/−9.0	61.7	+/−9.4	6.7	+/−4.8	103
Other	**26.0**	+/−8.6	64.0	+/−9.5	10.0	+/−5.9	99
Age							
24–34	32.3	+/−5.8	60.9	+/−6.1	6.8	+/−3.1	248
35–44	36.0	+/−4.1	58.8	+/−4.2	5.2	+/−1.9	518
45–54	**46.3**	+/−5.6	**48.3**	+/−5.6	5.5	+/−2.6	302
55–66	**26.6**	+/−7.3	64.1	+/−7.9	9.4	+/−4.8	140
Total	36.5	+/−2.7	57.4	+/−2.8	6.1	+/−1.4	1208

Data were weighted according to a longitudinal weighting.
Results indicated in bold differ significantly from the results obtained for the total sample with a confidence interval of 95%.

Source: nccr on the move — Migration-Mobility Survey 2016 and 2018

Migrants' self-assessed language skills, changes between 2016 and 2018

Speaking ability

T2.1b

	Improved	C.I. 95%	Stayed the same	C.I. 95%	Worsened	C.I. 95%	N
Gender							
Male	34.4	+/−3.2	51.8	+/−3.4	13.8	+/−2.4	824
Female	31.6	+/−3.5	56.5	+/−3.7	12.0	+/−2.4	688
Origin							
EU/EFTA	33.4	+/−3.2	53.5	+/−3.3	13.1	+/−2.3	858
Other European countries	27.6	+/−13.7	50.7	+/−15.3	21.7	+/−12.6	41
Africa	**47.6**	+/−12.0	**39.8**	+/−11.8	12.7	+/−8.0	66
North America	31.8	+/−10.6	61.1	+/−11.1	7.1	+/−5.8	74
South America	29.6	+/−5.3	56.6	+/−5.8	13.8	+/−4.0	285
Asia/Oceania	34.5	+/−6.8	56.8	+/−7.1	8.7	+/−4.0	188
Education							
None/Lower secondary level	**50.4**	+/−11.6	47.3	+/−11.6	2.3	+/−3.5	71
Upper secondary level	36.3	+/−4.8	52.2	+/−5.0	11.6	+/−3.2	384
Tertiary	**29.0**	+/−2.7	55.7	+/−3.0	15.4	+/−2.2	1057
Reason for migration							
Professional	32.0	+/−3.2	54.3	+/−3.4	13.7	+/−2.3	826
Family	31.1	+/−4.4	56.0	+/−4.8	12.9	+/−3.2	417
Professional and family	39.8	+/−8.5	53.3	+/−8.7	6.9	+/−4.4	126
Other	37.1	+/−7.9	48.1	+/−8.2	14.8	+/−5.8	143
Age							
24–34	**38.7**	+/−5.4	54.7	+/−5.5	6.6	+/−2.8	312
35–44	32.7	+/−3.6	52.4	+/−3.9	14.8	+/−2.8	638
45–54	36.8	+/−4.8	53.2	+/−5.0	10.0	+/−3.0	387
55–66	**18.0**	+/−5.7	58.1	+/−7.3	23.9	+/−6.3	175
Total	33.2	+/−2.4	53.8	+/−2.5	13.0	+/−1.7	1512

Data were weighted according to a longitudinal weighting.
Results indicated in bold differ significantly from the results obtained for the total sample with a confidence interval of 95%.

Source: nccr on the move — Migration-Mobility Survey 2016 and 2018

2.4.2 Interest in news and current affairs

Overall, migrants interviewed for the Migration-Mobility survey, whether in 2016 or in 2018, indicated a high level of interest in what is happening in Switzerland, but also in news from their country of origin. The figures in Graph G2.6 are average values for the answers given by the panel in 2016 and 2018.[6] This average lies between 4.4 and 5.9 on a scale of 0 to 7. Migrants almost always say they were slightly more interested in what is happening in Switzerland (blue squares) compared with their country of origin (orange and red squares). The gap was wider for European citizens from non-EU countries and for African citizens as well as for men, for people with upper secondary education and migrants in the second half of their working life. It is smaller for women, who are equally interested in the current affairs of the host country and those of their country of origin, migrants from Asia, low-skilled workers and the youngest people.

Score indicating interest of foreign immigrants in news and current affairs, 2016 and 2018

News and current affairs in Switzerland and in the country of origin, by sociodemographic characteristics

G2.6



Note: persons belonging to panel. Respondents indicated their interest on a scale of 0 (not at all) to 7 (very interested). The score was obtained by calculating the average of respondents' answers.

Source: nccr on the move – Migration-Mobility Survey 2016 and 2018 © FSO, author 2020

The results show an openness towards the host country, sign of a willingness to integrate socially, but also an interest in the country of origins that remains high. This interest is, however, relatively low among non-EU/EFTA European and African communities. The results also show that in 2016 persons of Spanish, North American and British origins said they were more interested in news about their country than in Swiss news and current affairs. The survey took place during the American presidential elections, just before the Brexit referendum and during the Catalan independence debate. These events may have temporarily increased the three groups' interest in news from their countries of origin.

Generally speaking, interest in Swiss current affairs gradually increased for the panel between 2016 and 2018, but the difference was not statistically significant. Interest in the current affairs of the country of origin remained stable.

2.4.3 Voluntary work in Switzerland

The third social integration indicator is the percentage of people taking part in voluntary activities in Switzerland (in sports, social, political or cultural organisations).[7] This indicator is particularly important because it is proof of direct interaction with the host population, as well as of the desire to become involved in various causes in the host country. The percentage is over 40% among migrants with tertiary-level education and training, migrants from West Africa, India and North America. Among Portuguese nationals, it is just above 20% (Graph G2.7). Overall, 16% of people interviewed take part in voluntary activities related to sport, 12% for charities and 9% for religious organisations.

Figures for 2016 on voluntary activity by the whole of Switzerland's population aged 15 and over were published by the FSO, based on data gathered by the Swiss Labour Force Survey.[8] According to that survey, 23% of Swiss nationals and 8% of foreign nationals are involved in organised voluntary work. Foreigners are less likely than Swiss nationals to be involved in voluntary work. As the wording of the questions[9] and the populations covered by the two surveys were different, no comparison can be made between the two sources.

According to the Migration-Mobility survey, involvement in voluntary work was greater among persons who arrived in 2013 or before compared with later cohorts.[10] This situation again suggests a process of gradual integration in certain social activities in the host country.

The three indicators used show that social integration is not only gradual but also considerable. Unsurprisingly, the level of comprehension of the local language improves for a large percentage of migrants. The differences observed between groups for the three indicators suggest, however, that the speed of social

[6] Respondents indicated their interest on a scale of 0 (not at all interested) to 7 (very interested).

[7] This question was asked only in the 2016 Migration-Mobility survey. The question asked comprised a list of 7 organised voluntary activities, including cultural activities related to the host country.

[8] www.bfs.admin.ch → Look for statistics → Work and income → Unpaid work → Voluntary work (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

[9] The question asked in the Swiss Labour Force Survey specifically referred to voluntary activity during the preceding four weeks.

[10] Significant result after controlling for factors of confusion.

Involvement of foreign immigrants in voluntary work in Switzerland, 2016

By sociodemographic characteristics and year of arrival

G 2.7



Source: nccr on the move – Migration-Mobility Survey 2016

integration can vary depending on individual characteristics and especially depending on whether migrants are able to use English as a lingua franca. Education is not always an indicator of integration and this result contradicts the hypothesis that a high level of education is conducive to integration.

2.5 Migration: temporary or permanent?

The third section of this article looks at migrants' outcomes. To do this, data from the population registers are used.

Among persons arriving in 2000 (excl. asylum), more than 60% left Switzerland within ten years of arrival (Graph G 2.8; see also Chapter 3.5). This percentage was slightly lower (56%) for the 2005 cohort; this fall can be accounted for by the fact that migrants from the European Union stay longer, or even permanently. This decline is also explained by the relative stability of the Swiss labour market compared with other European countries, some of which felt the full impact of the financial crisis.

The rate of departure from Switzerland in the ten years following arrival varies considerably depending on immigrants' nationality; for the 2005 cohort it was 34% for Portuguese nationals and 71% for citizens for OECD member countries outside of the EU/EFTA[11]. This percentage varies between 60% and 65% within the three main immigrant groups (besides Portuguese nationals): German, French and Italian nationals (Graph G 2.8).

Among immigrants still present in Switzerland ten years after their arrival, more than half were holders of a C permit at the end of the period. This was the case for 78% of German nationals who immigrated in 2005 and who were still in Switzerland in 2015. Among migrants still in Switzerland after 10 years, between 14% and 24% were B permit holders (probably due to repeated immigration and emigration) and a varying proportion of them were naturalised: 16% of citizens from OECD member countries outside of the EU/EFTA and 24% of citizens from countries that belong neither to the OECD nor EU/EFTA obtained Swiss citizenship during the 10 years after their arrival. During the period under observation, citizenship could be obtained before 12 years of residency in the case of marriage to a Swiss national (facilitated naturalisation) or if a person was in compulsory education in Switzerland. This means that a permanent stay in Switzerland for third-country nationals is often related to family circumstances giving access to speedy naturalisation.

The residence permit allocated upon arrival obviously has an effect on the migration outcome. In 2000, the A permit (seasonal permit) had run its course as it was abolished in 2002. It was, however, awarded to 39 200 people in 2000, compared with 63 900 people awarded a B permit and 69 400 people awarded an L permit (allowing a short stay of 3 to 12 months). In a small number of cases a C permit was awarded on arrival (4300).[12] The L permit, which at that time had recently come into force, fulfilled its role as a short-term permit, as more than 80% of those awarded an L permit on arrival had left Switzerland by 2010

[11] These are citizens from the following countries: Australia, Canada, Chile, South Korea, Israel, Japan, Mexico, New Zealand, Turkey and USA.

[12] These people migrated to Switzerland in 2000 or in 2005. We have no information on their previous migration experience but we can assume that people awarded a C permit of residence on arrival had already resided in Switzerland in the past.

Status of foreign immigrants ten years after immigration

By cohort of arrival and nationality

G 2.8



Note: matched data. A few cases of persons of unknown nationality have been excluded.

Sources: FSO – STATPOP; SEM – ZAR, ZEMIS

(Graph G 2.9). However, the seasonal permit seems to have often preceded a longer-term stay, as among holders of this permit, more than 40% were still in Switzerland ten years later.

In 60% of cases, the B permit was followed by a stay of at least 10 years, with naturalisation in 15% of cases. Most people who arrived in Switzerland for family reunification fall into this category as they then meet the conditions for rapid naturalisation. Holders of a C permit on arrival often go on to stay long-term in Switzerland (in 85% of cases). In 2010, 20% of C permit holders obtained Swiss citizenship.

Compared to those proportions, people from the 2005 cohort who hold the short-term permit, which has gained importance since the seasonal permit was abolished, no longer systematically return to their country of origin: almost four in ten short-term permit holders on arrival were still resident in Switzerland 10 years later, mostly with a C permit. Some 50% of holders of a B permit on arrival in Switzerland were still here after 10 years. This shows that the differences in terms of migration pathway are less marked between L and B permits. Compared with the 2000 cohort, B permit holders arriving in Switzerland in 2005 became more mobile, as the percentage of them leaving the country rose from 40% to 48%.

Although the permit awarded upon arrival has a significant role to play in the length of stay, this role can also change over time. The short-term permit, which is not aimed at people staying long-term in Switzerland, now sees 4 in 10 holders staying for at least 10 years in Switzerland. In contrast, the B permit, which was supposed to precede a longer-term stay, now sees only one in two holders staying. Compared with the cohort that immigrated five years before, that of 2005 is characterised by a higher number of returns of B and even C permit holders.

Status of foreign immigrants ten years after immigration

By cohort of arrival and type of permit on arrival

G 2.9



Note: Persons arriving in the context of asylum were not included. A few cases of persons arriving in Switzerland with a different type of permit to those mentioned in the graph have been excluded.

Sources: FSO – STATPOP; SEM – ZAR, ZEMIS

The hypothesis by which the opening of borders stimulates migration flows, i.e. that it multiplies an individual's migration movements, is only partly borne out by the data on international migration. In fact, the majority of immigrants in 2000 (2005, respectively) and who were still present in Switzerland 10 years later, remained resident in Switzerland throughout the whole period. A high proportion of return trips was seen only among persons holding a seasonal permit upon arrival in Switzerland

(95%) and those holding an L permit upon arrival (2000 cohort: 69%, 2005 cohort: 43%). For those arriving with a B or C permit, the predominant model, adopted by at least 90% of these permit holders was to remain in Switzerland for the whole period (Graph G2.10). However, this result was obtained on the basis of data from the population registers and does not cover certain types of mobility, such as informal or short-term return trips (with no change of residence declared).

The Migration-Mobility survey provides some further information in this regard about the relationship that migrants have with their country of origin. In 2018, more than 90% of migrants returned at least once a year to their country of origin. Some 18% even returned at least once per month. More than half said that they had ties to their country of origin as most of their friends lived there. According to the Swiss Labour Force Survey 2017, which also includes the 2nd generation (i.e. people with a migration background born in Switzerland), 67% return to their country of origin a least once a year.[13] Mobility seems to comprise trips made at more or less regular intervals depending on the distance between Switzerland and the country of origin. Such trips are made possible by the current means of transport and additionally by plane ticket prices which have fallen in recent decades.

Persons who made return trips or who stayed permanently in Switzerland[1]

By cohort of arrival and type of permit **G2.10**



[1] foreign immigrants still present in Switzerland 10 years after immigration

Note: persons arriving in Switzerland excluding asylum-seekers. A return trip is defined as having made at least one emigration and then an immigration during the observation period.

Sources: FSO – STATPOP; SEM – ZAR, ZEMIS

2.6 Conclusion

Migration to a foreign country is an event that can have far-reaching repercussions on the person or family concerned. From the host society's point of view, the phenomenon of migration presents a challenge, for both politics and the economy. With this in mind, it is important to have detailed knowledge of the integration characteristics of the populations concerned by migration as well as of their behaviour in terms of mobility. A wealth of literature has attempted to explain the choice between returning or remaining permanently, often referring to Borjas and Bratsberg's theory of selective migration (1994). This theory distinguishes between two reasons for leaving the host country: on the one hand, the achievement of predefined migration goals (completion of education and training, e.g.); on the other, failure of the migration project due to misleading information about the potential gains of migration. Poor structural or social integration represents, for the migrant, failure of the migration project and encourages them to return home. Structural and social integration are closely linked to migration outcome.

Whether in terms of the labour market, language or social participation, the results presented in this article all show that integration into society is a long-term process. The process of integration does not end on an equal footing, if we consider, for example, the wage gap between migrants and the total population of Switzerland, but it does improve as the length of stay increases. Consequently, a country that aims for long-term migration will increase the chances of successful integration and the professional and social integration of migrants, in contrast to a country characterised by short-term migration. As a result, a sudden increase in migration flows, such as that observed since the start of the 21st century in Switzerland, challenges social integration and cohesion policies as it leads to renewed migration flows and to the presence of recent migration populations at the start of the integration process. From a social cohesion perspective, migration at the start of the 21st century, by virtue of the number of migrants concerned, posed a challenge for integration policy in Switzerland. The results presented here show that the situation of migrants on the labour market and in terms of social integration varies greatly according to individual characteristics, such as nationality, gender, the reason for migration or level of education. Regarding income from employment, the situation of German nationals in particular is very advantageous from the very beginning. This is probably linked to selective immigration (persons arriving in Switzerland have a high level of education). Moreover, their income increases significantly throughout their stay in Switzerland. In contrast, other nationalities show a rather low income from the start, with little increase. Migrant groups, therefore, can find themselves in very different situations. Despite this, satisfaction with employment is judged positively. This is probably due to the fact that in Switzerland migrants encounter working conditions which, although not always optimal, are considered better than those in the country of origin. The economic context explains these results and encourages professional integration.

[13] www.bfs.admin.ch → Look for statistics → Population → Migration and integration → Transnationalism (last accessed on 14.05.2020).

The data on local language skills show that non-English-speaking populations make quicker progress regarding comprehension and speaking the host region's language than do populations from English-speaking countries, although these may be better qualified. This result is probably due to the fact that highly qualified populations tend to live in larger urban zones where they can use English for every day communication. It does, however, raise questions about the host country's expectations with regard to command of the local language and about the groups that linguistic integration policy should be targeting.

Finally, although they are descriptive in nature, the analyses reveal the ambiguous role played by residence permits. The latter obviously have an impact on the length of stay in Switzerland, but this impact is not clear-cut. Migrants frequently transit between short-term and annual permits: This is an interesting feature of migration policy in that the system does offer a certain amount of flexibility although this is limited for citizens of non-EU/EFTA countries.

In conclusion, this article makes use of descriptive statistics and adopts a longitudinal approach for a better understanding of the characteristics of integration and the outcome of migration. It does not intend to explain certain behaviours but to describe the situation and its development over time. The wealth of data henceforth available in Switzerland will enable in the near future more detailed analysis of the characteristics of migration and integration over a longer period of time while adopting a more analytical approach.

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3 Immigration, return migration and integration from a labour market perspective

Sandro Favre, Reto Föllmi, and Josef Zweimüller

Abstract

This chapter examines how well migrants integrate in the Swiss labour market. In the year of arrival in Switzerland, the employment rate and labour income of migrants are below those of people-born in Switzerland. Over the course of their stay, however, migrants can significantly reduce this gap. The employment rate of migrant men after five years in Switzerland is only 4 percentage points below the level of men born in Switzerland, and the income of migrants is even slightly higher. Meanwhile, the employment rate of migrant women after five years is still 13% below the level of women born in Switzerland. Employed migrant women earn significantly more than women born in Switzerland as they work more hours on average. However, just over half of migrants leave Switzerland after a stay of less than five years.

3.1 Introduction

Since the turn of the millennium, Switzerland has significantly opened up its labour market internationally and the country's economic attractiveness has subsequently led to high levels of immigration. This trend has sparked a broad political debate. A key question in this debate is how well migrants integrate in Switzerland—particularly in the labour market.[1] Two questions are of interest, and will be further explored in this chapter:

- Are migrants able to gain a foothold in the labour market in the longer term or are they more likely than people born in Switzerland to be unemployed or not employed for other reasons?
- Can employed migrants achieve a similar labour income to comparable individuals born in Switzerland?

Thanks to linked register data, we can analyse the employment careers of migrants over the course of their stay in Switzerland. We compare the achieved labour market outcomes with those of people born in Switzerland (not necessarily Swiss citizens), factoring in the different composition of the two groups in terms of sex, age, education and region of residence using regression analyses.

One area that is less studied but no less relevant is the increase not only in immigration but also in return migration brought about by the opening-up of the Swiss labour market. This opening-up therefore triggered dynamic social change. How well migrants integrate in the labour market is not the only crucial question, but also which migrants remain in Switzerland in the longer term. This chapter therefore also highlights to what extent return migration is linked to the labour market.

In terms of methodology, we adhere to a study that we authored for the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) in 2018 (Favre, Föllmi, and Zweimüller 2018). Thanks to new data, we are able to update the analyses and examine individual aspects in more detail.

There are also content-related links to Chapter 2 in this publication. In Chapter 2, one of the things that Philippe Wanner looks at is also the gap in labour income between migrants and people born in Switzerland. The difference in this chapter compared with the income comparison is that Wanner does not track a particular group of persons over time, rather he considers the whole cohort at any given time. In addition, the influence of age, education and region of residence on earnings is not stripped out from the income gap between migrants and people born in Switzerland. Chapter 2 therefore reveals the income gap between people born in Switzerland and all migrants in a cohort every year since the migrants in the cohort arrived in Switzerland, while this chapter shows how individual migrants integrate in the labour market in relation to comparable people born in Switzerland.

[1] This chapter will only address labour market integration. Other integration measures are not covered in the analysis.

Box 3.1: Research data

For the analyses, individual data sets from the following sources were linked up:

Individual OASI accounts (IA) (Central Compensation Office CCO): employment status and earnings of all persons from 1981 to 2016;

Population and Households Statistics STATPOP (Federal Statistical Office FSO): age, sex and place of residence of all persons from 2010 to 2017, as well as household composition;

Structural survey (FSO): qualifications (education, learned occupation) and working time in the period 2010 to 2017 for approx. 300 000 randomly selected persons in the permanent resident population;

Central Migration Information System ZEMIS (State Secretariat for Migration SEM): date of immigration and emigration, residence status and place of residence of foreign nationals from 2003 to 2017.

The population of the data set is made up of Swiss nationals who were resident in Switzerland for at least one year between 2010 and 2017, and foreign nationals who were resident in Switzerland at the beginning of 2003 or who have moved to Switzerland since. Persons who immigrate to Switzerland as asylum seekers are only considered once they are issued a residence permit.

3.1.1 Methods and definitions

Methods

Our analyses take into account persons aged between 25 and 65 (descriptive analyses) and persons aged between 25 and 55 (regression analyses). There are two reasons for restricting the analyses to these age groups. First, persons aged under 25 and over 55 are under-represented among migrants, which limits comparability with people born in Switzerland. Second, those under 25 are often still in education and therefore earn below-average incomes.

To analyse integration, we compare the labour market outcomes of migrants throughout their stay in Switzerland (study group) with the labour market outcomes in the same period of people born in Switzerland (control group).[2] As we are interested in individual integration trajectories, we only include people who lived in Switzerland throughout the entire study period in the analysis of employment and unemployment (in the case of our main results: five years). For the analyses of labour income we similarly considered persons who earned an income from employment throughout the entire study period. If we also included persons in the analyses who left Switzerland or gave up their employment before the end of the study period, the measured differences between the study and control group would no longer only reflect the integration trajectory, but also the changing composition of the study group.

To improve the comparability of the study and control groups, we exclude people aged under 25 and over 55, and conduct the analyses separately for men and women. In our regression analyses, we also consider subjects' age, qualifications and region of residence. So, in effect, we compare migrants with comparable individuals—measured using these characteristics—who were born in Switzerland.

For this purpose, we estimate regression equations of the type

$$\log(x_{it}) = \alpha + \sum_{y=0}^{5} \beta_y D_{yit} + \sum_{j=1}^{3} \gamma_j \mathrm{Age}_{it}^{j} + \sum_{e\in\{\mathrm{SecII,Tert}\}} \delta_e D_{eit} + \sum_{g=2}^{7} \theta_g D_{git} + \sum_{r=2004}^{2013} \iota_\tau D_{\tau it} + \varepsilon_{it},$$

x_{it} denotes the labour market outcome studied (labour income, employment rate, unemployment rate) of person i in calendar year t; D_{yit} an indicator variable that assumes the value 1 if person i in year t has been in Switzerland for years t and 0 if they belong to the control group; Age_{it} the age of person i in year t; $D_{\mathrm{SecII},it}$, $D_{\mathrm{Tert},it}$ indicator variables that take value 1 if person i in year t has an upper secondary or tertiary level qualification; D_{git} an indicator variable that assumes value 1 if person i in year t lives in region g; $D_{\tau it}$ an indicator variable that assumes value 1 if $\tau = t$ (calendar year effects).

We are interested in the coefficients β_y. These measure the differences in terms of labour income, employment rate and unemployment rate between people born in Switzerland and comparable migrants in the twelve months after they arrive. A comparison of these coefficients therefore shows the average integration trajectory.

As the migrant group is extremely heterogeneous, we differentiate our results in various dimensions. So, for example, we present the results by country of origin separately, as migrants from EU and EFTA states find it easier to integrate than migrants from third countries due to comparable education systems and labour market structures and the fact that migrants from neighbouring countries already speak one of Switzerland's national languages. There are also major differences in qualification level between migrants. Compared with those born in Switzerland, people with a low level of education (lower secondary or less) and those with a high level of education (tertiary level) are over-represented among migrants (see also Chapter 1.4.2). Within these groups, however, there are a disproportionately high number of migrants with particularly low and particularly high incomes.

We therefore also calculate regressions separately by region of origin, to compare the integration trajectory of those from EU and EFTA states with that of people from third countries, for example. In addition, we also present the coefficients separately by education group to highlight whether the average figures conceal differences in qualifications between migrants. This is of particular importance in the analysis of income trajectories as

[2] See Table T 1.1 in Chapter 1. Here in Chapter 3, people born in Switzerland are compared with migrants, i.e. with people born abroad who did not have Swiss citizenship when they arrived in Switzerland.

here the average values may be heavily driven by high incomes. We therefore analyse in a separate section how the distribution of migrants' earnings and those of people born in Switzerland evolve more or less in tandem over time.

For all these analyses the study period is the first five years after the year of arrival. All those who left Switzerland within this period are thus excluded from the analyses on employment and unemployment, and those who were not continuously employed are excluded from the income analyses. An analysis of residence histories shows that half of migrants leave Switzerland within the first three years. We therefore document the integration trajectories of people who stayed between one and thirteen years. This provides us with a complete and differentiated picture of how well migrants integrate in the labour market both in the short and longer term.

In addition, we look at which factors influence the length of stay. In particular, we highlight the link between labour market success and probability of return migration. We thus analyse whether people who have trouble finding employment or who lose their job are likely to remain in Switzerland or return to their country of origin. We also show whether people with above average income or a particularly steep income profile stay longer in Switzerland due to their success on the labour market, or whether such individuals are particularly internationally mobile and therefore soon leave Switzerland.

Definitions

In our analyses we compare the labour market outcomes of migrants with those of people born in Switzerland.[3] The migrant group comprises foreign nationals who immigrated to Switzerland within the study period and who were between 25 and 55 years old during the entire study period. These individuals remain in the migrant group, even if they are subsequently naturalised. The control group is made up of people aged between 25 and 55 who were born in Switzerland, even if they are not Swiss nationals.

We measure the labour market integration of migrants in terms of the extent to which they participate in the labour market and the level of income they earn if they are employed:

- Our primary measurement for labour market participation is the employment rate. It is calculated by dividing the number of employed and self-employed people by the total number of persons in the relevant group. The complementary measurement to the employment rate is the proportion of not employed persons in the group. Not employed persons comprise unemployed and economically inactive people. In our study, people are deemed unemployed in the months in which they draw unemployment benefits. Economically inactive people are defined as those who are neither self-employed or employed nor unemployed in a given month.
- Income comparisons are based on average monthly income from employment. As working hours and work-time percentage (for part-time work) are not recorded in the available data sources (see Box 3.1), we cannot calculate hourly wages or standardised income. In the case of men, hourly wages and monthly income are strongly correlated, as their average work-time percentage is very high. In the case of women, however, differences in income do not directly imply differences in hourly wages.

3.1.2 Literature

How well migrants integrate in the labour market of their host country has long been a core question of migration research. In early works, Chiswick (1978) and Borjas (1985, 1987) used cross sectional data to examine the correlation between length of stay and the income ratio of migrants and US nationals in the United States. Borjas (2015) updated these analyses. As these studies are not based on longitudinal data, however, but on (repeated) cross sections, they cannot show individual integration trajectories, but only the average evolution of a cohort of migrants. However, as the composition of such cohorts is constantly changing due to return migration, integration cannot be distinguished from the consequences of the changed composition.

Only in the last two decades has migration research analysed longitudinal data in order to highlight integration trajectories. Hu (2000) and Lubotsky (2007) examine individual differences in earnings between migrants and natives using US administrative data. They find that over time migrants are able to close the migrant-native earnings gap. Bratsberg et al. (2010, 2014) analyse Norwegian administrative data and in contrast to the previous authors not only consider income, but also employment. They found that migrants from European countries leave Norway after just a few years on average. Migrants from countries outside Europe stay longer in the country, are initially well integrated in the labour market but increasingly leave it after around ten years to claim social insurance benefits instead.

There is very little literature relating to Switzerland in this area. The first study based on administrative longitudinal data was conducted by Fluder et al. (2013) on behalf of the Control committee. It is based on linked social insurance and migration register data. The authors only use the longitudinal dimension of their data to calculate the length of stay, and then analyse the incidence of unemployment and social insurance claims in cross sections. Two other studies look at the labour market outcomes of foreign nationals in Switzerland. Steinhardt et al. (2013) compare native Swiss with naturalised Swiss citizens and foreign nationals. A study by BASS (2015) compares migrants from countries affected by the European debt crisis with migrants from other EU countries.

The authors of this chapter already analysed the integration of migrants in the labour market on behalf of SECO in 2018 (Favre, Föllmi, and Zweimüller 2018). Methodologically we draw on these existing studies, but we go further in several dimensions. First, a new data set allows us to extend the study period by three years, to 2016. This allows us to analyse integration over a longer period, and allows us to incorporate additional cohorts in the analyses. Furthermore, we highlight the significance of the household situation in labour market decisions and thus integration. To take better account of the heterogeneity of migrants, we expand the

[3] See Table T 1.1 in Chapter 1.

analyses of distribution of labour income. Finally, we document the integration trajectories of persons with different lengths of stay in Switzerland and analyse how labour market success influences return migration, in order to obtain a more complete picture of integration.

3.2 A comparison of the labour income structure of migrants and people born in Switzerland

The number of migrants arriving in Switzerland every year rose steadily between 2003 and 2013. Immigration has since fallen slightly, but in 2017 was still well above 2003 levels. The proportion of migrants from EU and EFTA states was consistently at around 80%.

By and large, these migrants have integrated well in the labour market, but they do not achieve quite the same labour market participation as people born in Switzerland on average. For example, at 78% for men and 66% for women, the percentage of employed migrants aged between 18 and 65 in 2015 was relatively high, but was still significantly below the labour force participation of the comparable population born in Switzerland (85% for men and 78% for women).

A descriptive analysis shows that employed migrants even earn a slightly higher average income than those born in Switzerland. This extremely positive integration picture must be viewed in a differentiated manner, however. On the one hand, the employment rate of migrants is lower. On the other, we need to distinguish between men and women as there are clear differences in work-time percentage. Both male migrants and men born in Switzerland are for the most part in full-time employment and in 2016 earned about the same average monthly income of CHF 7540. Meanwhile, employed migrant women work on average around 10% more than employed women born in Switzerland, and in 2016 also earned 10% more, with an average monthly income of CHF 4766. From this it follows that migrants and those born in Switzerland earn similar average salaries. However, these average values conceal considerable heterogeneity among migrants, as those with particularly high and those with particularly low incomes are over-represented compared with people born in Switzerland. This particularly applies to recent migrants.

Graph G3.1 compares the income distribution of migrants and people born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55. The box represents the quartile of distribution; the solid lines show the 5th and 95th percentiles and the point shows the average income.

Migrant and men born in Switzerland earn virtually the same average monthly income of around CHF 8000. Among migrants, however, there are slightly more individuals with low incomes and the 1st quartile is accordingly somewhat lower. This is offset by a larger proportion of individuals who earn a very high income. A comparison of education groups shows that there are many top earners among migrants who have completed tertiary education in particular, with 5% of this group earning more than CHF 30 000 a month.

Distribution of income from employment of migrants and people born in Switzerland, 2016 **G3.1**



Note: The graph shows the distribution of monthly income from employment in 2016. It takes into account migrants who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2016 and who were aged between 25 and 55 in 2016, as well and people born in Switzerland of the same age. The box represents the quartile of income distribution, the horizontal lines denote the 5th and 95th percentile, and the point shows the mean. The vertical lines in the middle of the boxes indicate the median income.

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

Both among migrants and among people born in Switzerland, women earn lower monthly incomes than men. As a descriptive analysis of the Swiss labour force survey shows, this is due in particular to the fact that on average women are more likely to work part-time and thus fewer hours per week. Migrant women also earn higher average incomes than women born in

Switzerland as they work more hours on average.[4] As with men, the income distribution of migrant women is also more widely spread than that of women born in Switzerland.

3.3 Employment and unemployment

In this section we look at labour market integration measured in terms of employment rate and unemployment rate. To this end we compare migrants and people born in Switzerland, factoring in differences in age, education and region of residence.

3.3.1 Differences in employment and unemployment over the course of a stay

Graph G3.2 shows the proportion of the population that is not employed and the proportion that claims unemployment benefit. The graph shows the differences between migrants and people born in Switzerland in each case, factoring in the differences owing to age, education and region of residence using the regression equation as set out in Section 3.1.1. The analyses include migrants who moved to Switzerland between 2003 and 2011, stayed for at least five years, and were aged between 25 and 55 during this time. The control group comprises persons born in Switzerland in the same age group who were resident in Switzerland during this time.

Among migrants, the proportion of not employed men in the year of arrival is 15 percentage points higher than that of men born in Switzerland. Over the course of their stay, however, this gap drops to just below 5 percentage points. Migrants are thus able to gain a good foothold in the labour market after a few years in Switzerland. The remaining difference can largely be explained by the higher risk of unemployment in migrants. While the unemployment rate among migrants is initially below that of people born in Switzerland, within five years it rises well above the rate of those born in Switzerland (see also Chapter 1.4.2).

The difference between migrants and people born in Switzerland is much greater in women. In the year of immigration, the proportion of employed migrant women is around 35 percentage points below that of comparable women born in Switzerland and even five years after immigration, there is still a discrepancy of around 15 percentage points. As opposed to men, only a small portion of this difference can be attributed to unemployment in women. Migrant women are thus much more likely than women born in Switzerland to remain completely outside the labour market, or they fail to find employment.

Proportion of not employed persons and proportion of unemployed persons

Migrants arriving between 2003 and 2011 compared with people born in Switzerland

G3.2



Note: The study group is made up of migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 and who stayed in the country for at least five years. The control group comprises individuals born in Switzerland, aged between 25 and 55. The light blue line shows the difference in the proportion of not employed persons between migrants and people born in Switzerland, while the dark blue line indicates the difference in the percentage of unemployed. Differences in age, education and region of residence are stripped out using regression analysis.

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

3.3.2 Differentiation by origin and education

Table T3.1 differentiates the above results by country of origin and education. For the sake of simplicity, the differences in employment rate—in other words the complementary value to no employment—are stated and the differences in unemployment are omitted.

For the detailed analysis by country of origin, the countries are grouped according to a SECO categorisation. This categorisation draws a distinction between different EU and EFTA geographical regions, and between groups of third countries. The differentiation of third countries is guided by whether workers are primarily recruited from a country (e.g. India, United States, China, Japan), or not.

[4] As working hours and work-time percentages are not recorded in the available data sources, we are unable to directly examine what portion of the documented income differences can be attributed to pay gaps and what portion is due to differences in working hours. However, analyses of the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) show that on average, migrant women work more hours than women born in Switzerland.

Employment rate of migrants arriving between 2003 and 2011

Compared with people born in Switzerland (in percentage points) **T3.1**

	Years since arrival	
	0 years	5 years
Total		
Men	–16.1	–3.6
Women	–37.3	–13.3
By country of origin		
Men, EU/EFTA North-West	–9.2	–3.3
Men, EU/EFTA South	2.3	3.0
Men, EU/EFTA East	–13.1	–2.7
Men, third countries, recruitment countries	–29.8	–8.8
Men, third countries, other	–44.9	–9.3
Women, EU/EFTA North-West	–22.2	–7.6
Women, EU/EFTA South	–17.2	1.2
Women, EU/EFTA East	–39.7	–11.7
Women, third countries, recruitment countries	–57.9	–30.4
Women, third countries, other	–60.3	–25.4
By education		
Men, lower secondary level	–8.0	7.0
Men, upper secondary level	–19.2	–5.4
Men, tertiary level	–17.0	–6.7
Women, lower secondary level	–30.6	–3.5
Women, upper secondary level	–37.6	–13.0
Women, tertiary level	–38.6	–17.8

The study group is made up of migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 and who stayed in the country for at least five years. The control group comprises individuals born in Switzerland, aged between 25 and 55. The table shows the differences in the employment rates of migrants and people born in Switzerland. The second column indicates the difference in the year of immigration, and the third column the difference five years after immigration.

Sources: FSO — Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM — ZEMIS; CCO — IA

Employment rate: a comparison of migrant women five years after arrival and women born in Switzerland T3.2

	Employment rate (%)	
	Migrant women after 5 years	Women born in Switzerland
Marital status		
Married	61	80
Unmarried	83	86
Household composition		
Individual household	87	87
Minimum 2 adults, no children	77	86
Minimum 1 child aged 6 or above	67	81
Minimum 1 child aged under 6	55	76

The study group is made up of migrant women who were aged between 30 and 55 in the period 2012 to 2016 and had immigrated to Switzerland five years previously. The control group consists of women born in Switzerland of the same age. The table shows employment rates (in %) by marital status and household composition in the year under observation.

Sources: FSO — Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM — ZEMIS; CCO — IA

Among both men and women, migrants from EU and EFTA states integrate much better in the labour market than migrants from third countries. This is hardly surprising as these migrants are likely to find it easier to orient themselves in the labour market given the cultural proximity of their home countries to Switzerland. For example, many of them already speak one of Switzerland's official languages on arrival. What is surprising is the low employment rate compared with people born in Switzerland of migrants from third countries from which workers are primarily recruited. Here, it is probably people who travel to Switzerland primarily for education and training purposes who remain outside the labour market.

If we differentiate the results by education group, it is striking that migrants with low qualifications fare better relative to those born in Switzerland than migrants with a high level of education. However, this is due to the fact that people born in Switzerland with a low level of education have a much lower employment rate than people born in Switzerland with a high level of education.

3.3.3 Employment and family situation of migrant women

A comparison of male and female migrants shows that migrant men integrate more rapidly and more fully in the labour market than migrant women. Migrant women lag further behind women born in Switzerland from the very beginning and are less able to reduce this gap than migrant men.

A large proportion of these differences can be attributed to the family situation of migrant women, as shown in Table T3.2. After five years in Switzerland, unmarried migrant women aged between 30 and 55 achieve almost the same employment rate as women born in Switzerland of the same age (83% versus 86%). Of the married migrant women, on the other hand, only 61% are in gainful employment after five years in Switzerland. While the employment rate of married women born in Switzerland is also lower than that of unmarried women, it is still 80%. This suggests that the migration decisions of married women focus more on the husband's professional situation than the wife's employment opportunities.

A similar picture emerges if we look at the composition of households in which migrant women and women born in Switzerland live. Migrant women who live in single-person households achieve the same employment rate as women born in Switzerland who live alone. Migrant women who live in a household with other adults (in many cases this is likely to be married women living in a household with their husband) are less likely to be in gainful employment than comparable women born in Switzerland (77% versus 86%). The difference is even greater between migrant women and women born in Switzerland in households with minor children. This indicates that migrant women are more likely to remain outside the Swiss labour market if they live with a partner who earns enough to support the family and if there are minor children in the household.

3.3.4 Differences between migrants with varying lengths of stay

The above analyses only include persons who stayed for at least five years in Switzerland. However, around half of all migrants left Switzerland after just three years. This raises the question as to whether the integration trajectories presented up to now convey an incomplete picture by excluding all those migrants who only stay in the country for a short period.

Furthermore, the previous analyses do not reveal anything about the longer-term integration of migrants in the Swiss labour market. Do migrants successfully gain a foothold in the labour market in the longer term, or does the discrepancy compared with people born in Switzerland increase again after a few years as migrants draw more social insurance benefits?

To answer these two questions, in this section we compare the integration trajectories of people who only stayed for a short time in Switzerland with the integration of persons who remained long term in Switzerland. To this end, we look at people who immigrated to Switzerland between 2003 and 2006 and who were aged between 25 and 55 during the study period. The control group is made up of people born in Switzerland of the same age.

The results of this analysis are shown in Graph G3.3. As in Graph G3.2, we factor in age, education and region of residence to make migrants and people born in Switzerland comparable. The red line shows the integration trajectory of migrants who stay in Switzerland for one year or longer. The other three lines shows the integration trajectories of migrants who stayed in Switzerland for at least three, five and ten years. In men, integration trajectories look similar, regardless of the length of stay. Migrant men initially exhibit a much lower employment rate, but in the first five years make up a large part of this discrepancy compared with men born in Switzerland. After around five years, the integration profile flattens out and a gap of around 3 percentage points remains. In women, too, the integration profiles look similar to Graph G3.2 irrespective of the length of stay, although the discrepancy between migrant women and women born in Switzerland further widens after the fifth year. After ten years, there is a discrepancy of just 9 percentage points.

If we only consider cohorts of migrants who arrived in 2003, we can track integration trajectories up to 13 years after arrival. There is no change compared with the finding above: the gap between migrant men and men born in Switzerland amounts to 2.4 percentage points after 13 years, while between migrant women and women born in Switzerland it totals 10.2 percentage points.

Employment rate of migrants arriving between 2003 and 2006

Compared with people born in Switzerland **G 3.3**



Note: The study group is made up of migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2006 and who stayed for at least one, three, five or ten years. The control group comprises people born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55. In each case, the lines show the difference in the employment rate between migrants and people born in Switzerland. Differences in age, education and region of residence are stripped out using a regression analysis. The difference between these lines is in the minimum length of stay of the migrants considered (one to ten years).

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA © FSO, authors 2020

Income from employment: migrants arriving between 2003 and 2011

Compared with people born in Switzerland **G 3.4**



Note: The study group comprises migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 and who stayed in the country for at least five years and earned an income from gainful employment every year. The control group consists of people born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55 who also earned an income from employment in at least five consecutive years. The light blue line shows the difference in monthly income between migrants and people born in Switzerland. Differences in age, education and region of residence are stripped out using a regression analysis.

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA © FSO, authors 2020

3.4 Differences in labour income

In this section we explore labour market integration measured in terms of monthly labour income. For this purpose, we compare migrants and people born in Switzerland, factoring in differences in age, education and region of residence.

3.4.1 Income differences over the course of a stay

Graph G 3.4 shows the difference in the average monthly income between migrants and people born in Switzerland. Again, the analysis includes male and female migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 and who stayed in the country for at least five years. The control group is made up of persons born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55 who were resident in Switzerland during this period. For both groups, it is presumed that they earned an income from employment in each of the years being studied. The difference between the incomes is indicated in log points. A difference of 0.01 thus equates to an income difference of around 1%.

In the year of immigration, the income of migrant men is just over 5% below the income of men born in Switzerland, but they make up this difference within the first year of arrival. After five years in Switzerland, migrant men even earn more than comparable men born in Switzerland. Meanwhile, migrant women earn slightly more in the year of immigration than comparable women born in Switzerland, and this lead grows to over 20%

Income from employment of migrants arriving between 2003 and 2011

Compared with people born in Switzerland (in log points) **T3.3**

	Years since arrival	
	0 years	5 years
Overall		
Men	−0.058	0.049
Women	0.008	0.227
By country of origin		
Men, EU/EFTA North-West	−0.002	0.101
Men, EU/EFTA South	−0.039	0.020
Men, EU/EFTA East	−0.170	−0.083
Men, third countries, recruitment countries	0.098	0.250
Men, third countries, other	−0.264	−0.056
Women, EU/EFTA North-West	0.175	0.350
Women, EU/EFTA South	−0.145	0.134
Women, EU/EFTA East	−0.121	0.134
Women, third countries, recruitment countries	0.148	0.373
Women, third countries, other	−0.328	0.081
By education		
Men, lower secondary level	−0.111	0.060
Men, upper secondary level	−0.266	−0.122
Men, tertiary level	0.068	0.138
Women, lower secondary level	−0.200	0.126
Women, upper secondary level	−0.048	0.164
Women, tertiary level	0.164	0.279

The study group comprises migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 and who stayed in the country for at least five years and earned an income from gainful employment every year. The control group consists of people born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55 who also earned an income from employment in at least five consecutive years. The table shows the differences in average monthly income between migrants and people born in Switzerland. The second column indicates the difference in the year of immigration, and the third column the difference five years after immigration.

Sources: FSO — Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM — ZEMIS; CCO — IA

within five years. A descriptive analysis shows that this is due to longer average working hours in migrant women, whereas average salaries of migrant women are at about the same level as those of women born in Switzerland (see also Section 3.2).

3.4.2 Income differences by education and nationality

Table T3.3 differentiates the above results by origin and education. It reveals that migrants from northern and western EU and EFTA states and those from the usual recruitment countries also fare particularly well in terms of earnings. Migrant men from these three groups and from southern EU and EFTA states integrate so well in the labour market that after five years they earn a higher income on average than men born in Switzerland. In migrants from eastern EU and EFTA states and—somewhat unsurprisingly—in migrants from third countries that do not belong to the usual recruitment countries, there is still an income gap even after five years. In women too, migrants from northern and western EU and EFTA states fare particularly well. However, after five years, all groups surveyed had integrated so well that they earned a higher income on average than women born in Switzerland.

If we analyse the education groups separately, it is striking that migrant men and women with an upper secondary qualification earn much lower incomes than comparable people born in Switzerland. This shows the high value the labour market attaches to the Swiss apprenticeship. In both men and women, the migrants who fare best are those who have a tertiary level qualification. Migrant men with a tertiary level qualification earn 14% higher incomes than comparable men born in Switzerland, while migrant women with a tertiary level qualification earn almost 30% higher incomes than women born in Switzerland.

3.4.3 Income differences along the income distribution

As shown in the previous section, the average incomes of migrants conceal significant income differences. The positive integration shown in Graph G3.4 could thus be driven by a particularly positive development among top earners. Indeed, the separate analysis by education group in Table T3.3 shows that highly-qualified migrants have a particularly steep income trajectory relative to the control group of people born in Switzerland. However, this analysis also shows that low-qualified migrants also integrate rapidly in the labour market and earn comparable incomes to low-qualified people born in Switzerland after five years.

Graph G3.5 once again clearly shows this outcome. To draw up this graph, the income of people born in Switzerland was first compared with that of migrants, controlling for age, education and region of residence. We split the (controlled) income of both groups into twenty groups of equal size (ventiles). The light blue lines show the proportion of migrants who fall into each of these ventiles in the year of immigration. If the income distributions of migrants and people born in Switzerland were identical, these lines would be horizontal at 5% (i.e. 5% of migrants would fall in every income ventile of people born in Switzerland).

Migrant men are significantly over-represented in the lowest income ventiles, under-represented in the middle of the income distribution and again slightly over-represented in the top ventile. Recent migrants are thus disproportionately likely to earn particularly high or particularly low incomes. A similar picture emerges for women, although the distribution of migrant women has shifted marginally upwards because they work slightly longer hours on average than comparable women born in Switzerland.

The dark blue lines show the distribution of the same migrants (male and female) five years after arriving in Switzerland. In both men and women, the proportion of migrants has fallen at the lower end of the income distribution and increased at the upper end. This underscores that it is not only the top-earning migrants who achieve above-average income growth, but that the income distribution of migrants is approaching that of people born in Switzerland.

Position of migrants arriving between 2003 and 2011 in the income distribution

In the year of immigration and five years later
Compared with people born in Switzerland

G3.5



Note: The study group comprises migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2011 and who stayed in the country for at least five years and earned an income from gainful employment every year. The control group consists of people born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55 who also achieved labour income in at least five consecutive years. The lines with dots show the proportion of migrants found in each income ventile of people born in Switzerland. The light blue line shows the distribution of migrant men and women in the year of arrival in Switzerland; the dark blue line shows the distribution five years after immigration.

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

3.4.4 Differences between migrants with varying lengths of stay

The previous income analyses were limited to male and female migrants who stayed in Switzerland for at least five years. As outlined in the section on labour market participation, in this section we extend the focus to persons who stayed between just one year to ten years.

Graph G3.6 shows the income integration of people who immigrated to Switzerland between 2003 and 2006 and who were aged between 25 and 55 during the study period. The control group comprises people born in Switzerland who were in the

Income from employment of migrants arriving between 2003 and 2006

Compared with people born in Switzerland **G3.6**



Note: The study group comprises migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland between 2003 and 2006 and who stayed in the country for at least one, three, five or ten years and earned an income from employment every year. The control group consists of people born in Switzerland aged between 25 and 55. In each case, the lines show the difference in monthly income between migrants and people born in Switzerland. Differences in age, education and region of residence are stripped out using a regression analysis. The difference between the lines is in the minimum length of stay of the migrants considered (one to ten years).

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

same age group during this period. As in all previous analyses, we consider age, education and region of residence. The red line shows the integration trajectory of migrants who stayed in Switzerland for at least a year, while the other three lines show the integration paths of migrants who stayed at least three, five or ten years in the country.

Regarding income convergence between migrants and people born in Switzerland, there are no significant differences between those who had a short stay in Switzerland and those who remained for the longer term. In all cases, migrant men initially achieved significantly lower incomes than men born in Switzerland, instead enjoying much greater income growth in subsequent years. In the year of immigration, migrant women earn about the same as women born in Switzerland irrespective of their length of stay and also enjoy an above-average increase in income in the early years of their stay.

3.5 Return migration

In the first sections of this chapter, we looked at how male and female migrants integrate in the Swiss labour market during their stay in the country. It is in the nature of such analyses that they focus on migrants who stay for at least a short time in the country. But how many migrants stay for a short or longer period in Switzerland? And how does the length of stay in Switzerland relate to labour market success? We will now address these questions.

Length of stay of migrants who arrived after 2003 until departure **G3.7**



Note: Proportion of migrants who arrived after 2003 and who are still resident in Switzerland after a certain length of stay (estimated according to Kaplan and Meier 1958).

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

Graph G3.7 shows the proportion of the migrants who arrived in Switzerland after 2003 who are still in the country after a certain time. Here, we use the Kaplan and Meier estimator (1958). Indeed, many migrants only stay for a very short period in Switzerland: one third leave within the first year and just half of a migrant cohort stays in the country for longer than three years. After three years, the propensity to leave falls significantly, however (see also Chapter 2.5). Quantitatively and therefore macroeconomically, migrants who only stay for a very short time in Switzerland play a less important role than this graph would suggest—precisely because they only remain in Switzerland for a short time. If we take all migrants as a basis, more than half have already lived in Switzerland for over ten years, while the proportion of people who stay less than two years is only around a fifth.

Among those migrants who only stay in Switzerland for a year, many participate in the labour market from the outset. In both men and women, the employment rate of those who quickly leave Switzerland is above that of people who remain in the country for more than a year. However, in subsequent years a

Employment rate of migrants who left Switzerland between 2003 and 2017

Compared with migrants who remained in Switzerland **G3.8**



Note: The study group comprises migrants aged between 25 and 55 who arrived in Switzerland from 2003 onwards. The dark blue line indicates for each year since arrival the employment rate of migrants who leave the country in the relevant year. The light blue line shows the employment rate of migrants who were still in Switzerland the following year.

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

Income from employment of migrants leaving Switzerland between 2003 and 2017

Compared with the migrants who remained in the country **G3.9**



Note: The study group comprises migrants aged between 25 and 55 who immigrated to Switzerland from 2003 onwards. The line shows the relationship between the average income of migrants in the year before they left Switzerland and the average income of those migrants who remained in Switzerland.

Sources: FSO – Structural Survey, STATPOP; SEM – ZEMIS; CCO – IA

disproportionately high number of people who do not earn an income from gainful employment leave Switzerland, in other words those who do not work and are not unemployed.

This correlation can be seen in Graph G3.8. The dark blue line shows the employment rate of people who leave Switzerland in the relevant year, while the light blue line shows the employment rate of those who remain in Switzerland. This includes people who arrived in Switzerland from 2003 and who are aged between 25 and 55.

Graph G3.9 illustrates a similar analysis of labour income of emigrants and those who stayed in Switzerland. The line with dots compares the income of migrants the year they left Switzerland with the average income of the whole cohort in that year.

In the first year, it is primarily those with very low earnings who leave Switzerland. Those with a very short length of stay are thus frequently low-qualified workers who do participate in the labour market but who earn a below-average income. In the subsequent years, the average income of emigrants is around 10 to 20% above that of the migrants in the same cohort who remained in Switzerland. However, if we look at the income distribution of male and female emigrants, it is noticeable that people with both very high and very low incomes are over-represented. The high average income of emigrants is thus driven by some people with particularly high incomes. This therefore concerns highly-qualified workers who are active on an international labour market and are thus particularly mobile.

3.6 Conclusion

Our analyses show that migrant men are able to integrate rapidly and well in the Swiss labour market. While their employment rate in the year of arrival is around 16 percentage points below that of comparable men born in Switzerland, this gap narrows to just 4 percentage points after five years (see Table T3.1). In addition, employed migrant men rapidly make up the initial income gap and after five years even earn slightly higher monthly incomes than men born in Switzerland. However, they are more likely to be unemployed.

On the other hand, the employment rate of migrant women is significantly lower (–37 percentage points) in the year of immigration than that of women born in Switzerland. Migrant women are also able to narrow this gap over the course of their stays, however, and after five years it amounts to just 13 percentage points. Employed migrant women also earn the same level of income in the year of immigration as women born in Switzerland, and 23% more after five years. This can be partly attributed to the fact that migrant women work more on average.

These average values conceal significant heterogeneity. If we compare the education structure of migrants with that of people born in Switzerland, we notice that among migrants, both those with a low level of education (lower secondary level or less) and those with a high level of education (tertiary) make up a larger proportion than among those born in Switzerland. This bimodal qualification structure is also reflected in income distribution, with male and female migrants over-represented at both the lower and upper ends of the income distribution.[5]

To make sure that our results are not driven by individual groups of migrants, we therefore differentiate our analyses by qualification and country of origin. The picture of positive integration is maintained in all sub-groups. There are significant differences in the extent of integration, however. In terms of employment rate, migrants with a low level of education fare better than migrants with a high level of education in relation to the Swiss control group. On the other hand, male and female migrants with a high level of education fare best in terms of labour income. In both dimensions, migrants from EU and EFTA states do better than migrants from third countries.

The analysis of income distribution for those who are employed also paints a very positive integration picture. While male and female migrants are still over-represented on the bottom end of the income distribution even after five years, this proportion significantly decreases over time. Conversely, the share of male and female migrants at the upper end of the income distribution increases. Male and female migrants are therefore able to catch up with the income distribution of people born in Switzerland across the board. Comparing income gains by quintile confirms this picture. All male and female migrants achieve positive income growth on average, and in all except the first quintile, this growth exceeds that of people born in Switzerland.

In our analyses we focus on migrants who stayed in Switzerland for at least five years. But we also extend this focus to take account of migrants who remained in Switzerland for less than five years. We note that the integration profiles of these people look very similar to the integration profiles of migrants who stayed in the country for longer. While they initially exhibit lower employment rates and average incomes, they are rapidly able to reduce the gap compared with people born in Switzerland. These extended analyses also show that even after ten years, the employment rate of migrants does not fall compared with that of people born in Switzerland. Migrants can therefore participate in the labour market in the longer term and do not slip into dependence on social insurance in significant numbers. However, among women in particular, a substantial gap remains compared with women born in Switzerland.

The migrants who remain in Switzerland thus integrate well in the labour market. Nevertheless, it is clear that many migrants leave Switzerland quickly, with over half leaving the country after less than three years. People with very low incomes have particularly short stays. In later years, more highly-qualified workers—who seem particularly internationally mobile—leave Switzerland, as well as people who were not employed in the country.

[5] See also the study by Jey Aratnam (2012).

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4 Household income and wealth among people with a migration background. A comparison of Switzerland and Germany

Laura Ravazzini, Christoph Halbmeier, and Christian Suter

'This is the even-handed dealing of the world!' he (Scrooge) said. 'There is nothing on which it is so hard as poverty; and there is nothing it professes to condemn with such severity as the pursuit of wealth!' Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol, 1843

Abstract

In this chapter, we add an important indicator of integration and living conditions of migrants: household wealth. Starting with household income and continuing with wealth, we compare the monetary living conditions of migrant, non-migrant and mixed households in Switzerland and in Germany. We find that migrants in Germany earn less income than non-migrants and this income difference contributes to a substantial migrant wealth gap. Migrant households in Switzerland share incomes among more people. This sharing of resources makes migrants less affluent than non-migrants. In Switzerland, limited home ownership among migrant and mixed households is important to explain why migrants hold on average less wealth than non-migrants. Regulations about access to mortgages and to secondary residences, practices of inheritance, work experience, the evolution of housing prices and intentions of mobility are possible explanations for the lower accumulation of wealth among migrants in this country.

4.1 Introduction

The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO) monitors the integration and the living conditions of migrants through 68 indicators linked to 11 life domains. Among these indicators there are comparisons of employment conditions during the active life, including the risk of being a low wage earner (Kristensen et al. 2017). Results for 2015 indicate that 13% of workers with no migration background have low salaries and that the percentage is higher (20%) for workers with a migration background. The migration background of individuals affects also the poverty rate of the active population and therefore the number of working-poor.

The annual indicators provided by the FSO go beyond the active population and provide measures of integration and living conditions for the entire population. Thanks to these indicators, we understand that there are differences in the economic resources of migrants and non-migrants outside of the active population. In 2017, the disposable annual median equivalent income[1] was indeed significantly lower for all people with a migration background, independent of their activity status (CHF 46 592 for people with a migration background versus CHF 53 745 for without migration background) (FSO 2019a). This corresponded to a much higher risk of poverty for people with a migration background (17.5%) than for those without a migration background (11.5%) (FSO 2019b).

In addition to the difference in disposable income, material deprivation was three times higher among people with a migration background (7.0% versus 2.4% for the rest of the population) (FSO 2019c). This stronger economic hardship for people with a migration background is reflected in their subjective evaluation of the difficulty in making ends meet: 17.3% of people with a migration background versus 7.2% of the rest of the population reported that they faced difficulties in meeting everyday living expenses (FSO 2019d). In this sense, we can observe that the objective risk of poverty is similar, but does not correspond perfectly with the subjective evaluation of the financial situation.

These differences are persistent. Even if migrants are a heterogeneous group, at the aggregated level, these differences have been consistent over time and across multiple definitions and survey methodologies,[2] and have existed at least since 2010 (FSO 2019b, c). In terms of income and material deprivation, people with a migration background in Switzerland are therefore objectively and subjectively disadvantaged in comparison to people without a migration background.

4.2 The importance of wealth

To this rich picture of indicators of integration and living conditions of migrants we add another important measure: household wealth. We do so because wealth has large effects on material living conditions over the life-course that are not captured by income-based indicators. Wealth is a fundamental part of a person's old-age provision—e.g. in the form of savings and privately-owned housing (Guggisberg and Häni 2014). Wealth can substitute income and smooth consumption in periods of economic hardship, and it can create new opportunities for

[1] Equivalent income is income divided by the equivalized household size. Children have a lower weight than adults in the equivalization.

[2] 2014–2016 is the most comparable period for these indicators. The trend has been created with SILC.

employment through self-employment. Moreover, wealth is a means to transfer social status among generations and, thus, is intimately related to questions of social mobility.

For these reasons, wealth is currently being discussed as a complementary measure of income in the measurement of economic poverty (UNECE 2017, 157–158; OECD 2018a). As opposite sides of the same coin, poverty and wealth cannot be separated.

4.3 The international comparison with Germany

We compare the monetary living conditions of households with a migration background in Switzerland with households with a migration background in Germany.[3] Germany is an interesting country for an international comparison with Switzerland. Apart from being a neighboring country, Germany shares important economic similarities with Switzerland: low unemployment, low home-ownership (47.5% in Germany and 37% in Switzerland)[4] and equal loan-to-value ratios (20%) for the acquisition of real estate properties with a mortgage, similar sector shares in value added, a similar welfare system (e.g. generous unemployment benefits for short periods of unemployment and public education based on a dual education system), and high wealth inequality (Kaas et al. 2015). The institutional context that concerns private wealth accumulation, however, differs between both countries in some important respects. Switzerland is one of the few OECD countries with a wealth tax, while in Germany the wealth tax was effectively abolished in 1997 (OECD 2018b). The pension systems contrast in so far that occupational pensions are mandatory in Switzerland, while the German system relies more strongly on the first pillar and occupational pensions are voluntary.[5] Health care is organized in both countries around a system of mandatory health insurance with standard benefits regulated by federal legislation. However, per capita health expenditures are significantly higher in Switzerland (OECD 2019) and are financed to a larger degree by out-of-pocket payments and cost-sharing.[6]

Although no study has so far investigated the migrant wealth gap in Switzerland, previous studies on the migrant wealth gap exist in Germany. In this country, the difference between migrant households and those with a non-migrant background in wealth holdings and savings rates has been found to stem primarily from differences in the educational attainment and demographic characteristics (Bauer et al. 2011; Bauer and Sinning 2011). In addition, migrant households are much less likely to own their homes than non-migrant households (Sinning 2010), but those with a stronger commitment to the host country are more likely to achieve home ownership (Constant et al. 2009).

Going beyond already available FSO indicators, with this chapter we aim to give a more encompassing picture of the economic living conditions of the households with a migration background in Switzerland. The comparison with Germany will enrich the analysis and will put the migrant income and wealth gaps in Switzerland into an international context.

4.4 Data and methodology

A preliminary analysis with wealth as an indicator of living conditions is now possible due to the availability of new survey data from the Swiss Statistics of Income and Living Conditions (SILC), which in 2015 contained an experimental module on household wealth.[7] In this chapter, we use the 2015 SILC version (dated 07.06.2018) to analyse the income and wealth possessions of households with and without a migration background.

One difficulty of this analysis is that the migration background is identified at the individual level, while wealth is monitored at the household level. To solve this issue, we define three types of household: households with all individuals with a migration background (which we define as 'migrant households' for simplicity), households with individuals with different backgrounds (which we define as 'mixed households') and households with no individual with a migration background (which we define as 'non-migrant households'). Given that migrant and non-migrant households also include single households, in comparing these households with mixed households, we exclude single households in order to have similar household sizes. The migration background of individuals is defined according to the composition of three indicators. We consider a person to have a migration background depending on their nationality, their place of birth, and the place of birth of their parents. This definition corresponds to the definition used in Chapter 1.

The sample of SILC 2015 is composed of a total of 7468 households. Of these households, 1413 are currently dropped due to missing data—principally due to the migrant status[8]—and 6055 are included in the analysis. Very wealthy households, and particularly foreign individuals subjected to lump-sum taxation, are underrepresented in this survey.

For the international comparison with Germany, we use data of the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which collects wealth data similarly to SILC, but oversamples migrants and high-income

3 This chapter is based on research funded by the SNSF (project no. 10001AL_166319: 'Wealth distribution in Switzerland and Germany: Evidence from Survey Data').

4 Home ownership rate is computed at the household level.

5 There is higher employee involvement (social contributions of protected persons) in the financing of social security in Switzerland than in Germany or the EU more in general (FSO 2019e).

6 In Switzerland, health insurance premiums are per capita, and not at the household level as in Germany. Moreover, contrary to Germany, there is little or no contribution or cost sharing for health insurances by the employers. In addition, in Switzerland, dentist treatments are not covered by the health insurance. In 2013, out-of-pocket payments and cost-sharing constituted 25.9% of total health expenditures, compared to 13.5% in Germany in 2012 (Busse and Blümel 2014; De Pietro et al. 2015).

7 The first module on household wealth was introduced in 2011, but data coherence was rather low (Ecoplan 2014). In 2015, coherence with national accounts has largely improved reaching 92% for net worth (Ravazzini et al. 2019). In this chapter, we use the experimental module of SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018, which has still some limitations: the impossibility to disentangle wealth of the first residence from other real estate, the lack of a question about financial debt other than mortgages, measurement errors linked to the estimation of housing wealth and to data imputation. Despite these limitations, the experimental module of SILC 2015 is so far the most coherent survey about the wealth of the overall population in Switzerland.

8 60% of these observations are missing due to the migration status, 20% are households with several adults, where the couple cannot be identified, and the other 20% have missing values in the explanatory variables.

households. Detailed information on household wealth was collected in 2002, 2007, 2012, and 2017, of which we use the most recent year with harmonized data: 2012. Initiated in 1984, the SOEP is collected on a yearly basis and provides representative data on the German population. Since its first wave, the SOEP continuously oversamples migrants and is therefore specifically well suited for studies on migration. Currently, the sample of the SOEP is of approximately 30 000 individuals living in 15 000 households (Goebel et al. 2019). In the analysis, we adopt the same definition of the migration background as for Switzerland.[9]

SILC and SOEP differ in terms of wealth components because SILC 2015 does not measure consumer debt and business assets, whereas SOEP is unable to differentiate bank accounts from other financial assets. To make the data comparable, in the analysis, we excluded business assets and consumer debt measured in SOEP.[10] Since many differences might be visible in other financial assets than bank accounts, we show these two components as separate for Switzerland and as the same component for Germany. Third pillar accounts are asked by SILC and SOEP and are included in the analysis. These accounts include also life insurances. First and second pillar accounts are not covered by these two surveys.

Other than that, the SOEP uses individual interviewers who can help with language problems. This enables migrants with lower levels of language proficiency to better understand the questions. SILC is a telephone interview conducted in the national languages, and therefore might discourage the participation of migrants who do not speak the national language perfectly. Both surveys do not specify in which country people hold wealth assets or debts and no instruction is given to the interviewers. It remains therefore at the discretion of the respondent to declare foreign assets. In both countries, this might create underreporting of wealth possessions among migrants.

With these data, we construct the migrant wealth gap and the migrant income gap between households with and without a migration background. Income is defined as annual disposable income including imputed rents. We display the results excluding the extremes of the distribution due to their volatility. In the first part of the results, we provide robust summary statistics and the portfolio composition of households with and without a migration background. In addition, for households with a migration background, we give details about the region of origin. We define the household head of each household as the person with the highest income and in case of parity, as the eldest person.

In the second part of the analysis, we deconstruct the wealth gaps at the 25 percentile, at the median and at the 75 percentile to see whether the gaps are explained by the different characteristics of households with and without a migration background. This procedure is well established in the literature and has been used by many authors.[11] The analysis shows how much of the gap in household net worth results from the fact that non-migrant households have different characteristics than households with a migration background.

Box 4.1: DFL method

We use the so-called DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux decomposition (DiNardo et al. 1996), which is commonly applied in the analysis of income and wealth gaps to identify whether the gaps may be explained by different characteristics. The unexplained part of the gap may indicate discrimination. More information about this technique can be found in the appendix.

The socio-demographic characteristics used in the analysis are: age, gender, education, work experience, activity status, number of children, marital status, and the household size. The economic characteristics used in the analysis are income, home ownership, and the ability to save. It is important to note that the analysis might not attribute the full gap to different household characteristics because many relevant characteristics are unobserved. Wealth is an indicator that accumulates over a lifetime, depending on the characteristics of that lifetime, many of which are unobserved in today's data. Given these data constraints, the results should be taken as indications for the relevance of characteristics that we observe today. The part of the gap which is not explained by these characteristics could indicate the lack of data and cannot be interpreted solely as discrimination.

4.5 The mystery of the Swiss migrant wealth gap

The migrant wealth gap depends both on the amount of economic resources that migrant and non-migrant households accumulate and on the number of people among which these resources are shared. In this paragraph, we will see how labour income, the composition of assets and debts and the household composition influences the wealth accumulation of migrant and non-migrant households in Switzerland and in Germany.

4.5.1 Swiss migrants share income among more people than non-migrants

Migrant households have CHF 5391 less per year in median equivalent disposable income than non-migrant households (see Table T4.1). However, this difference is not only due to lower household income. Migrant households indeed earn CHF 2264 less per year than non-migrant households. This difference however, is not so significant, though migrant households are significantly

[9] A minor difference is that the German data do not allow to classify second generation migrants exactly as in Switzerland because the data do only show whether both parents were born in Germany or not. Persons with one parent born outside Germany therefore have to be classified as persons with migration background.

[10] We tested the difference with German data and we found that consumer debt is not significantly different between non-migrant and migrant households. Business assets, however, are significantly different between these two household types.

[11] See Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006a) or Painter and Qian (2015) for the US, Cobb-Clark and Hildebrand (2006b) for Mexican Americans, Gibson et al. (2007) for New Zealand, Bauer et al. (2011) for the US, Germany, and Australia, as well as Mathä et al. (2011) for Italy, Luxembourg, and Germany.

Average characteristics of the Swiss sample, 2015

According to the household head

T4.1

	Non-migrants (1)	Migrants (2)	Mixed (3)	(2) – (1)	(3) – (1§)
Age (years)	54.47	48.60	51.49	–5.87 years**	–1.15 years
Household size (number of persons)	1.87	2.20	2.87	+0.33 persons**	+0.12 persons**
Number of children	0.27	0.49	0.66	+0.22 children**	+0.12 children**
Marital status (%)					
Never married	32.40	28.55	15.22	–3.85 p.p.**	–0.95 p.p.
Married	37.08	44.95	80.83	+7.87 p.p.**	8.05 p.p.**
Divorced	18.98	19.71	3.73	+0.73 p.p.	–6.54 p.p.**
Widowed	11.54	6.80	0.22	–4.75 p.p.**	–0.56 p.p.*
Highest education (%)					
Compulsory	9.06	21.03	5.75	+11.97 p.p.**	+0.45 p.p.
Secondary II	53.46	38.72	43.25	–14.73 p.p.**	–7.19 p.p.**
Tertiary	37.48	40.24	50.99	+2.76 p.p.	+6.74 p.p.**
Work experience (years)	28.39	22.53	28.12	–5.86 years**	–1.66 years**
Activity status (%)					
Privately or publicly employed	55.37	68.44	71.69	+13.07 p.p.**	+8.36 p.p.**
Self-employed	8.73	5.12	7.60	–3.60 p.p.**	–2.19 p.p.
Retired	30.16	15.15	16.38	–15.00 p.p.**	–6.40 p.p.**
Unemployed	1.15	4.24	1.22	+3.09 p.p.**	+0.54 p.p.
Inactive	4.60	7.04	3.11	+2.44 p.p.*	–0.30 p.p.
Yearly disposable household income (median, CHF)	68 480	66 216	105 806	–2 264 CHF	+6 649 CHF**
Yearly equivalent disposable household income (median, CHF)	52 240	46 849	56 502	–5 391 CHF**	+601 CHF
Do not/cannot save	45.96	49.53	42.70	+3.57 p.p.	+3.09 p.p.
Observations	4 032	1 260	763		

All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights. 1§ includes only couples and excludes single households among non-migrants. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. p.p. refers to percentage points.

Source: FSO — SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

larger (i.e. composed of more individuals and more children) and therefore share this income among more people. This difference in the household composition makes migrants less well off than non-migrants (– CHF 5391). This disadvantage does not concern only people with relatively high or low incomes but is persistent throughout the entire distribution (see Graph G 4.1).

Apart from this difference, the household head of migrant households is younger and has accumulated less work experience than the household head of non-migrant households. Furthermore, migrants are more often in the active labour force and less often among retirees.

Mixed households are situated in between migrants and non-migrants. They are more like migrants in terms of socio-demographic conditions and more like non-migrants in terms of economic conditions. Like migrants, mixed households are composed of fewer retirees and by more educated people than non-migrants. Mixed households are also large, with many children, but their equivalent disposable is the same as the income of non-migrant couples (see Graph G 4.1). With respect to income, mixed households are not disadvantaged compared to non-migrant couples. Mixed households earn in total about CHF 6649 more per year than non-migrant couples and on average almost CHF 601 more in equivalent terms.

Percentiles of yearly equivalent disposable income, 2015

Among non-migrant, migrant and mixed households in Switzerland **G 4.1**



Note: All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights.

Source: FSO – SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

4.5.2 Swiss migrants accumulate less wealth both in terms of housing and of financial wealth

The relatively small difference in median equivalent household income between non-migrants and migrants translates into a much larger difference in total net worth at the median (see Table T4.2).

Among migrant households 49.5% declared that they cannot save and 5.3% said that they fall into debt. These proportions are lower among non-migrants, with 46.0% who cannot save and 1.5% who fall into debt. In terms of wealth, this difference in income and in savings makes migrant households have about CHF 209 387 less than non-migrants in total net worth. The difference is smaller at the bottom of the distribution and larger at the top, but it is always significant (see Graph G 4.2). At the median, migrant households who have the lowest income compared to non-migrant households come from former Yugoslavia and Turkey. These migrants are also those with the lowest net worth, together with migrants from Africa. A smaller but substantial disadvantage both in terms of income and net worth is also present among migrants from Eastern and Southern Europe. Interestingly, migrant households from Northern and Western Europe have higher incomes than non-migrant households, but lower net worth. Similarly, households with a household head born in Switzerland to at least one foreign parent have the same income as non-migrants, but a significantly lower net worth.

Possible reasons for a lower wealth accumulation could be again the number of children and other relatives among which income is shared, inheritances, a different propensity to save and home ownership. The difference in the proportion of home ownership is confirmed when we look at the value of real estate assets owned by non-migrant and migrant households (see Table T4.3).

About a quarter of migrant households hold real estate compared to approximately a half among non-migrant households. Fewer migrants than non-migrants also have mortgages to acquire a house. This difference is rather large, but is not the only one. A substantial difference also exists in ownership of bonds, stocks and mutual funds with fewer migrants holding this type of assets than non-migrants. In addition to this, fewer migrants hold bank accounts than non-migrants. Migrants are therefore less wealthy both in terms of housing wealth and in terms of financial wealth. Moreover, there is also a small difference in ownership of valuables, which indicates lower material well-being among migrants than non-migrants.

Percentiles of household net worth, 2015

Among non-migrant, migrant and mixed households in Switzerland **G 4.2**



Note: All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights.

Source: FSO – SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

The situation is again different for mixed households. In this case, the difference in financial assets does not exist. Moreover, more mixed households than non-migrant households hold valuables. However, access to home ownership is reduced for mixed households. The difference between non-migrant and mixed households in Graph G 4.2 is therefore attributable to housing wealth.

Differences in median equivalent household income and median net worth, 2015

Between non-migrants and migrants in Switzerland, according to the origin of the household head **T4.2**

	Median equivalent household income	Difference with non-migrants	Median net worth	Difference with non-migrants	Proportion of all migrants
All migrants	46 849 CHF	–5 391 CHF**	50 000 CHF	–209 387 CHF**	100%
Region of origin of migrants					
Switzerland	50 323 CHF	–1 917 CHF	61 600 CHF	–197 787 CHF**	14.0%
Northern and Western Europe	56 472 CHF	4 232 CHF*	127 144 CHF	–132 243 CHF**	30.5%
Southern Europe	43 867 CHF	–8 373 CHF**	40 000 CHF	–219 387 CHF**	24.6%
Eastern Europe	40 235 CHF	–12 004 CHF**	28 000 CHF	–231 387 CHF**	5.8%
Former Yugoslavia and Turkey	32 379 CHF	–19 861 CHF**	14 250 CHF	–245 138 CHF**	11.6%
Africa	47 790 CHF	–4 450 CHF	16 218 CHF	–243 169 CHF**	5.0%
Other	41 731 CHF	–10 509 CHF**	24 000 CHF	–235 387 CHF**	8.5%

Median equivalent household income and household net worth in CHF. All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Mixed households are excluded.

Source: FSO — SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

Portfolio composition of different households in Switzerland, 2015 **T4.3**

Asset type	Share of households holding an asset type (%)			Difference (percentage points)	
	Non-migrants (1)	Migrants (2)	Mixed (3)	(2) – (1)	(3) – (1§)
Real estate	51.7	29.4	54.8	–22.3**	–12.0**
Bank account	94.9	85.6	94.8	–9.3**	–0.9
Bonds, stocks and mutual funds	36.2	21.0	39.7	–15.1**	–2.4
Valuables	38.6	34.4	48.7	–4.2*	+4.8*
3rd pillar pension wealth	52.5	41.3	65.2	–11.2**	–1.3
Mortgages	43.2	22.8	48.1	–20.4**	–11.7**
Observations	4 032	1 260	763		

All statistics weighted with cross — sectional household weights. 1§ includes only couples and excludes single households among non-migrants. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.

Source: FSO — SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

4.5.3 In Germany, migrants earn less than non-migrants

The demographic and economic situation of mixed households is comparable between Switzerland and Germany. Similarly, in Germany, mixed households are composed of more people, are more educated, earn more income and have similar disposable incomes to non-migrant couples in equivalent terms (see Table T4.4). Migrant households in these two countries however, show substantial differences in their economic conditions. Even though they share some similar demographic characteristics, e.g. they are younger than non-migrants and have more children, German migrants have a more similar work experience to non-migrants than Swiss migrants (– 3.9 years in Germany compared to – 5.9 years in Switzerland), but they earn significantly less than non-migrant households even before taking into account their different household structure. Migrant households in Germany have a total disposable income of EUR 3410 per year less than non-migrant households at the median and this difference grows to EUR 4464 when the household structure is taken into account. Moreover, this difference increases over the distribution and becomes larger for top earners (see Graph G4.3).

Average characteristics of the German sample, 2012

According to the household head

T4.4

	Non-migrants (1)	Migrants (2)	Mixed (3)	(2) – (1)	(3) – (1§)
Age (years)	56.97	51.31	53.72	–5.66 years**	–1.25 years
Household size (number of persons)	1.82	2.18	2.78	+0.36 persons**	+0.13 persons*
Number of children	0.25	0.49	0.55	+0.23 children**	+0.04 children
Marital status (%)					
Never married	25.17	23.53	9.06	–1.64 p.p.	–3.11 p.p.
Married	37.55	40.72	86.22	+3.17 p.p.	+11.00 p.p.**
Divorced	19.99	23.10	3.82	+3.11 p.p.	–5.91 p.p.**
Widowed	16.64	11.64	0.72	–5.00 p.p.**	–1.92 p.p.**
Highest education (%)					
Compulsory	11.68	22.83	7.66	+11.16 p.p.**	–0.12 p.p.
Secondary II	51.78	45.49	48.31	–6.29 p.p.**	–2.67 p.p.
Tertiary	36.50	31.40	44.03	–5.10 p.p.*	+2.85 p.p.
Work experience (years)	26.53	22.63	27.61	–3.90 years**	–0.19 years
Activity status (%)					
Privately or publicly employed	49.06	55.88	62.81	+6.82 p.p.**	+4.51 p.p.*
Self-employed	6.31	6.32	7.55	+0.01 p.p.	+0.14 p.p.
Retired	31.54	19.67	20.49	–11.86 p.p.**	–3.84 p.p.
Unemployed	3.72	7.83	2.10	+4.11 p.p.**	–0.54 p.p.
Inactive	9.26	9.96	7.04	+0.70 p.p.	–0.11 p.p.
Yearly disposable household income (median, EUR)	25 999	22 589	40 674	–3 410 EUR**	+2 516 EUR*
Yearly equivalent disposable household income (median, EUR)	20 276	15 812	22 491	–4 464 EUR**	+271 EUR
Do not/cannot save	37.26	57.30	30.80	+20.03 p.p.**	–2.34 p.p.
Observations	10 555	1 422	1 021		

All statistics weighted with cross-sectional weights. 1§ includes only couples and excludes single households among non-migrants. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. p.p. refers to percentage points.

Source: DIW Berlin — SOEP 2012 v33.1

Percentiles of yearly equivalent disposable income, 2012

Among non-migrant, migrant and mixed households in Germany **G 4.3**



Note: All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights.

Source: DIW Berlin – SOEP 2012 v33.1 © FSO, authors 2020

Percentiles of household net worth, 2012

Among non-migrant, migrant and mixed households in Germany **G 4.4**



Note: All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights.

Source: DIW Berlin – SOEP 2012 v33.1 © FSO, authors 2020

Differences in median equivalent household income and median net worth, 2012

Between non-migrants and migrants in Germany, according to the origin of the household head **T 4.5**

	Median equivalent household income	Difference with non-migrants	Median net worth	Difference with non-migrants	Proportion of all migrants
All migrants	15 812 EUR	−4 464 EUR**	5 835 EUR	−43 882 EUR**	100%
Region of origin of migrants					
Germany	17 648 EUR	−2 628 EUR**	8 000 EUR	−41 717 EUR**	29.5%
Northern and Western Europe	16 147 EUR	−4 129 EUR	29 500 EUR	−20 217 EUR	6.3%
Southern Europe	15 995 EUR	−4 281 EUR**	14 000 EUR	−35 717 EUR**	7.6%
Eastern Europe	15 012 EUR	−5 263 EUR**	2 800 EUR	−46 917 EUR**	21.9%
Former Yugoslavia and Turkey	14 833 EUR	−5 443 EUR**	2 000 EUR	−47 717 EUR**	17.3%
Africa	15 889 EUR	−4 387 EUR	900 EUR	−48 817 EUR**	1.9%
Other	15 854 EUR	−4 422 EUR**	2 450 EUR	−47 267 EUR**	15.5%

Median equivalised household income and household net worth in Euro. All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights.
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.

Source: DIW Berlin — SOEP 2012 v33.1 © FSO, authors 2020

4.5.4 German migrants accumulate less wealth if born outside of Northern and Western Europe

Like in Switzerland, this difference in income between migrants and non-migrant households also translates into a difference in wealth in Germany. Among migrant households in Germany, 57.3% declared that they cannot save compared to 37.3% of non-migrants. Even though the saving differential is larger between migrants and non-migrants in Germany than in Switzerland, the difference in net worth is smaller in its amount (see Graph G 4.4), as these two countries have very different levels of average income and net worth among the overall population.

Even though the same nationalities seem to hold a substantial disadvantage in terms of net worth (i.e. households with a household head born in Africa, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Eastern and Southern Europe), it is interesting to notice that people with a migration background born in Germany accumulate less wealth than migrants from Northern and Western Europe, who are at a

Portfolio composition of different households in Germany, 2012 **T4.6**

Asset type	Share of households holding an asset type (%)			Difference (percentage points)	
	Non-migrants (1)	Migrants (2)	Mixed (3)	(2) − (1)	(3) − (1§)
Real estate	48.9	31.0	58.9	−17.8**	−3.6
Bank accounts, stocks, other financial assets	68.5	47.3	80.8	−21.2**	+4.6*
Valuables	8.7	6.1	15.4	−2.6**	+4.4*
Life insurances and private pension plans	45.5	36.3	58.7	−9.3**	+0.1
Mortgages	21.4	17.2	31.2	−4.2**	−0.5
Observations	10 555	1 422	1 021		

All statistics weighted with cross-sectional household weights. 1§ includes only couples and excludes single households among non-migrants. * significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.

Source: DIW Berlin — SOEP 2012 v33.1

similar level of wealth accumulation as those with a non-migrant background (see Table T4.5). This may be linked to belonging to the European Union, which creates a uniform legal and civil status for Germans and other Europeans.

Like in Switzerland, migrant households in Germany accumulate less wealth both in real estate assets and in financial wealth. Access to home ownership might therefore also be important for migrant households in this country. However, unlike Switzerland, mixed households do not display a significant disadvantage in terms of real estate assets and mortgages compared to non-migrant couples (see Table T4.6). Mixed households are therefore more comparable to non-migrants in terms of wealth in Germany than in Switzerland.

4.5.5 Home ownership explains half of the migrant wealth gap in Switzerland

Using the socio-demographic characteristics illustrated in Table T4.1 for Switzerland and in Table T4.4 for Germany, we analysed how much of the gap in household net worth results from the fact that non-migrant households have different characteristics than migrant households. In Switzerland, about 45.1% of the wealth gap among households with relatively low wealth (25th percentile of the distribution) can be explained by observable characteristics, whereas only 24.9% of the gap can be explained among households with relatively high wealth (75th percentile of the distribution) (see Table T4.7). This means that unobservable characteristics and the portfolio composition influence more the wealth accumulation among rich households than among less wealthy households. If we add home ownership as an explanatory variable, we notice that we can explain more than half (58.4%) of the wealth gap between wealthy migrant and non-migrant households (see Table T4.8). Moreover, at the median, the explained effect goes from 36.2% to 71.3%, therefore roughly two fifths of the migrant wealth gap can be explained by home ownership. The difference in home ownership between migrants and non-migrants might also be linked to other factors, including access to mortgages and the real estate market, especially for third country nationals who are subjected to additional requirements for home ownership, settlements' intentions and the probability to inherit a house. Non-migrants are more likely to inherit a house in Switzerland, and might have clearer intentions to remain in the country. Moreover, access to mortgages and the real estate market might be enabled/accessed by word-of-mouth information that is more available to non-migrants than to migrants. The migrant income gap may also be a relevant element here, as lenders require a deposit of at least 20% of the value of a house, 10% must be in cash while the other 10% can be funded from a pension fund. Home ownership might also explain much in the Swiss context, as the growth of housing prices has augmented the value of houses that were constructed or bought in the 1970s, 1980s or early 2000s when recent migrants were not in the country.

DFL decomposition of the migrant wealth gap in Switzerland, 2015 **T4.7**

	Percentiles		
	25th	Median	75th
Overall gap	**42 126 CHF****	**209 387 CHF****	**469 000 CHF****
Characteristics effect	19 000 CHF** (45.1%)	75 887 CHF** (36.2%)	117 000 CHF** (24.9%)
Unexplained part	23 126 CHF** (54.9%)	133 500 CHF** (63.8%)	352 000 CHF** (75.1%)
Observations	5 292	5 292	5 292

** significant at 1%

Source: FSO — SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

DFL decomposition of the migrant wealth gap in Switzerland, 2015
Including home-ownership as explanatory variable **T4.8**

	Percentiles		
	25th	Median	75th
Overall gap	**42 126 CHF****	**209 387 CHF****	**469 000 CHF****
Characteristics effect	27 118 CHF** (64.4%)	149 387 CHF** (71.3%)	274 000 CHF** (58.4%)
Unexplained part	15 008 CHF** (35.6%)	60 000 CHF** (28.7%)	195 000 CHF** (41.6%)
Observations	5 292	5 292	5 292

** significant at 1%.

Source: FSO — SILC 2015, version of 07.06.2018 with experimental data on wealth

4.5.6 Migrant wealth can be better explained in Germany by income and personal characteristics

The same variables for Germany explain much more of the migrant wealth gap (see Table T4.9). Among relatively rich households, the characteristics of migrants explain 54.3% of the migrant wealth gap in Germany, while they explained only 24.9% of the migrant wealth gap in Switzerland. Moreover, in Germany, the whole gap (100%) is explained among less wealthy households. A reason for this difference between these two countries might be the relatively larger income differences between migrant and non-migrant households in Germany. Additionally, the average level of Swiss wealth is very high, and this makes the wealth to income ratios in Switzerland higher than in Germany. There is indeed a lower correlation between income and wealth in Switzerland than in Germany (0.41 in Switzerland vs. 0.55 in Germany).[12] An explanation for this lower correlation is that a larger part of Swiss wealth might not come from income, but from other sources, such as inheritances, increases in prices of real estate and returns from financial investments.[13]

[12] These values are created censoring the data at the 1st and the 99th percentile to reduce the effect of outliers.

[13] As wealth data in Switzerland are still provisional, a lower correlation might also be due to the imputation of missing values and to uncertainty in answering the correct value of wealth.

DFL decomposition of the migrant wealth gap in in Germany, 2012 **T4.9**

	Percentiles		
	25th	Median	75th
Overall gap	**3600 EUR****	**43882 EUR****	**123300 EUR****
Characteristics effect	3600 EUR** (100.0%)	35067 EUR** (79.9%)	67000 EUR** (54.3%)
Unexplained part	0 EUR (0.0%)	8815 EUR** (20.1%)	56300 EUR** (45.7%)
Observations	11977	11977	11977

** significant at 1%; the migrant wealth gap at the 25th percentile is totally explained because of the low amount of wealth owned at the bottom of the wealth distribution.

Source: DIW Berlin — SOEP 2012 v33.1 © FSO, authors 2020

DFL decomposition of the migrant wealth gap in Germany, 2012
Including home-ownership as explanatory variable **T4.10**

	Percentiles		
	25th	Median	75th
Overall gap	**3600 EUR****	**43882 EUR****	**123300 EUR****
Characteristics effect	3600 EUR** (100.0%)	40717 EUR** (92.8%)	118500 EUR** (96.1%)
Unexplained part	0 EUR (0.0%)	3165 EUR* (7.2%)	4800 EUR (3.9%)
Observations	11977	11977	11977

* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%.

Source: DIW Berlin — SOEP 2012 v33.1 © FSO, authors 2020

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has analysed how the monetary living conditions, and more particularly household income and wealth differ among migrant, non-migrant and mixed households in Switzerland and Germany. The results indicate that the monetary living conditions of migrants differ between the two countries.

In general, migrant households are composed of more people and due to this this larger household size, income is redistributed among more people in migrant than in non-migrant households. While this is the main difference between migrant and non-migrant households in Switzerland, in Germany, migrant households also earn substantially less income than non-migrant households. In this respect, the most disadvantaged groups of migrant households are those whose household head was born in Africa, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Eastern or Southern Europe. Some groups, however, are advantaged, such as migrants from Northern or Western Europe, who earn the same or even more than non-migrants in both countries, and accumulate the same amount of wealth than non-migrants in Germany.

For wealth comparisons, both housing and financial wealth have an impact on the total migrant wealth gap. Migrant households appear less wealthy in terms of both types of assets in the two countries, but housing wealth explains more of the migrant wealth gap at the median in Switzerland than in Germany.

Even though these two countries have similar home ownership rates and similar ratios of wealth accumulation between owners and renters (Kuhn and Grabka 2018), home ownership and mortgages are less frequent among Swiss than among German migrant households. This does not concern only households composed exclusively by migrants, but also mixed households. Mixed households who have a similar disposable equivalent income compared to non-migrant households both in Switzerland and in Germany are better off in terms of housing wealth in Germany but not in Switzerland. The difference in home ownership among Swiss or German migrant households might be dependent on several factors.

First, only wealthier households might be able to buy their home. The Swiss and German regulations about access to mortgages with a deposit of at least 20% of the value of the house might create a high barrier for home ownership among migrants. In addition, Swiss migrants are younger and have fewer years of work experience than non-migrants, which might also condition

their access to mortgages. Moreover, as home ownership acquired with mortgages has a positive effect on saving behaviour, this component is likely to amplify the overall migrant wealth gap.

Second, only people who want to live for a reasonable amount of time in the same area acquire a house as first residence. Even though home ownership is similar among the overall population in Switzerland and Germany, a possible hypothesis is that migrants in Switzerland are or have the intention to be more mobile than migrants in Germany. In Switzerland, the average year of immigration among migrants is 1995, while it is 1985 in Germany. There are therefore more new migrants in Switzerland than in Germany. Moreover, almost half (49%) of the migrants arrived in Switzerland in 1998 have left the country after 17 years and 26% of new migrants declared that they intend to re-emigrate (Steiner 2019). The situation is different in Germany, where 83% of migrants in our sample declared that they want to stay permanently in the country and 17% that they would rather re-emigrate. Mobility intentions among migrants might then create different incentives to acquire a house in these two countries.

Third, depending on the nationality and the residence permit, some migrants in Switzerland face legal constraint to owning first and secondary residences. These special requirements concern mainly third country nationals, but other requirements apply also to foreign nationals residing abroad who are interested in purchasing a secondary residence in Switzerland. The number of secondary residence acquisitions that they may purchase is restricted to 1 500 per year for the whole territory of Switzerland and is divided among the cantons within communes that promote tourism. This legal restriction might clarify why the migrant wealth gap among wealthy households in Switzerland is larger than in Germany. Apart from this hypothesis, about one third of the migrant wealth gap of Switzerland remains unexplained.

The question about the larger unexplained migrant wealth gap in Switzerland might also boil down to the question about why the Swiss have such a high level of wealth generally. Unlike Germany, Switzerland has not experienced any shocks to the wealth distribution over multiple decades. In Germany, there have been many events that lowered average wealth levels: the hyperinflation in 1923; the Second World War that included considerable destruction of physical capital; the influx of millions of German refugees after the war with almost zero wealth accumulation; the currency reform in 1948; the so-called 'Lastenausgleich' after the Second World War, that obliged wealthy Germans to pay a tax on their wealth to finance the reconstruction and alleviate other shortages or hardship of that time; and the unification with Eastern Germany, which was not a particularly wealthy region. In contrast, Switzerland has fared quite well over the last century. Moreover, due to the inherent scarcity of land, Swiss house prices are considerably higher than in Germany. It is therefore quite difficult to capture all these historical changes that might have contributed to the migrant wealth gap using simple socio-demographic variables like income, education, marital status or the number of children.

As a cautionary note, we must also mention that the exclusion of assets held in second pillar pension funds, business assets and consumer debts might have underestimated the wealth gap between migrants and non-migrants. Taking everything into account, the actual migrant wealth gap might be even larger than what we have estimated in this study. Therefore, we can conclude that even though it is generally easier for migrant households to earn the same income as non-migrant households in Switzerland, because of home ownership and the other conditions discussed in this report, it is more difficult for migrant households to 'work their way up the wealth ladder' in Switzerland than in Germany.

Appendix

In our work, we rely on the DiNardo-Fortin-Lemieux (1996) (DFL) decomposition to estimate how much of the wealth gap can be attributed to differences in characteristics of households with and without a migration background. In this appendix, we briefly describe the DFL decomposition. For a more detailed explanation of the method, we refer to DiNardo et al. (1996).

Without loss of generality, the observed difference between the quantiles of two distributions, $\Delta_O^{q_\theta}$, can be decomposed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_O^{q_\theta} &= q_\theta(F_{W_n}) - q_\theta(F_{W_m}) \\ &= \underbrace{q_\theta(F_{W_n}) - q_\theta(F_{W_n}^C)}_{Characteristics\ effect} + \underbrace{q_\theta(F_{W_n}^C) - q_\theta(F_{W_m})}_{Unexplained\ part} \quad ,\end{aligned}$$

where $q_\theta(F_{W_n})$ and $-q_\theta(F_{W_m})$ are the θ^{th} quantiles of the non-migrant and migrant net wealth distribution. The term can be expanded by $\pm q_\theta(F_{W_n}^C)$, the counterfactual quantile of non-migrant wealth that would prevail if non-migrant households had the same characteristics as migrant households. Two terms result: The characteristics effect, which indicates how much of the observed wealth gap results from differences in characteristics, and a residual unexplained part.

To estimate the counterfactual distribution $F_{W_n}^C$, DiNardo et al. (1996) propose to reweigh the observed distribution of net wealth of non-migrants. The observed distribution of net wealth is defined as:

$$F_{W_n} = \int F_{W_n|X_n} \; dF_{X_n} \quad ,$$

where $F_{W_n|X_n}$ is the conditional distribution of net wealth of non-migrants (conditional on characteristics X), and F_{X_n} is the distribution of their characteristics. Similarly, the counterfactual distribution can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned}F_{W_n}^C &= \int F_{W_n|X_n} \; dF_{X_m} \\ &= \int F_{W_n|X_n} \; \underbrace{\frac{dF_{X_m}}{dF_{X_n}}}_{Reweighting\ factor\ \psi} \; dF_{X_n} \quad ,\end{aligned}$$

where F_{X_m} is the distribution of characteristics of migrants. It becomes clear that the counterfactual distribution differs from the observed distribution by a reweighting factor ψ. Based on Bayes' theorem, the reweighting factor can be rewritten in terms of estimable quantities:

$$\psi = \frac{dF_{X_m}}{dF_{X_n}} = \frac{Pr(X \mid Migrant = 1)}{Pr(X \mid Migrant = 0)} = \frac{Pr(Migrant = 1 \mid X)/Pr(Migrant = 1)}{Pr(Migrant = 0 \mid X)/Pr(Migrant = 0)} .$$

$\Pr(Migrant = 1 \mid X)$ and $\Pr(Migrant = 0 \mid X)$ are the probabilities of being a migrant or non-migrant household conditional on X, and $\Pr(Migrant = 1)$ and $\Pr(Migrant = 0)$ are the unconditional probabilities. In our work, we estimate the conditional probabilities using a probit model, in which the dependent variable is a 0/1 dummy variable, marking non-migrant and migrant households, and the independent variables correspond to those described in the article. The unconditional probabilities correspond to the weighted share of migrant/non-migrant households in the sample.

After estimation of the reweighting factor, we reweigh the observed distribution of non-migrant wealth to obtain the counterfactual quantiles allowing to decompose the migrant wealth gap. Intuitively, the reweighting is such that non-migrant households who have similar characteristics to migrant households receive larger weights. Consequently, the non-migrant distribution of characteristics, if reweighted, resembles that of migrants.

We obtain standard errors and confidence intervals for all estimates by bootstrapping the estimation 500 times.

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5 Migrants' participation in the Swiss social security system: social protection for whom?

Monica Budowski, Eveline Odermatt, and Sebastian Schief

Abstract

This chapter is inscribed in broader discussions on (in particular EU-labour) migrants' participation in the Swiss welfare system and critically reviews the dominant public and policy discourse on the international migration-social security nexus. An overview of migrants' monetary contribution to the Swiss welfare system and international calculations suggest that overall migrants contribute more than they receive in Switzerland. Migrants' access to old-age pensions are restricted upon return to their country of origin as they lose the right to apply for supplementary benefits at old age (EL). Findings from qualitative interviews reveal that migrants have difficulties navigating through the welfare institutions in Switzerland and further perceive themselves unjustly treated when back in their home countries. Based on quantitative and qualitative secondary data sources, the chapter argues that a more comprehensive discussion about social protection and migration would benefit from a more precise look at the migrants' overall contribution to social welfare.

5.1 Introduction

Formal social security is organised within states with varied migration regimes, labour market regulations and social security arrangements. The states define entitlements to social security according to criteria of contribution and/or belonging. The type, level and conditions of welfare entitlements for migrants are issues of debate within states as well as between migrant sending and destination countries. Such debates intensify within national borders when solidarity is (or might be) extended to individuals or groups that are not, or only partially perceived of as members of the defined community, and/or who are perceived of as not contributing proportionally or adequately to social security or the community more broadly. To manage and reduce restrictions of national welfare entitlements beyond state borders bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements are put in place for migrants.

Substantial migration within and into Europe raises various questions of solidarity in terms of provisions, access as well as portability of social protection beyond national borders (Sabates Wheeler 2009). In Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe, the concepts of welfare entitlement are presently challenged by the alleged or de facto impact of migration on the welfare regime. Particularly, the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the European Union in 2007 and to the Schengen area in 2014 has fuelled fears in public and policy discourse about 'welfare tourism' and migrants being 'social protection magnets' ('immigration into the social system'). Unsurprisingly, research on migrants' financial participation and on their access to welfare of host countries has flourished in the last 15 years (e.g., Carmel et al. 2011; Faist 2017; Lafleur and Mescoli 2018; Levitt et al. 2017). Furthermore, the topic of migration, especially EU labour migration, and social protection has become a major issue in political negotiations, for instance with the entry into force of the framework agreement of Switzerland and the EU (e.g. free movement of persons), or presently, with the ongoing Swiss-EU negotiations on the funding of unemployment benefits for cross-border migrants (Favre et al. 2018; Ramel and Sheldon 2012). For some years now, attitudes towards migrant recipients of welfare have hardened across Europe (IOM 2010). In what follows, we discuss the role of migrants within the Swiss welfare regime.

Firstly, based on existing research, we provide a concise synopsis of the migrants' contribution to the Swiss social security system. Secondly, apart from the responsibilities that migrants and institutions associate with transnational belonging, we focus on migrants' rights to entitlement to social security. We argue that the migrants' access to the Swiss social welfare regime are characterised by a lack of concern for migrants' positionality towards social security systems in general and the spatial and temporal dimensions thereof in particular. Thus, we expound the migrants' own experiences of social protection and services. We end with a short discussion of the findings.

5.2 The current state-of-the-art of migrants' contribution to the Swiss social welfare regime

After a brief description of the Swiss welfare regime and the immigration context, we compare both the elements of migrants' financial participation and their access to benefits with those of the Swiss population.

5.2.1 The Swiss welfare regime

Most welfare state typologies still place Switzerland close to the Anglo-Saxon model of liberal welfare states. In Esping-Andersen's 1990-typology of welfare regimes (1990), Switzerland was characterised by low social expenditures[1], a medium level of income inequality and a low protection of workers' rights. However, in the last four decades, Switzerland has been transformed from a liberal to a conservative regime (Armingeon et al. 2004; Obinger et al. 2010; Nollert 2007; Nollert and Schief 2011). In contrast to liberal welfare regimes, such as the United Kingdom or the United States, there has been no substantial decline of net replacement rates[2] regarding illness, work accident, and unemployment insurance. Social expenditure even grew in the 1990s, primarily due to unemployment, health care and disability insurances. The Swiss welfare system is characterised today by high social expenditure, a high degree of independence of social security from the labour market, a low poverty rate and moderate income inequality (Bonoli and Natali 2012; Förster and Mira d'Ercole 2005; OECD 2019).

The Swiss system of social security is constituted by three levels. The basic level is based on means-tested benefits, of which the most important instruments are social assistance, supplementary benefits to the pension insurance, premium reductions for health insurance and family allowances. These benefits are financed either through insurances, general taxes or a combination of both. Means-tested benefits are demand-oriented and based on the subsidiary principle; they only take effect if higher-order social insurances do not provide sufficient support. Additionally, specific social risks are targeted with types of benefits that are adequate for a given circumstance.

The second level consists of social insurances: the old age pension (OASI), the occupational pension, the unemployment insurance, the health and accident insurance, and the disability insurance. The uppermost level provides basic services like the health system, the educational system and the rule of law.

In a nutshell, Swiss insurance models and public administration policies address various potential risks on different institutional levels; the community, canton, and federal level. They are financed by individual contributions, contributions of employers, and taxes. Consequently, the question of cost-benefits for Switzerland as a result of migrants' provision and use of the Swiss welfare scheme is a complex one.[3]

5.2.2 Main characteristics of migration in the Swiss context

Immigration has been significant throughout Switzerland's recent history. In the social sciences consensus lacks regarding a single, all-encompassing definition of an *immigrant* or *migrant*. In Switzerland, the *term migrant* encompasses asylum seekers, refugees, former guest workers, documented and undocumented immigrants, individuals who have entered Switzerland through family reunification, foreign spouses, and occasionally also individuals who themselves have never migrated but whose parents or grandparents have experienced migration (Jurt et al. 2014). The Swiss Federal Statistical Office defines the 'population with a migration background' as including 'all foreign nationals and naturalised Swiss citizens, except for those born in Switzerland and whose parents were both born in Switzerland, as well as Swiss citizens at birth whose parents were both born abroad' (see Chapter 1). *Foreign nationals* are individuals who do not possess a Swiss passport (see Chapter 1). In what follows, we define migrants in the Swiss context as foreign nationals born abroad living in Switzerland regardless of when they entered Switzerland and who do not possess Swiss citizenship.

In the year 2018, one quarter of the Swiss resident population was estimated to be foreign nationals. The majority of foreign nationals are citizens of an EU member state (approximately 17% of the total population), and only 4% of the total population are non-European citizens (see Chapter 1; FSO 2019b). Switzerland has one of the most rigorous citizenship laws in Europe. Gaining Swiss citizenship is particularly difficult, even for individuals who were born in Switzerland, resulting in one of the lowest naturalisation rates in Europe (see also Chapter 7).[4]

Since 2002, the date when the Free Movement of Persons Treaty (FMP) with the EU/EFTA in Switzerland was implemented, and again in 2010, Switzerland experienced a high level of immigration with a large migrant intake proportional to the resident population in comparison to all other OECD countries (OECD 2012, 276, 292). Migration to Switzerland is largely driven by labour market demand (see Chapters 2 and 3). Switzerland attracts proportionally more high-skilled migrants than other European countries (OECD 2018a). Indeed, the total number of highly qualified migrants has more than doubled since 1991. The highest share of this migrant group are nationals from Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain, but also from the USA/Canada and India. Generally, these migrants are better qualified than immigrants from Southern Europe, West Africa or South America (Wanner and Steiner 2018). Based on the data set PETRA (the statistics of foreign residents in Switzerland), over 70% of the migrants who arrived to Switzerland between 2003 and 2009 were aged 18 to 35, and another 23% were aged 36 to 50 (Ramel et al. 2012, 18). Between 2015 and 2016, the number of permanent workers declined by 6%, while the number of temporary-type intra-EU posted workers increased by 7% (OECD 2018a, 77).

[1] Net total social expenditure includes both public and private expenditure. It also accounts for the effect of the tax system by direct and indirect taxation and by tax breaks for social purposes. This indicator is measured as a percentage of GDP or USD per capita (OECD 2018b). In comparison to other countries, Switzerland ranked third in net social spending of GDP (public and private) in 2015 (23.7%), whereas it is amongst the lowest ranked countries regarding public expenditure of GDP (16%) (OECD 2018b).

[2] The net wage replacement rate corresponds to the net household income in the event of illness, work accident or unemployment as a percentage of the previous net household income.

[3] The Swiss Federal Statistical Office (SFSO) provides an insightful graph on the social security system model, see: www.bfs.admin.ch → Look for statistics → Social security → Social reports (last accessed on 15.05.2020).

[4] According to the Federal Law on the Acquisition and Loss of Swiss Nationality (2018), individuals can apply for Swiss citizenship when having been residents in the country for at least ten years, of which three of the five years preceding their application. The years spent in Switzerland between the age of eight and eighteen count double (OECD 2018a).

Estimations concerning older migrants living in Switzerland assume that one third returns to their country of origin, one third stays in Switzerland and on third commutes between Switzerland and their country of origin (Bolzman et al. 2006, 1362, Wanner and Fibbi 2002, 37). While return migrants are still entitled to the Swiss old age pension (old-age and survivors' insurance (OASI) retirement benefits) within the European Union area, other social security benefits, for instance supplementary benefits (EL/PC) increasing old-age and survivors' insurance (OASI) to the minimum living cost level, disability insurance benefits (DI) or social assistance are no longer available, once they have returned (Bolzman and Bridji 2019).

In general, access to formal social security depends on migrants' legal and residency status in relation to their home and host countries. In the majority of cases, immigrants have citizen status, multi-citizen or emigrant status in their countries of origin. In the host country, for instance in Switzerland, their legal and residence status differs. They are either naturalised citizens, permanent residents, temporary residents or undocumented migrants.[5] The rights and entitlements of refugees and migrant groups are presently amongst the most contested political issues. Because of the demand-driven labour market immigration, we focus basically on EU-labour migrants currently living in Switzerland. This group makes up for approximately 65% of all migrants (FSO 2019b). In Section 5.3, we briefly refer to European labour migrants from non-EU countries currently living in Switzerland or in another European country.

The international literature on the migration-social security nexus emphasises labour migration. Therefore, we restrict our analysis on Switzerland to migrants holding status B, C, and L, and do not take into consideration migrants with status N and F (persons in an ongoing asylum procedure, respectively those given a provisional admission).

As in most other European countries, entitlement to social security in Switzerland is based on residency or contributions or a combination of the two. Entitlement to social security depends on migrants' participation in the formal labour market, while access to the labour market relies primarily on the migrant's residence status. Residency of EU nationals in Switzerland is still conditional. Social security for migrant workers within the European Union generally refers to minimum standards that are codified, for example, by the ILO Convention 102 (ILO 2019), or by the EC Regulation 1408/71 on social security for migrant workers (European Union 2019). EU citizens living and working in Switzerland, however, have only limited access to social assistance. They do not have access to social benefits or unemployment benefits during their first year of stay; if they are unemployed over a long period of time, they also risk losing their right to stay (residence status).

[5] For a list of the varied types of residence permits in Switzerland, see https://www.ch.ch/en/renewal-overview-swiss-residence-permit/ (last accessed on 15.05.2020).

5.2.3 Migrants and welfare: who pays for what?

The relationship between the Swiss welfare regime (e.g., the different financing models based on tax or contributions) and migration—shaped by the interplay of social factors, economic drivers and legal norms (e.g., different types of residencies, diverse rights to entitlement to social security and social assistance)—is multifaceted. Therefore, the interdependency between the Swiss welfare regime and migration is a complex one. Studies have shown that cost-benefit calculations for a migrant host nation in the migration-social security debate contain many unknown factors (due to migration trends, and/or migration data), and many assumptions need to be made (Österman et al. 2019). Thus, important aspects of the topic often remain subjects of speculation (Can et al. 2013; Ramel 2013). Nonetheless, in the following, we review studies that allow for a better understanding of the implications of migration and social security in Switzerland.

Tax contributions and fiscal effects

Despite the high interest in the fiscal effects of EU migrants in public and policy debates in many European countries, research on these issues has been very limited (Österman et al. 2019; Ramel et al. 2012). In Switzerland, taxation is low compared with other European countries. Swiss taxation is progressive and proportional at the community, cantonal and federal level, and may be capped at an upper-income level; in 21 cantons, a lump-sum tax option exists. Higher-income earners contribute to taxes required for the system of social security in Switzerland, therewith easing the tax burden on other taxpayers (Nollert and Schief 2011; FDF 2018). According to Bruchez (2019) immigration to Switzerland has a positive impact on public finances in the beginning yet a rather negative one in the long-run. Research by Ramel and Sheldon (2012) and Ramel (2013) point in the same direction, as do Favre et al. (see Chapter 3) when analysing the duration of stay (see Table T5.1 for a summary of findings).

However, these calculations depend on previous (debatable) assumptions. Moreover, they neglect positive (economic and fiscal) dynamic aspects over time, such as the immigrants' contribution to the economic activities of the host countries, flexible coverage of work demand, know-how, or innovation, economic benefits for skills and education that migrants have acquired elsewhere. Fiscal (long-term) benefits for Switzerland may further depend on whether and which migrants remain in Switzerland or return to their home countries, respectively migrate onwards, and the development of the Swiss welfare regime and/or the Swiss fiscal policy (Ramel 2013; Bruchez 2019; Österman et al. 2019).

In line with the current Swiss immigration pattern of about 50% of low-skilled and 50% high-skilled migrants, the average salary of the recently arrived EU-migrants is either higher or lower compared with the average Swiss salary that is situated in the middle of the income distribution (for the years 2003–2011; SECO 2018, 75; see Chapter 3). Data from the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) for the year 2018 (FSO 2019a) show that there are proportionally more migrants from EU28 and the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries in executive positions,

and about an equal proportion in academic professions when compared to the Swiss. Furthermore, migrants are slightly over proportionally employed in services professions and sales staff, in craft and related jobs, as plant and machine operators, and occupy employments in elementary occupations three times more often than the Swiss.

With regards to the relationship between duration of stay and income, Favre et. al. (2018, see also Chapter 3) find that migrants who leave the country within their first year of stay, earn over proportionally less:[6] '(t)he typical immigrant who leaves Switzerland after only one year earns less than those who remain in the country, but the typical emigrant of the following years earns more than those who remain in Switzerland for longer.' (own translation, Favre et al. 2018, 98). Amongst female migrants, those with a middle and higher income leave the country earlier, whereas those with lower income remain. The majority of high-skilled women are young, single (with no family obligations in Switzerland), and highly mobile. An estimated two thirds of them have already lived in another country than their country of origin prior to their arrival in Switzerland (Wanner and Steiner 2018). These characteristics make them particularly prone to onward migration.

Drawing on a data set 'matching micro-level data from the EU-SILC data base with statistics of national accounts', Nyman and Ahlskog (2018, i) examine the fiscal effects of EU migrants across the 29 European Economic Area (EEA) countries, including Switzerland. The authors provide evidence from a static model that migrants' tax contributions in Switzerland have a positive effect on GDP. This positive fiscal effect of EU migrants in Switzerland stands out when compared to the other countries. According to the authors, this is due to Switzerland having the highest share of EU citizens (16%) among the 29 countries, and partly due to the composition of EU migrants (proportionally high share of high-skilled migrants). These results were confirmed in a later study on the impact of national institutions and the fiscal impact of migrants both on the individual and on the welfare regime level (Österman et al. 2019).

With regard to different types of welfare states across Europe, Österman et al. (2019) find no evidence in support of the common idea that migrants generate a greater fiscal burden in more generous welfare regimes. Even though some regimes, e.g., the 'basic security regime' (e.g. in the UK, and Ireland) and the 'universal regime' (in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden), are considered to be 'diametrically opposed in terms of welfare state and labour market institutions', there is no indication of statistically significant differences (Österman et al. 2019, 34).

The UK case is a telling example, where studies show that the average EU migrant in the UK, for instance, contributes more in taxes than British-born residents and receives less benefits from public services and benefits. Dustmann and Frattini (2014) conclude: 'the net fiscal impact of immigrants, and considering the immigrant population that resided in the UK over the 1995–2011 period, (…) EEA [European Economic Area] migrants contributed 10% more than natives (in relative terms), and non-EEA immigrant contributions were almost 9% lower' (Dustmann and Frattini 2014, F595). Moreover, 'immigrants who resided in the UK in any of these years have been generally less likely than natives to receive state benefits or tax credits and also less likely to live in social housing as natives in the same region' (Dustmann and Frattini 2014, F595).

Pensions

Old-age insurance (OASI)

The old-age insurance (OASI) makes up for 26.6% of the overall social insurance expenditures in 2017 (FSIO 2019, 31). It is financed by employees, employers (accounting together for 72.8% of the contributions in 2018, FSIO 2019, 31) and tax contributions. Since the development of the wages of foreign citizens are more dynamic than that of Swiss citizens, the share of contributions from foreigners has increased. Swiss citizens contributed 76.4% in 2000 and 68.7% in 2016; the contribution of members of the EU28/EFTA countries rose from 18.1% in 2000 to 26.1% in 2016, and decreased for nationals from other countries from 5.5% (2000) to 5.2% (2016) respectively (SECO 2019, 30, Table 4.1). In 2016, the EU28 and EFTA member nationals' overall contribution to the old-age pension insurance is higher than the 15.3% benefits they obtained from it (SECO 2019, 30). Not having contributed to the old-age pension insurance throughout their career, and belonging to the previous immigration waves with lower educational levels, in 2018 'only 7 per cent of all EU28/EFTA citizens in Switzerland receive a full old-age pension' (own translation, SECO 2019, 31). Balancing contribution to and reception of old-age pension, migrants are presently contributing substantially to this insurance (SECO 2019, 31). However, future trends are not clear: Ramel and Sheldon (2012) estimate that the better-educated migrants emigrate from Switzerland, whereas the less-educated migrants from Southern European countries are more prone to remain. If this trend continues, the authors argue, the present positive fiscal effect may turn negative when the presently young people age. Whether future migrants to Switzerland hold the same characteristics as today, remains to be seen; moreover, it is difficult to estimate whether migrants anticipate staying or returning to their home countries (see Table T5.1 for a summary of findings).

Supplementary benefits (EL/PC)

Supplementary benefits are means-tested, on demand and are only available with residence in Switzerland. They supplement insufficient income from the old-age or disability pension. Supplementary benefits make up for 3% of all social insurance expenditures in 2017 (FSIO 2019, 51). In 2018, almost 81% of the EU28/EFTA citizens receiving old-age pension lived abroad and therefore had no right to claim the supplementary pensions (SECO 2019, 34).

[6] Calculations are based on various data sets: individual accounts of the old-age insurance, the central compensation office (CCO) 1981–2015; population and households statistics (STATPOP) 2010–2015; the central migration information system 2003–2015 (ZEMIS); the structural survey 2010–2014, FSO.

Disability insurance (DI)

In 2017, expenditures for disability insurance made up for about 5.7% of all social insurance expenditure (FSIO 2019, 41), 'about 72% of all disability insurance pensioners were Swiss citizens, while 19% of all pensioners were EU/EFTA citizens' (SECO 2019, 32). About 9% of all disability insurance pensioners were third-country nationals (other countries of the world excluding EU/EFTA countries and other European countries including Turkey). Third-country nationals are proportionally slightly overrepresented, while Swiss citizens are underrepresented. EU28/EFTA nationals contribute to financing the disability insurance to a greater extent (26.1%) than they receive benefits (15.1% of the sum of disability and pensions and integration measures; see Table T 5.1 for a summary of findings).

Health insurance

In 2017, health insurance accounts for 18.1% of all social insurances (FSIO 2019, 71). There is scant information on the situation of migrants: '(d)ue to the Free Movement of Persons Treaty, certain persons resident in an EU/EFTA state are also subject to health insurance in Switzerland. These, like other insured persons, are in principle entitled to individual premium reductions if they live in modest economic conditions' (SECO 2018, 32). In general, there are no problems with insured persons living in foreign countries (SECO 2017, 73). Very few of them are entitled to a premium reduction (CHF 1.03 Mio in 2016, SECO 2017, 74). Migrants obtain on average higher premium reductions than Swiss citizens; they contribute around CHF 500 per person to health insurance more than they receive in benefit. This is due to the demographic characteristics: there are more Swiss nationals among the older population (Ecoplan 2018, 99; see Table T 5.1 for a summary of findings).

Labour market and unemployment insurance (UI)

Migration is strongly related to the Swiss employment situation where the Agreement on the Free Movement of Persons has contributed to meeting the demand for especially well-skilled workers. Swiss workers in low-skilled jobs are rarely replaced through highly skilled foreigners (SECO 2019). Immigration reduced unemployment and increased employment of residents between 2005–2013 (Basten and Siegenthaler 2013). According to Steinhardt et al. (2010) differences in success on the labour market are due mainly to collective differences in the educational structure of foreigners and Swiss citizens. Favre et al. (see Chapter 3) find that men integrate into the Swiss labour market more easily than women; highly educated are more successful than lower educated; EU/EFTA citizens are more successful than third-country citizens. Compared to other OECD countries migrants do much better on the labour market in Switzerland. Nevertheless, for some groups of migrants (women with children, refugees) the situation is more difficult (Liebig et al. 2012).

The unemployment insurance makes up for 4.5% of the overall social insurance expenditure in 2017 (FSIO 2019: 101). Swiss citizens pay 70.4% of the unemployment insurance contributions and receive 55%, while EU/EFTA citizens pay 24.4% and receive 31% of the contributions. Even though EU/EFTA citizens are net receivers within the unemployment insurance, they both pay and receive more when accounting for their share of the population. The same is true for third-country nationals (contributing 5.3%, receiving 13.6%; SECO 2019, 37).

The economic fluctuations are usually left out in cost-benefit calculations of migrants' participation in the social welfare system. Yet, these fluctuations and, in particular, the sectors in which the lower-skilled migrants work, put them statistically more at risk to find themselves unemployed than Swiss citizens (see Table T 5.1 for a summary of findings).

Social assistance

In 2018, approximately 3.2% of the overall resident population in Switzerland received social assistance. Foreigners constituted 6.1% (FSO 2019). The percentage of EU/EFTA citizens (2.9%) is only slightly higher than that of Swiss citizens (2.3%) (FSO 2019). The percentage of European countries including Turkey without EU/EFTA is 8.5%; the highest rate of social assistance receivers (16.3%) is found amongst third-country nationals (excluding EU/EFTA, FSO 2019c); within this group there is a strong connection between receiving social assistance and persons seeking asylum (FSO 2019b). Migrants from North and West Europe have a smaller percentage of social assistance receivers than Swiss citizens while migrants from South and East European countries have a higher one (FSO 2019c). The group of third-country nationals is smaller than that of all EU/EFTA and other European countries (including Turkey) so social assistance spending is lower. Moreover, having claimed social assistance, renders the migrants' chance of obtaining Swiss citizenship almost impossible (see Table T 5.1 for a summary of findings).

Summing up, there are positive and negative effects of EU-migrants as regards the various social benefits, yet overall, the studies suggest that the positive ones predominate. Switzerland is privileged when compared with other European countries: it has a flourishing economy with a low percentage of unemployment, a labour market driven immigration, and a proportionally large number of young highly skilled migrants. Migrants make less use of social insurances or are entitled to a lower amount of benefits due to contribution gaps (e.g. old-age pension insurance) when compared with the whole of the Swiss population (see Table T 5.1 for a summary of findings). Therefore, the presented studies suggest that overall EU-migrants are not a financial burden to the Swiss welfare system. Moreover, migrants cannot make use of some social security benefits once they are older and more fragile due to having returned to their home country or migrated onwards.

Key findings, sources and data by issue T5.1

Tax contributions and fiscal effects	Source	Data
– Impact of migration for the State budget is positive at first; static calculation models suggest a negative effect in the longer term (depending on duration and origin of migration). – Migrants' tax contributions in Switzerland have a positive effect on GDP. – When compared to the other EU-countries, Switzerland stands out with the positive fiscal effect of EU migrants. This is because Switzerland has the highest share of EU citizens (16%) among the 29 countries, and it is partly due to the composition of EU migrants (proportionally high share of high-skilled migrants).	Bruchez 2019; Favre/Föllmi/Zweimüller (2018) (see also Chapter 3); Ramel/Sheldon 2012; Ramel 2013; Nyman/Ahlskog 2018	AMECO macro-economic database (European Commission); EU-SILC; Swiss labour force survey (SLFS); World Bank health, nutrition and population Statistics 2017; Structural survey; Population and Households Statistics (STATPOP); Central migration information system (ZEMIS); Individual OASI accounts
Old-age insurance (OASI)	**Source**	**Data**
– The old-age insurance (OASI) makes up for 26.6% of the overall social insurance expenditures in 2017. – Aggregate wages of foreign citizens have a positive impact on the financing of the OASI. – Most EU/EFTA nationals receive only partial old-age pensions due to the lower number of years they have contributed. – To stabilize the financial situation of the OASI, an additional 3.5 million migrants necessary, i.e., the total foreign population would increase by 110%. At the same time, raising retirement age is discussed as a feasible measure to reduce the need of foreign labour force from 110% to 80%.	Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) 2019a; Milivinti 2018; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) 2017, 2018, 2019	Central Aliens Register (ZAR) 1998–2010; STATPOP 2010–2016; OASI statistics 1998–2014; Contributions (Register of Individual accounts (IA)) and benefits (Annuities register (RR)); Structural survey (SE/RS 2010–2014)
Disability Insurance (DI)	**Source**	**Data**
– In 2017, expenditures for disability insurance made up for about 5.7% of all social insurance expenditure. – Freedom of movement has no significant impact on the disability insurance (DI). – 19% of all DI pensioners are EU/EFTA citizens; they obtain 15% of the amount of the pensions. – Most EU/EFTA nationals receive only partial disability pensions due to the lower number of years they have contributed.	Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) 2019a; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) 2017, 2018, 2019	ZEMIS; STATPOP; SLFS; OASI statistics; Swiss social insurance statistics 2017; Profit and loss account OASI/DI 2017; Labour market data analysis (LAMDA)
Health insurance	**Source**	**Data**
– In 2017, health insurance accounts for 18.1% of all social insurances. – Freedom of movement has no considerable effect on health insurance. – In 2016, about 65 000 people with Swiss health insurance lived in EU countries, receiving 1.03 Mio. Swiss Francs of premium reduction (EU countries). – On average, migrants obtain higher premium reductions than Swiss citizens, yet they pay CHF 500 per person more than they receive in benefits (due to the population structure: younger population).	Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) 2019a; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) 2017, 2018, 2019; Ecoplan 2018	ZEMIS; STATPOP/ESPOP; SLFS; ZAR; Swiss earnings structure survey; OASI statistics; Swiss social insurance statistics 2017; Profit and loss account OASI/DI 2017; Labour market data analysis (LAMDA); Migration statistics (FSO, SEM); Swiss social insurance statistics 2016
Labour market and unemployment insurance (UI)	**Source**	**Data**
– The unemployment insurance makes up for 4.5% of the overall social insurance expenditure in 2017. – EU/EFTA citizens are net receivers within the unemployment insurance; they both pay and receive more than their share of population is. The same is true for third-country nationals. – Freedom of movement does not have an impact on unemployment rates of foreigners.	Federal Social Insurance Office (FSIO) 2019a; State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) 2017, 2018; Sheldon 2015	ZEMIS; STATPOP; SLFS; OASI statistics; Swiss social insurance statistics 2017; Profit and loss account OASI/DI 2017; Labour Market Data Analysis (LAMDA); Migration statistics (FSO, SEM); Censuses 1970–2000; Data from the tax authorities
Social assistance	**Source**	**Data**
– In 2018, approximately 3.2% of the overall resident population in Switzerland received social assistance. Foreigners constituted 6.1%. The percentage of EU/EFTA citizens (2.9%) is only slightly higher than that of Swiss citizens (2.3%). – People seeking asylum are often in need of social assistance.	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO) 2017, 2018, 2019; Federal Statistical Office (FSO) 2019b, 2019c	Swiss social insurance statistics 2016, 2017; ZEMIS; STATPOP/ESPOP; SLFS; ZAR; Swiss wage index; OASI statistics; Profit and loss account OASI/DI 2017; Labour Market Data Analysis (LAMDA); Migration statistics (FSO, SEM)

5.3 Migrants' experiences of social protection

The way migrants make use of the formal social security system, their entitlements to services in host countries, their positionalities vis-à-vis social security stakeholders, their experiences with eligibility and access to social security have to date not been coherently questioned and researched and constitute a gap in the present literature. Therefore, it is necessary to complement the monetary contribution of migrants to the Swiss social security system and its use by asking how Switzerland and other affluent North and West European host countries protect and provide for a mobile population. Migrants' perspectives, in particular that from the less advantaged, are important beyond the discussed cost-benefit models. Due to lack of particular data on this issue for EU-migrants, we present results of a qualitative study of elderly in the canton of Zug. Larger population groups were interviewed: Italian and English-speaking people, and people from former Yugoslavia and Turkey (Jurt et al. 2014, 9). Similar results were found in other countries (see, for instance, Scheibelhofer and Holzinger, 2018 for Austria, Germany, Sweden, and the UK).

5.3.1 Experiences with access and materialisation of social protection

A study commissioned by the canton of Zug shows that especially elderly migrants, around or after their retirement, experience their social security rights as a discrepancy between the discourse on their entitlement of benefits and everyday practice (Jurt et al. 2014). A large proportion of the migrants they interviewed did not fully make use of the state or institutional services available (such as health services or services of social affairs) as they were not familiar with the Swiss welfare system and/or faced administrational hurdles, be this due to the complexity of the welfare system in general or the application procedures for means-tested social insurance schemes in particular (Jurt et. al. 2014). The majority of the interviewees lacked information about where to seek support:

> 'We often don't know where to turn to. We feel helpless and at the mercy of the situation. We can't express ourselves clearly. When we receive letters, we don't really understand the content. Once, people from Basel came to our apartment. They were employees from the SMUV (Trade Union Industry, Commerce, Services). They told us we should not draw all of our pension fund assets (second pillar) but only a part of it, so we will not experience any disadvantages later on. We only received this information. We don't know if this is true or not' (Hakan 63, for 34 years in Switzerland: Jurt et al. 2014, 25).

Lack of language skills was one reason why some migrants were unaware of certain services and made less use of them than the population with the necessary language skills. Particularly migrants in need of a translator faced difficulties (for instance to consult a general practitioner):

> 'I always had regular contact with my doctor and interpreter, but now I can't visit the doctor anymore, because I don't have an interpreter any more' (Asmeret 64, since 5 years in Switzerland; Jurt et al. 2014, 27).

> '(…) At the counter they don't take the time to look through the forms with us. They hand it out to us, knowing that we don't understand it, and they expect us to come back with the form filled out. We are completely on our own.' (Hakan 63, for 34 years in Switzerland; Jurt et al. 2014, 25).

Due to such previous negative experiences, migrants also held prejudices towards state institutions in their host and home countries. The authors conclude that many elderly migrants do not demand services for which they are theoretically entitled to, even if they had contributed to the Swiss welfare system during most of their adult lives. Jurt et al (2014) interpret the lack of use of available services by migrants as a discrepancy between a common understanding of a transcultural openness within the relevant administrations and institutions, and both the migrants' and state institutions' practices.

5.3.2 Experiences with the portability of social protection and services upon return

Migration is shaped by migrants' and/or their families' agency as well as by structural factors such as migration laws, labour markets, or welfare services. State-provided or employment-related institutionalised welfare provisions in host and home countries contribute to determining decisions to migrate (Hunter 2011). Migrants' intention to return to their home country, for instance, are often related to their opportunity to access social rights in different welfare contexts. Migrants may decide against returning home, if they fear losing their social benefits upon return. Therefore, the social security system and agreements between home and host countries are important elements that migrants take into account when deciding upon returning home or moving onward. When bilateral agreements lack, migrants may need to adapt the benefits they have acquired in a host country to the levels of the country of origin (Vathi et al. 2019). Migrants from Croatia, who anticipate returning to their country of origin after retirement, for instance, exemplify how the lack of bilateral agreements between Switzerland and other countries shape individual access to social rights and influence the migrants' life plans. If Croatian migrants intend to retire in Croatia, their Swiss pensions

are taxed there.[7] This means that their Swiss pension is reduced to the level of those Croatians who never left the country, even though they have contributed a proportionally much higher sum into the Swiss pension scheme and paid taxes in Switzerland than in Croatia (Jurt et al. 2014). Therefore, migrants often remain in the host country as they fear not to be able to make ends meet with the rather low local pension; alternatively, they travel back and forth, as long as their physical health and financial situation allows (Jurt et al. 2014). In the following quote, Stjepan's frustration is evident when he anticipates the consequences of the portability of his Swiss Pension in view of planning to return to Croatia.

> 'It's about pensions, because Croatia wants to tax the pension like income. And we don't think this is right. We have been living here, and we've paid our taxes here, in Switzerland, and now we are supposed to deliver money there? But there, we don't receive anything. So we will retire here. That's unfair to us' (Stjepan 58, for 34 years in Switzerland; Jurt et al. 2014, 19).

In a study on return migration to Albania and social protection, the vast majority of migrants spoke about lacking social protection upon their return, as well as having experienced financial loss due home- and host countries lacking transnational arrangements regarding the portability of their social security contributions (Vathi et al. 2019). Their experience in their home country contrasts starkly with their experience in their host country in the EU. They return with expectations that the institutions and public administrations in their home country do not meet and are confronted with prejudices about their wealth:

> 'Realistically, we returnees are foreign again… now in our own country (…) because we do not have protection, no one protects us… they do not help us. They think there was so much money in Greece that we went there and filled sacks! Basically, wherever you go, in any state institution, they ask you if you have money (to give them)!' (Vathi et al. 2019, 12).

Access to social security systems in host countries constitutes accumulated capital for migrants—the result of long years of often strenuous migration experiences (Vathi et al. 2019). Migrants feel discriminated if they are partly or entirely deprived of their social protection upon return to their home country, or when lack of portability of social protection hampers their return plans. Such examples of migrants' experiences highlight gaps that still exist between the interdependencies in everyday life and the portability of their social protection.

[7] Croatian citizens who receive their pensions from an EU member state are not subject to double taxation upon their return to Croatia (Jurt et al. 2014).

5.4 Conclusion

The aim of this contribution was two-fold: firstly, by means of a concise literature review, we presented in particular the EU-labour migrants' contributions to and benefits from the Swiss social security system. Secondly, we highlighted the way transnational social protection materialises and its relevance in everyday life by considering migrants' experiences and views on the Swiss social security system.

While the migrants' contribution to the Swiss social security system varies between the different parts of the social security system, various studies conclude that their present overall contribution is positive, meaning that they presently contribute more than they receive. The studies conclude rather consistently that EU migrant nationals from the North and West of Europe contribute more to the welfare state than they cost, and their tax contributions have a positive effect on the GDP (Nyman and Ahlskog 2018; Österman et al 2019; Can et al 2013; Ramel 2013). However, the studies also point at possible issues of sustainability in the longer term, depending on the assumptions in their calculations and on the development of the welfare regime and institutional policies.

The current trends of cost-benefit models tend to neglect the overall positive economic effects of the migrants' varied contributions to the economic activities of the host states, i.e., flexible coverage of work demand, know-how, or innovation, as well as the resources in knowledge and education, and health) that they bring along from the countries they grew up in or migrated from. In most cases, labour migration benefits all parties precisely because migration varies in response to *economic cycles*—a fact most often neglected in the current discussion surrounding migrants' contribution to social protection, respectively their financial strain for the Swiss social security system.

In Section 5.3, the migrants' experiences in Switzerland and elsewhere in Europe reveal that they are often caught between official discourses on entitlement, their practical access to social protection and various experiences with state institutions leading to prejudices from both sides (institutions and migrants). While legal and regular mobility works for the majority of intra-European migrants, obstacles concerning the transferability of their social protection remain. They often face a set of challenges such as experiences of discriminations linked to (negative) judgements of deservingness, the complexity of social security regimes or language barriers.

Research and public discussions often treat transnational economic, political and social processes separately, as if they were not connected. Yet, looking at the costs and benefits of migrants for social security for the host country only might fall too short; other services, such as education, need to be included into the calculation alongside the social insurances and other social security schemes. Moreover, in order to meet the various issues of social protection produced through migration, and *transnational practices and processes* in different domains, policies that cross national borders are required. Migrants' participation and entitlement to social security merits a stronger relational thinking by emphasising how migrants' contributions and rights—embedded in their everyday (transnational) lives—are interconnected with

global economic trends, such as flexible labour market demands across borders and international developments in migration policies. Such investigations based not exclusively on economic factors but also on transnational regularities and socio-economic, political and emotional fractures provide the foundation for a more nuanced approach in discussions about migrants' financial participation in welfare regimes of receiving countries. Studies that analyse migrants' entitlement to host and home country public welfare policies in conjunction with market- family- and community-based practices should be

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6 Internal migration in Switzerland: behaviour and impact

Jonathan Zufferey

Abstract

This chapter looks at internal migration in Switzerland between 2011 and 2016. It draws on exhaustive population data that cover some 4.2 million changes of address concerning almost 47 million individual and spatially geocoded observations. Today's Switzerland is characterised by a high degree of internal mobility—the average person moves 7.5 times in a lifetime. The study shows that behaviour varies greatly between cantons, but that the biggest differences are seen with regard to the type of commune. However, migration flows in Switzerland are mainly small-scale and take place over short distances. The chapter also analyses the influence of individual factors on internal migration and on people moving home several times within a few years. It shows, in particular, that age and migration background are the most decisive factors explaining mobility.

6.1 Introduction

Internal migration plays a major role in the population's distribution. Quantitatively speaking, in Switzerland today, internal flows contribute more to the population's spatial distribution than the arrivals and departures of international migrants (Wanner 2014).

This was also the case in the past. In the 19th century, industrial development drew the population towards towns close to the factories and industrial centres at the expense of rural areas, which were gradually abandoned. During the second half of the 20th century, internal migration once again gained importance. Driven by a desire for space, coupled with the development of transport, in particular individual transport, a section of the population preferred to live on the outskirts of towns. This phenomenon continued into the 1970s; at the same time Switzerland's economy was becoming dominated by the service sector (Bassand 2004). Internal migration flows—especially long-distance flows—slowed down in the following years and the Swiss population became more evenly spread across the country's regions (Schuler and Kaufmann 1996). At local level, however, the development of suburbs and peri-urban zones was growing. This resulted in shorter-distance migration flows, from the larger urban zones towards the surrounding residential neighbourhoods. As early as the 1980s, the centres of all major Swiss towns, with the exception of Zurich, lost inhabitants who moved to the periphery (Kupiszewski et al. 2000). Following this phase of urban decline, Swiss towns experienced growth some 20 years later (Rérat 2016) and became popular once again among a section of the population moving back into town centres and reclaimed brownfield sites.

This internal migration trend, briefly outlined above, not only influenced the spatial distribution of the population but also changed its composition. Whether in terms of the rural exodus or the more recent urban renewal of towns (gentrification), migration does not affect all parts of the population equally and the people who leave differ from the people who stay in terms of age, socio-economic position or ethnic origin, for example (Rérat et al. 2009). Internal migration may well redistribute the population, but the redistribution is selective.

The overall picture of internal migration is, therefore, not homogeneous. This heterogeneity holds true whether comparison is being made between a country's different regions or between different countries themselves. In international comparison, Switzerland has always shown a high level of internal migration. It has been estimated that in 1941, only 44% of the resident population was still living in their commune of birth (Zelinsky 1971): this would make Switzerland the country with the second-highest level of internal migration. Other estimations, this time based on changes of residence in 1980, also place Switzerland among those countries with the highest level of internal mobility, after the English-speaking countries (Long 1991). Data from the early 21st century indicate that internal migration behaviour in Switzerland is now less pronounced than in Scandinavian countries and the United States, and is similar to France, but much higher than in its neighbouring countries—Germany, Austria and Italy (Caldera Sánchez and Andrews 2011).

Apart from macro-regional phenomena in terms of attractive or deterrent factors encouraging people to move to, stay or leave their place of residence, individual characteristics have a major influence on the likelihood of undertaking an internal migration.

Family reasons (leaving the parental home, setting up home, the birth of a child, divorce, etc.) are major factors in the decision to look for a new place to live. Aspects concerning education (leaving to study in another town) and working life (new job, unemployment or retirement) also explain a number of changes in residence although nowadays public transport allows people to commute rather than having to move home (Dessemontet et al. 2010). In Switzerland, family, work and educational reasons account for 35% of internal migration (Charton and Wanner 2001). It's worth noting that young people are more affected by these factors of internal mobility, but certain population groups are also concerned—people with a high level of education are more likely to migrate, for example, due to a more flexible labour market.

Individual wishes, but also economic factors (rent, taxes, and mortgage rates, being or becoming a home owner), spatial planning (housing availability, population density, degree of urbanisation, environment and infrastructure) and political factors (welfare state, housing benefits, home ownership and other rights) are some of the factors that individuals take into consideration when moving home. According to the study by Charton and Wanner (2001), just under a quarter of people who changed residence in Switzerland did so to find more suitable housing and another quarter did so in order to become home owners (purchase, construction or inheritance).

When measuring internal migration in statistical terms, methodological considerations can have an important effect on the results. How should migration be measured and recorded? The approach adopted by the Federal Statistical Office considers every change of commune to be an internal migration (FSO 2019) and makes a distinction between movements within the same canton and movements between cantons. This approach has the advantage of reliability as these movements are duly recorded in the communal population registers. However, it excludes migrations that take place within the same commune. The larger the commune, the greater the potential number of omissions. Furthermore, Switzerland has restructured its communes in recent years—between 2000 and 2010 the number of communes fell by more than 300—to such an extent that the statistics on internal migration are no longer comparable over time. Because of these problems, which are not unique to Switzerland, and in order to improve international comparisons, researchers are calling for the measurement of internal migration to include all changes of residence and using geocoded data to achieve this (Stillwell et al. 2017).

This chapter explores internal migration in Switzerland based on changes of residence within the permanent resident population between 2011 and 2016 (see Box 6.1 which gives details of the data used). Section 6.2 provides an overview of internal migration whereas Section 6.3 is concerned with individuals and the factors that help explain migration.

Box 6.1: Data used

This study is based on individual data from the population and household statistics (STATPOP) as on 31 December of each year between 2010 and 2016. Only people in the permanent resident population were taken into account. The population registers record demographic information at individual level (mainly age, sex, marital status, nationality, and length of stay), at household level (identifiers of household members) and geographic information (building identifier and geo-coordinates). Data have also been matched with the contribution and pensions register enabling income from employment to be calculated (Steiner and Wanner 2015).

As data have an individual identifier for people and for buildings, it was possible to reconstruct the past history of places of residence of all people who were recorded for at least two consecutive years. Data for the year in which individuals have migrated to or emigrated from Switzerland, were born or died, as well as data on individuals whose building has not been geocoded, are excluded from the analyses. This represents around 6% of observations of the permanent resident population. People who were resident in Switzerland between 31 December 2010 and 31 December 2016, for example, are observed for six consecutive years. In contrast, someone who arrived in Switzerland during 2011 and who died in 2015, would only be observed for 3 full years (2012, 2013 and 2014). It goes without saying that only changes of residence announced to the administration are taken into consideration here.

The data used for the period 2011–2016 contain 46 987 116 observations of 8 798 177 different individuals who experienced 4 281 250 changes of residence. As data are compiled on an annual basis, only one change of residence per year is counted.

These almost exhaustive individual data make it possible to identify the factors influencing mobility at individual level. Furthermore, thanks to the geographic coordinates, for the first time, this study is able to measure mobility within the same commune and establish the distance of these movements. The analyses presented in this research are slightly different to the Swiss demographic statistics, which define internal migration as the changing of one's residence to another Swiss commune and therefore do not take into account movements within the same commune. Moreover, demographic statistics usually present internal migration in the form of flows, i.e. the number of movements that took place in one year among the resident population (a person can thus make several migrations), and not the number of people who migrate. Due to missing data and to avoid giving numbers that differ from those of the Federal Statistical Office, the results are presented in the form of the annual probability of migrating rather than an absolute number.

6.2 Internal migration: spatio-temporal trends

This section provides a description of migration flows in Switzerland. The study attempts to analyse migration in as much detail as possible by using the almost exhaustive individual data for the 2011 to 2016 period (see Box 6.1). These data make it possible not only to describe individual factors of internal migration but for the first time to also gather information at intracommunal level by looking specifically at migrations taking place within the same commune.

6.2.1 Flow intensity

Internal mobility in Switzerland has grown considerably in recent decades: the number of changes of commune made by the permanent resident population has risen from some 370 000 movements in the 1980s to more than 500 000 in 2015 (FSO 2019). This 35% increase, however, coincides with a rise in population (+32% between 1980 and 2015) and therefore in the number of people likely to migrate. As a consequence, the number of changes of residence per capita has hardly grown in recent decades.

Taking into account all types of internal mobility (including within the same commune) our analyses show that between 2011 and 2016, 9.2% of the population changed residence annually. This proportion remained stable over the six years of observation. On the basis of the behaviour observed between 2011 and 2016, a person living in Switzerland from birth until the age of 90, would move home on average 7.5 times in their lifetime.

Local moves dominate as 44% of these changes of residence take place within the same commune, 40% to a commune in the same canton and only 16% to another canton. Graph G6.1 illustrates the intensity of migration flows by canton and by type of movement. Overall, these results show the importance of local moves in the mobility system of today.

This graph also illustrates wide diversity in behaviour from one canton to another as the most mobile population is found in Basel-Stadt with an average of 10.1% of the population who move in a given year compared with only 7.2% in Appenzell Innerrhoden. This diversity is also found in the type of movements made.

The cantons with larger urban zones have the fewest moves to other cantons—this is the case in Geneva, Bern, Vaud and Zurich and, to a lesser extent, Lucerne. Cities, with many educational and job opportunities, are extremely attractive, limiting the number of departures to another canton. Because of its small size and the interdependency with its neighbouring semi-canton, Basel-Stadt is an exception and experiences much intercantonal mobility.

The cantons of Ticino and Valais on the other hand, are characterised by a low annual probability of intercantonal migration. For Ticino, the linguistic barrier could explain why people prefer to change residence within the same canton. Regarding Valais, an alpine canton with a strong regional identity, this low probability is surprising, given the large number of young people who leave to go and study in other cantons. The explanation is probably related to under-registration at the local authorities of the actual place of residence.

Migration flows between communes in the same canton tend to be intense in cantons with a large territory (Vaud, Bern, Aargau, Fribourg and Valais) and which therefore offer more housing possibilities. But, with the exception of Basel-Stadt, the annual probability of internal migration within the same commune is paradoxically highest in the cantons without large towns. Glarus, Schaffhausen and Valais dominate the rankings.

Percentage of people making an internal migration, 2011–2016

By canton being left and by type of movement — **G6.1**



Source: FSO – STATPOP © FSO, author 2020

6.2.2 Distance

Migration studies tend to give a certain meaning to different types of movement. Long distance movements, for example, are associated with professional reasons, whereas short-distance movements are often equated with a change in household requirements (Clark and Huang 2003). Furthermore, although intracommunal movements are an important measure from a political and spatial planning point of view—in that they alter the population of an administrative unit and therefore change a population subject to different policies—it is also relevant to characterise the movements according to the distance covered.

The distances covered in the event of an internal migration are relatively short. 41% of individuals move under two kilometres away and 60% less than five. In contrast, only 2.2% of internal migrants move more than 100 kilometres away. Distances are obviously strongly related to the type of migration. Although movements within the same commune rarely exceed five kilometres, 10% of intercommunal movements and 1% of intercantonal movements are for less than two kilometres.

Annual probability of internal migration and distribution of movements by distance covered, 2011–2016
By type of commune being left **T6.1**

	Annual probability of internal migration (in %)	Distribution of distance moved (in %)					
		0–1 km	1–5 km	5–10 km	10–50 km	50 km+	Total
Urban, larger urban zone	9.6	26.8	36.3	13.8	17.1	6.1	100
Urban, medium urban zone	9.7	30.5	34.4	11.4	17.5	6.2	100
Urban, small urban zone or beyond	9.3	34.4	29.0	10.2	19.8	6.7	100
Peri-urban, high density	8.5	30.2	24.5	16.4	23.5	5.3	100
Peri-urban, medium density	7.8	25.8	24.4	18.9	25.0	5.9	100
Peri-urban, low density	7.1	20.5	22.8	21.4	28.8	6.4	100
Rural centre	9.1	37.0	21.3	9.9	23.5	8.2	100
Rural (central)	7.8	26.8	23.9	16.7	27.0	5.4	100
Rural (peripheral)	7.8	31.5	19.4	12.1	24.8	12.2	100

Source: FSO — STATPOP

6.2.3 Place of departure and arrival

As we shall see in Section 6.3, migration movements depend greatly on individual characteristics. Although certain inhabitants have profiles making them more likely to migrate, it is also true that certain places attract more arrivals and others are more likely to incite people to leave.

As far as the place of residence is concerned, the greatest number of departures is recorded in urban communes; in the larger and medium urban zones, the likelihood of internal emigration is higher than 9.6% (Table T6.1). These flows are mainly moves within the same larger urban zone or to an area close by as around 75% of movements from larger urban zones take place within a distance of under 10 km. This high degree of mobility is found essentially in a younger and more mobile population but is also due, to a lesser extent, to departures towards the outskirts or other regions that are not compensated by new arrivals. In this way, the country's five largest towns (Zurich, Geneva, Basel, Bern and Lausanne) together lost more than 35 000 inhabitants due to internal migration over the period from 2011 to 2016 (FSO 2019). Thanks to international inflows, however, these cities continue to grow.

In contrast, departing flows are smallest in the peri-urban and rural zones, where, paradoxically, those who do move cover the greatest distances (Table T6.1). With an annual probability of leaving of 7.1% this means that on average one person in 14 changes residence in a given year in the sparsely populated peri-urban communes. Peri-urban and rural zones contain more home owners and families, who are less likely to move home.

Internal movements are not neutral in effect; they influence the demographic and political balance not only at local and communal level, as we have just seen, but also at regional and cantonal level. Over the 2004–2013 period, some cantons, such as Basel-Stadt and Geneva lost more than 12 000 inhabitants due to internal migration (Heiniger 2015). They were followed by Saint Gallen and Neuchâtel with losses of more than 5000 inhabitants. In contrast, other cantons relied on intercantonal mobility to provide significant growth. This was the case in the cantons of Aargau and Fribourg, which had net migration of 21 000 and 17 000 respectively. They were followed by Valais, Thurgau and Lucerne with gains of more than 5000.

6.2.4 Crossing the language border

The linguistic regions in Switzerland are often regarded as real barriers to internal migration, especially from the 1990s on when changes from one linguistic region to another became particularly rare (Huissoud et al. 1996). This trend is confirmed by our analyses, since 96% of internal movements within Switzerland take place within the same linguistic region. Table T6.2 shows the flows between and within the linguistic regions.

Migration within linguistic borders is strongest in the most highly populated linguistic regions: in German speaking Switzerland, for example, almost 99% of migrations stay within the same region. The French-speaking population also remains very attached to its linguistic region (96.5%), whereas Italian speakers are more likely to leave their region (92.9%) and Romansh speakers are even more likely to leave (60.1%). It is interesting to note that people from an Italian-speaking region are more likely to migrate to German-speaking communes than to French-speaking ones, despite the latter being closer culturally speaking (5.6% of migrations to German-speaking communes and 1.5% to French-speaking ones).

The apparent barrier constituted by linguistic borders should, however, be regarded in light of the above statement confirming the dominance of short-distance migrations: as most Swiss people move short distances, it follows that crossing a distant linguistic border is a rare occurrence.

Distribution of migration flows between linguistic regions, in %, 2011–2016 **T6.2**

Relative distribution matrix of migration flow line by linguistic region (in %)					
	Language of commune arriving in				
	German	French	Italian	Romansh	Total
Language of commune departing from					
German	98.90	0.83	0.22	0.10	100
French	3.31	96.50	0.17	0.00	100
Italian	5.58	1.49	92.90	0.04	100
Romansh	38.20	0.61	1.06	60.10	100

Source: FSO — STATPOP

Distribution of migration flows between linguistic regions, in %, 2011–2016

For internal migration of more than 20 km **T6.3**

Relative distribution matrix of migration flow line by linguistic region (movements greater than 20 km) (in %)					
	Language of commune arriving in				
	German	French	Italian	Romansh	Total
Language of commune departing from					
German	94.00	4.07	1.42	0.50	100
French	16.60	82.30	1.06	0.02	100
Italian	40.20	10.80	48.60	0.33	100
Romansh	90.00	1.77	3.06	5.16	100

Source: FSO — STATPOP

An increase in flows between linguistic regions can be observed among people migrating over a distance of more than 20 km. Table T6.3 shows this phenomenon and clearly demonstrates a greater interconnection between the linguistic regions: although only 6% of people residing in a German-speaking region change linguistic region if the distance of their migration is greater than 20 km, this percentage increases to 17.7% for the French-speaking region and even reaches 51.4% for the Italian-speaking region.

6.2.5 Mapping the flows

By mapping migration flows in the same way that Cheshire and Uberti (2014) represented commuter flows around London, Graph G6.2 illustrates the intensity of internal migration in Switzerland throughout the period 2011 to 2016. It is thus possible to obtain a picture of trends in medium and long-distance migration.

This map reveals the Swiss Plateau as an extremely well-connected environment, whose centres of gravity are the country's largest urban zones. They attract flows from the surrounding peripheral regions. But the region of Zurich in particular stands out for its centrality. It is important to point out that flows around Zurich remain intense even beyond the borders of its larger urban zone.

The alpine regions, Graubünden, Ticino and Valais as well as the cantons of central Switzerland, are certainly less densely populated but are also barely connected with the rest of the country. It is also interesting to note that it is impossible to distinguish the linguistic border between German- and French-speaking areas on the Swiss Plateau. A visible gap can, however, be seen in Valais although there is no physical natural barrier blocking migrations into the Rhône valley.



6.3 Internal migration and life course

Migration trajectories are largely dependent on individual factors, but the decision to migrate is often brought about by an event that leads individuals to change their place of residence. Getting married, the birth of a child or a new job are all typical events related to moving home. The life course approach, developed by Elder (1974), allows such life course events to be interpreted and to be put into context, i.e. in terms of the individual moment (age) and also of the moment in time (period) at which they occur. This approach is used to interpret internal migration in this section, along with the consideration of individual characteristics.

Everyone's life course is strewn with events and transitions occurring in spheres relating to work, family and migration. These different spheres are in fact deeply connected and it frequently happens that an event in one sphere leads to another event in another sphere (Courgeau 1990). This is especially true for migration due to changes in an individual's family situation: moving in with a partner or a separation/divorce are associated with a move, at least for one of the two partners. The birth of a child and a growing family often go hand in hand with a change of home. The same applies to professional changes or the start of a university course, which may involve migration to find a closer residence.

Previous research has linked certain individual factors, such as age, sex, socio-economic position, ethnic origin or marital status to mobility. These factors are intrinsically linked to life course events but they also modulate personal aspirations regarding mobility or immobility. These are aspirations about various personal preferences—the desire for a larger or smaller home, living in a new neighbourhood, leaving the town centre, etc.—but also to constraints—a separation, too high rent, noise, plans to move, etc. They refer to very different situations and can be placed at several levels.

6.3.1 Life cycle

The life cycle approach analyses the intensity of migration by age. There exists a very clear and almost universal structure corresponding to an increase in migration flows among young adults and then a gradual decrease as people age. This form of migration according to the life cycle approach can be explained by events happening at the same time among individuals going through the same stage of their life cycle (Clark and Davies Withers 2009): individuals (from the same cohort) leave the parental home, get married, have children and divorce at more or less the same time.

Graph G6.3 shows that the internal migration structure is highly dependent on age. The form of internal migration follows a relatively similar tendency, regardless of the type of movement; the intensity is stronger for migrations within the same commune or between communes in the same commune than between communes in different cantons.

Annual probability of internal migration, 2011–2016

By age and by type of movement **G6.3**



Source: FSO – STATPOP © FSO, author 2020

The intensity of internal migration increases sharply once people reach the age of majority. It peaks at the age of 26 and then gradually decreases over the following decade. This stage of the life cycle corresponds firstly to leaving the parental home and to flexible types of housing (living in small apartments or studios or flat-sharing). The first professional changes also take place during this period of the life cycle and the start and end of education and training (universities or other institutions of higher education) which can trigger a change of town or region. The first foundation stones for starting a family are also laid in this period (moving in with partner, marriage) which call for a change of residence when the family grows (birth of a child) or the relationship comes to an end (separation or divorce). This period corresponds, moreover, to changes in aspiration, starting with the desire of young adults to live in the town centre followed by families moving away from the town to peri-urban zones (Kupiszewski et al. 2000). Graph G6.3 also illustrates the extent of these changes by the high mobility of small children—intensity is strongest at birth but then only decreases slowly afterwards as other events trigger these changes of residence (birth of siblings, starting school, parents divorcing, or a change in parents' aspirations, etc.).

Beyond the age of 40 there is a decline in migration, with a slight surge, however, observed at retirement age. Although intercantonal and intercommunal movements continue to decline, movements within the same commune increase massively from the age of 75 when people approach the fourth age and new needs arise. This short-distance migration corresponds to elderly people down-sizing into more functional dwellings or moving into an old people's home.

Life cycle mobility is heavily influenced by social norms and customs. With studies taking longer and young people leaving home later, the increase in mobility once adulthood has been reached tends to occur later, whereas its decline is more gradual. This can mainly be explained by today's life courses becoming less standardised and by new family norms (divorce, blended families) and the fact that people change jobs more often.

6.3.2 The individual factors of internal migration

This section discusses the intensity of internal migration according to different individual characteristics. Gender, marital status and household composition, origin and income are examined. As these factors are for the most part strongly linked to the variable 'age', an indicator that takes into account the distribution of ages is also presented: the total number of migrations standardised by age from birth to the age of 90 (TNM), which can be interpreted as the average number of internal movements that a person with this characteristic would make throughout their lifetime.

Gender

Women and men experience roughly the same intensity of internal migration and consequently the number of movements throughout their lifetime is very similar (Table T6.4). However, there is a slight discrepancy in the intensity of migration by age (Graph G6.4).

Women's mobility begins earlier than that of men but also declines sooner: it is related to leaving the parental home, moving in with their partner and the birth of their first child. These events occur, on average, earlier than for men. Among older people, mobility is stronger among women than men. This is due notably to the fact that on average, men live less long and that women who find themselves alone undertake one more change of residence in old age (to a more suitable apartment or an old-people's home, for example).

Annual probability of internal migration, 2011–2016

By age and sex **G 6.4**



Source: FSO – STATPOP © FSO, author 2020

Marital status and household composition

With regard to marital status and household composition, our analyses show intense mobility by single persons and single-person households (Table T6.4). For these groups, mobility is particularly pronounced for long-distance movements—the probabilities of intercantonal migration are greater than 2% compared with an average of 1.5% for the rest of the population. Married persons and households comprising between 2 and 10 persons have probabilities of internal migration that are much lower. This is partly due to a coincidence between family structure and an older age in the life cycle; married persons and those who don't live alone include more people who have already been through the family transitions related to mobility—leaving home, moving in with a partner or even the birth of a child.

Divorced and widowed persons have relatively low internal migration probabilities (significantly lower than average for all types of movement), which can be largely explained by the old age of these groups' members. The standardised indicator for the number of moves throughout life indicates particularly pronounced mobility by divorced persons (TNM 12.1).

It should also be noted that an extremely mobile population (TNM 13.2 for households of 10 to 99 persons and 18.3 for households of more than 100 people) passes through large households—collective households such as boarding schools, accommodation for temporary workers, homes for the elderly, hospitals, and prison etc., reflecting the ephemeral nature of such dwellings.

Origin

The internal migration of populations of foreign origin has often been analysed from an economic perspective, i.e. by interpreting movements as a labour force transfer dependant on labour market demand (Zarin-Nejadan and Murier 2000). The overall conclusion of previous researchers in Switzerland has been that foreigners have greater internal mobility than Swiss nationals. Although individual factors and life course are also decisive, populations with a migration background tend to be less attached to the region in which they live and therefore find it easy to leave again (Lerch 2012).

The results in Table T6.4 bear out the more pronounced mobility of people with a migration background. Foreign nationals born abroad have the highest annual migration probabilities (12.8%) followed by foreign nationals born in Switzerland (10.7%). Swiss nationals born in Switzerland have an annual migration probability of 8.1% and Swiss nationals born abroad 7.7%. As the population with a migration background is particularly young, the differences between Swiss and foreign nationals in terms of internal migration are less marked when the number of standardised movements by age are considered. The gap between foreigners born in Switzerland and Swiss nationals born in Switzerland is thus negligible (TNM 7.4 compared with 7.0).

Previous work on the mobility of migrants has shown that migrants are often most mobile during the first years after arrival from abroad (Lacroix and Zufferey 2019). Adjustment theory is often proposed to explain this phenomenon. It suggests that due to a lack of information about and knowledge of the country of destination (concerning the housing market, the neighbourhood or even the labour market, for example), migrants do not make *the best choice* on arrival and make spatial readjustments in the following years (Clark and Huang, 2003).

Among foreign nationals born abroad, a gradual decline in internal migration can be observed while the length of stay is increasing (Table T6.4). One year after an international migration, the probability of internal migration is 15.6% compared with only 6.1% or foreign nationals that have been living for 20 years or more in Switzerland. This higher rate of mobility concerns both short distance migrations (intra and intercommunal) and those including a change of canton that are more than just a simple readjustment at local level.

Income

In previous studies, researchers have demonstrated a strong link between the level of spatial mobility and a person's socio-economic position in Switzerland (Charton and Wanner 2001): the higher the level of education, the greater the tendency to migrate. This characteristic, which is not exclusive to Switzerland, is largely a reflection of the labour market structure as a university degree opens up very specific job opportunities, which sometimes involve moving home.

The data used in this chapter do not enable identification of an individual's level of education but do allow an estimation of their social position using a standardised measure of household income.[1] Our results in Table T6.4 show that the lowest income group (less than CHF 1000 per household member per month)

[1] Measured on the basis of Old Age and Survivors Insurance contributions, total household income is divided by the number of persons in the household using the OECD adult equivalence scale (1 for the first adult, 0.5 for every other person over the age of 14 and 0.3 for each child under the age of 14).

Annual probability of internal migration and total number of standardised migrations by age, 2011–2016

By different individual characteristics

T6.4

	Annual probability of internal migration (in %)				Total number of migrations*
	intercantonal	intercommunal	intracommunal	Total	TNM
Gender					
Men	1.48	3.69	4.01	9.18	7.4
Women	1.45	3.47	3.87	8.79	7.5
Marital status					
Single	2.10	5.03	5.09	12.22	8.0
Married	0.90	2.37	2.93	6.20	6.8
Divorced	1.68	1.17	3.10	5.95	12.1
Widowed	0.45	1.17	3.10	4.72	7.5
Size of household					
1 person	2.00	3.91	4.43	10.34	13.6
2 persons	1.42	3.40	3.35	8.17	9.2
3 persons	1.79	4.56	4.63	10.98	8.0
4 persons	1.10	3.03	3.65	7.78	6.4
5–9 persons	1.14	3.17	3.98	8.29	7.2
10–99 persons	1.39	4.38	6.40	12.17	13.2
100 persons and over	4.05	6.79	6.73	17.57	18.3
Migration background					
Swiss national born in Swiss	1.37	3.32	3.39	8.08	7.0
Swiss national born abroad	1.29	2.93	3.46	7.68	7.7
Foreign national born in Swiss	1.31	3.86	5.52	10.69	7.4
Foreign national born abroad	2.05	4.95	5.83	12.83	9.7
Missing	0.47	1.79	5.58	7.84	8.2
Length of time in Switzerland (for foreigners born abroad)					
1 year	4.39	9.79	11.39	25.57	17.5
2 to 4 years	3.46	7.83	8.24	19.53	13.2
5 to 9 years	2.44	5.54	6.31	14.29	9.3
10 to 19 years	1.31	3.60	5.14	10.05	6.9
20 or over	0.64	2.14	3.27	6.05	5.2
Standardised monthly household income by person					
less than CHF 1000	0.87	2.06	3.22	6.15	9.5
CHF 1000–2999	1.49	3.64	4.51	9.64	8.1
CHF 3000–4499	1.48	3.91	4.48	9.87	7.5
CHF 4500–5999	1.52	4.14	4.31	9.97	7.1
CHF 6000–7499	1.66	4.33	4.02	10.01	6.9
CHF 7500–8999	1.80	4.22	3.78	9.80	6.7
CHF 9000–14 999	1.97	3.93	3.57	9.47	6.8
CHF 15 000 and over	2.00	3.53	3.35	8.88	7.0
Total	1.46	3.63	4.15	9.24	7.5

* standardised by age

Sources: FSO — STATPOP; CCO — IA

has lower probabilities of internal migration than the others (6% compared with 9 to 10% for all the other categories). But when standardised by age, this tendency to migrate is, in contrast, strongest among people with low incomes. It is also interesting to note that the differences in the overall intensity of internal migration are relatively small for incomes higher than CHF 3000 but that the type of mobility varies greatly: people on high incomes tend to make more long-distance moves (between cantons), intermediate incomes between communes in the same canton, whereas low incomes move more within the same commune.

6.3.3 Multiple migration

The previous sections dealt with internal migration from a transversal perspective, i.e. by adding together all of the population's movements over a one year period. Certain individuals, however, have a strong tendency to move and move home each year, whereas others are more sedentary (Zufferey et al. 2020). This section rounds of the chapter on internal migration by presenting the characteristics of individuals who made several internal migrations during the six years of observation.[2]

Over 6 consecutive years, almost two-thirds of the population did not change residence between 2011 and 2016, a quarter moved in one year of observation, 8% in two and 2% in three years of observation (see Graph G6.5). Persons who moved home in more than three of the six years of observation form a very small group but nevertheless there were 610 individuals who moved in each of the six years. Such hyper-mobile individuals are certainly rare but they are significantly greater in number than could be supposed in the event of statistical independence (see note to Graph G6.5).

Multiple migrants have specific characteristics. Although differences due to gender are minimal (less than 1 percentage point difference), age appears to be the most decisive factor. Graph G6.6 shows that in the population observed for six consecutive years, young adults are the most mobile: 18 to 29 year-olds account for almost 60% of persons who migrated at least four times in six years and only 7% of them never moved home. Hyper-mobility is rare among 50–64 year-olds and even more so among persons aged 65 and over: these groups represent an ever-declining percentage among the most mobile populations.

Although the range of movements is very diverse, intercommunal and intercantonal movements tend to dominate multiple migration. Trajectories with more than two movements between cantons over a period of six years are therefore rare; they represent only 10% of all multiple internal migrants.

Number of internal migrations in the population observed for six years, 2011–2016 **G6.5**



Note: The red cross indicates the theoretical distribution (binomial distribution) if the number of internal migrations were governed by chance. The distance between the bar and the cross shows that there are individuals who are more sedentary and others who are more mobile due to their individual characteristics.

Source: FSO – STATPOP © FSO, author 2020

Number of internal migrations by age[1], 2011–2016 **G6.6**



[1] age in 2011

Source: FSO – STATPOP © FSO, author 2020

[2] The results presented in this section only take into account individuals who were considered across the whole observation period 2011 to 2016, i.e. for six years (n=6 915 069). This measurement is obviously flawed as it excludes any movement that took place before or after this period, but it does allow us to outline a trend for statistics hitherto little known in Switzerland. It should also be noted that by breaking down the population in this way, the average intensity of internal migration has declined (the annual probability of migration is henceforth 8.2% compared with 9.2% across the whole permanent resident population) in particular because people who undertook an international migration (arrivals or departures) between 2011 and 2016 cannot be considered here. As we have seen above, these individuals are particularly mobile.

6.4 Conclusion

Internal migration has a major influence on the population's distribution throughout Switzerland. Today, it plays a more important role in the population's spatial composition than the arrivals and departures of international migrants. This chapter attempts to examine in greater detail the subject of internal migration in Switzerland based on data on the whole population between 2011 and 2016. By processing almost 47 million individual and spatially geocoded observations, some 4.2 million changes of residence have been analysed in this research. Section 6.2 describes the intensity and the characteristics of migration flows whereas Section 6.3 concentrates on individual migration factors.

Today, Switzerland is characterised by a pronounced internal mobility. Our analyses show that between 2011 and 2016, 9.2% of the population moved home every year. On average, people move 7.5 times throughout their lifetime. However, internal migrations tend to be small-scale as 41% of all individuals move under two kilometres away and 60% less than five. These short distances are also seen at local administration level. 44% of changes of residence take place within the same commune, 40% to a commune in the same canton and only 16% to another canton. The study shows that behaviour varies greatly between cantons, but the biggest differences are seen in terms of the place where people choose to live (type of commune). Mobility is strongest in the larger urban zones, but it is confined, in the majority of cases, to the urban zone itself. In peripheral zones, internal movements are less frequent but they connect more distant places. The analysis also examines changes of residence between the linguistic regions and shows that, to a large extent, these regions are very hermetic.

In Section 6.3, the chapter examines the individual factors of migration. It shows, in particular, that age is one of the most decisive factors in mobility. The life cycle, i.e. the different stages experienced over the years such as leaving the parental home, moving in with a partner, the birth of a child, education and training, and a change of job, etc. all play a part in the dynamics of migration, thereby concentrating the majority of movements between the ages of 20 and 35. While there is little difference between the mobility of men and women, the study demonstrates that a migration background plays a decisive role, especially during the first years following an international arrival. The chapter also discusses the roles of marital status, household structure and income in internal mobility. The last section addresses the topic of multiple migration. During the six years of observation, almost two-thirds of the population did not move home once, one in six inhabitants changed residence twice or more and there is a small percentage of cases that moved in each of the six years of observation.

As far as methodology is concerned, this research makes an important contribution to this subject in Switzerland. By using geocoded individual data for the whole Swiss population observed over six years (at most), it allows us to resolve several shortcomings in official statistics and also avoids the problems inherent in measuring migration between administrative areas.

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7 Which path to inclusion? Citizenship between institutions and attitudes

Marion Aeberli and Gianni D'Amato

Abstract

Since the birth of modern nation-states, citizenship has been the most powerful tool to decide who should be regarded as equal. Nevertheless, discriminatory attitudes persist in the liberal polities as well. This chapter inquires the variation governing access to citizenship and the factors that take to more inclusive approaches. It investigates the extent to which cantonal institutions are decisive in determining inclusive or restrictive access to citizenship, and questions the degree to which institutions are responsive to general attitudes in the population. The inclusivity of cantonal practices, we argue, is associated with demographic and political indicators. Accordingly, cantons with a high level of migration and urban population prefer inclusive migration policies. The more liberal the political orientation of a canton is at its different political levels, the more likely such a canton displays a more inclusive practice. These results are cross checked and confirmed with a FSO survey on attitudes. Where cantonal practices are inclusive, liberal attitudes in the population predominate. Moreover, the population in demographically diverse cantons is more liberal and feels more at ease with current plural societies than the population in cantons with less diversity. Turning from aggregated to individual factors, opinions on diversity are shaped by living conditions, a proximity to migratory experience and political affiliation.

7.1 The importance of citizenship

7.1.1 Citizenship as a driver for inclusion

There is a prevailing political doctrine in Western societies according to which citizenship corresponds to a normative instrument that operates strongly as source of equality and social dignity (D'Amato 2001). Generally, all attributes which produce discrimination among citizens are catalogued in modern constitutions as 'no goes'. Consequently, equality and respectability refer not only to common rights, but also to duties and responsibilities that are intrinsically linked with citizenship as both a legal and political status. However, not all members of a polity may enjoy the same degree of respectability. Lack of rights, or asymmetries between rights and duties, may impede participation within their political community as equals among equals, potentially causing and reinforcing existing discrimination. Moreover, attitudes related to perceived others may cause a discriminatory behavior regarding other inhabitants, independently of their actual status. Traditionally, only citizens *pleno jure* enjoy the full protection of the state and constitutional rights. Therefore, the important questions are: who is a citizen; how can citizenship be expanded to non-citizens; and what attitudes assure mutual respect? This quest for inclusion or exclusion of residents that still are not considered citizens has increasingly become a focal point of debate over the last three decades. In general terms, liberal constitutions rarely exclude their current citizens and electorate on the basis of cultural, religious or ethnic criteria, however become important characteristics when evaluating or judging potential future citizens. These attitudes towards others may be related to common institutional settings; a possibility that will be analysed with data from the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) in this chapter. Indeed, the dispute on social, civil, and more recently also political rights, to which immigrants have been confronted with a multiplicity of ways, can be read as an indicator of the functioning of political systems and current forms of exclusion, and in this sense, the quality of our democracies.

Indeed, the history of democracies points to the fact that democratic and competitive systems can be experienced differently depending on the population. For example, one part of a population may experience the democratic system as inclusive and enabling, whereas others may find it to be exclusive and hegemonic in nature. Such a practice of marginalization was usually based on the appraisal of relevant criteria to legitimize exclusion. For example, in the US, race and gender limited access to military service, and within a 'republic in arms', access to citizenship (Shklar 1991). Besides race and gender—the segregation criteria among early Republicanism—social class was another important category of exclusion in the 19th and early 20th century. Different struggles at various levels have shaped the evolution of modern democracies on their path to national Welfare systems, working to bridge the gap between the 'haves and have-nots; assuring access to education, health and solidarity in an unprecedented way. However, nationality[1] was, and to a certain extent remains, a powerful instrument to decide if immigrants are to be regarded as equals, if they merit the same respect, or in some way deserve unequal treatment (D'Amato 2001).

Whereas in traditional overseas countries of immigration, immigrants' access to citizenship and eventual naturalization was taken for granted as a step in a broader process of integration.

[1] In the literature citizenship refers to citizens in possession of full participation rights, therefore the active part of being a citizen, whereas nationality denotes formal membership to a nation-state (D'Amato 2001). In this text we use both terms synonymously.

In Europe and in particular in Switzerland, the largest immigration contingents emerged after World War II, specifically from the recruitment of temporary guest workers who were not then imagined as potential future citizens. However, the dynamics of the migration process as well as other developments, may have helped to generate more inclusive conceptions of citizenship and to foster more inclusive attitudes towards migrants, both of which will be analysed in this chapter. Family reunification turned guest workers into settled immigrants. Many of those retained the nationality of origin, a rational choice both for its instrumental value as a set of rights and for its symbolic importance as a marker of a distinct national identity. At the same time, rights of permanent residents in major democratic receiving states were upgraded in many areas or equalized with those of citizens. Finally, more and more countries of immigration abandoned the consensus in international law that those who naturalize have to renounce their previous nationality and a growing number of sending countries also accepted multiple nationalities among their expatriates. All these developments have blurred the previously bright line separating aliens from citizens. While some observers welcomed these trends as heralding a new post-national cosmopolitan era in which state-bound citizenship would eventually be overcome, others were concerned about migrants' multiple loyalties, their apparent 'free ride' on citizenship rights without corresponding duties, and about the political mobilization of ethnic or religious identities (see the excellent article of Bauböck et al. 2006).

The claim of immigrants to be more included in terms of political participation took the migrants to the 'hard core' (Barbalet 1988) of modern democracies. The efforts to increase their capacity to participate in democratic processes, nationally as much as transnationally, transformed migrants into a new object of analysis, inquiring three interrelated and interdependent political dynamics: how have political systems reacted institutionally to the presence of a growing immigrant population, how (inclusively) was access to citizenship shaped, and which strategies were chosen by migrants to gain access to inclusion?

The rights reached so far can be read as an indication that a bundle of rights cannot be circumscribed—as it was imagined in the 19th century—to a nationally bound entity. The observation to understand long term settled immigrants more as denizens than as aliens (Hammar 1985) enabled productive reflections in order to understand the gap between the legal status of citizens and the existing rights of non-national inhabitants of a nation. It also took reconsideration of civil standards to be shared in order to allow cohabitation within a more plural world.

7.1.2 Conceptual transformations

Citizenship has undergone many transformations. Since the times of ancient Athenian democracy its core meaning has been a status of membership in a self-governing political community. Today, different meanings ranging from the legal status of nationality to the virtues of the 'good citizen' who contributes to the polity, are associated to the modern concept of citizenship. In this section, we will emphasize a broad political conception of citizenship that refers to individual membership, rights and participation in a political community. Particularly in migration contexts, citizenship marks a distinction between established members and outsiders based on their privileged relation to the state.

This relation to the state has changed. Technological developments allow the extension and deepening of contacts with the 'home country' as well as with the members of the same group in other places. Furthermore, a global imagination of 'home' notably conveyed by the media affected both immigrants and those who stayed behind (Kaya and Baglione 2008). One essential way to communicate a sense of common belonging has always been facilitated by media such as newspapers, radio or TV, including, nowadays, the internet. Therefore, keeping diasporic multiple ties is nowadays no longer stigmatized as illegitimate. Indeed, with the rise of globalization the fragmentized individual may be considered an asset. Focusing particularly on political transnationalism, Bauböck (2003, 701) has highlighted the importance of changing institutions of the polity and new conceptions of membership both in the country of origin as well as in the receiving country. One major new trait of today's transnational memberships are the increasing opportunities for all, nationals and non-nationals, to combine external and internal status and affiliations, as best exemplified by dual citizenship.

There is an emerging literature on modes of belonging that focuses on today's constructions of identities in relation to different places, groups and countries (e.g. Christiansen and Hedetoft 2004; Sicakkan and Lithman 2005; Paugam 2008; Paugam et al. 2020). Seen from a different angle, such affiliations may be called 'ties'. The notion of individuals' social, cultural, economic and political ties focuses our attention less on identities and more on social relations and practices that structure individual lives (Fibbi and D'Amato 2008).

According to different authors (Brubaker 1992; Bauböck 2003), citizenship is a more discriminating concept than both ties and belonging because it is a status of membership granted by an established or aspiring political community. Citizenship is neither a purely subjective phenomenon (as is a sense of belonging), nor is it objective in the sense that it can be inferred from external observation of a person's social circumstances and activities. Citizenship is instead based on a quasi-contractual relation between an individual and a collectivity (Bauböck et al. 2006). It refers to loyalty towards a community, but also to the idea of universalist protection of individual rights by the state. In contrast with belonging and ties, membership is also a binary concept that marks a boundary between insiders and outsiders.

Box 7.1: nccr — on the move

The nccr — on the move is the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) for migration and mobility studies. It aims to enhance the understanding of contemporary phenomena related to migration and mobility in Switzerland and beyond. Connecting disciplines, the NCCR brings together research from the social sciences, economics and law (see www.nccr-onthemove.ch).

More recently, republican and communitarian discourses have re-emphasized moral obligations and responsibilities as well as legal duties of citizenship. This may have an impact on the openness, respective to the restrictiveness in accessing citizenship. Citizenship duties are thus applied to migrants in a less gradual and differentiated way than citizenship rights. Yet receiving countries have periodically asserted a specific obligation of immigrants to assimilate or integrate and have used the naturalization process as an occasion for asserting a duty of loyalty that remains at best implicit for native citizens. Austria, Denmark, Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland have all introduced integration courses for newcomers that consist mainly of language training with some additional practical orientation and information on the legal and political system of the receiving country. Particularly Switzerland with its federal institutional setting and its direct democratic veto opportunities offers an interesting case to study the legitimizing factors that allow a more restrictive or liberal approach to inclusion. Therefore, this present chapter will address the following questions: is the liberal or restrictive character of inclusion linked to cantonal or federal institutions alone, or are they responsive to general attitudes represented in the population? To which extent is the character of citizenship related to these attitudes? In general, is there a relation between attitudes, the institutional context and individual characteristics?

7.2 Citizenship in a federal context

Undeniably, according to the nccr—on the move (2018; see Box 7.1), Swiss legislation is among the most restrictive in Europe with regard to the acquisition of citizenship by birth in the territory (*jus soli*—place of birth principle) and through long-term residence (ordinary naturalization). Switzerland also offers comparatively fewer opportunities to foreign residents to cast a ballot in local elections than its European neighbors, although there are significant differences among cantons. Particularly the French-speaking cantons manifest a higher degree of inclusivity than other linguistic areas. Conversely, Switzerland ranks as one of the most generous countries when it comes to the right of expatriates to participate in national elections from abroad.

There is a wide variation between Swiss cantons in the standards governing access to citizenship (see Graph G7.1). These vary according to the legal requirements concerning the length of establishment, language competence, civil and cultural integration, reputation and economic resources. In the field of naturalization, the cantons of Jura, Schaffhausen, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Lucerne and Obwalden have the most inclusive provisions. At the opposite end of the spectrum, the cantons of Aargau, Schwyz and Bern have the least inclusive provisions, generally imposing higher requirements in terms of residence, language, civic and cultural integration, good moral character and economic resources.

What explains the larger inclusivity of naturalization procedures in certain cantons? Does it correspond to another philosophy of integration which is institutionally set, or is it indirectly linked to values shared within the local populations of the different cantons? Indeed, accessibility to citizenship is confronted, in a federal state like Switzerland, with the challenges of multi-level governance. Certain centralizing mechanisms, which in Germany and the US are enforced by a Supreme Court, are less successful in Switzerland. Centralizing legal approaches are counteracted by Parliament and citizens, which both give to attitude a remarkable political weight during phases of mobilization. Indeed, direct democracy gives social groups some opportunities to participate directly in the political process through popular initiatives and referendums, and is able to provoke major politicization of the migrant issue. Historically, the instruments of direct democracy have always forced the political elite to negotiate anti-immigration attitudes with populist challengers. While other European countries may be able to adopt policies 'behind closed doors' (Guiraudon 2000) to extend political and social rights to migrants, this is nearly impossible in Switzerland.

Moreover, while the Federation has the legislative power in most areas, responsibility for implementing federal policies resides largely with the cantons, which explains partly the variation observed among them. For the Federation, this has the

Visualization of the Swiss Citizenship Laws at the cantonal level[1]
Indicators of Swiss Citizenship Law, status: 10 January 2019 **G7.1**



[1] Regarding the calculation of the indicators please consult: https://nccr-onthemove.ch/publications/swisscit-index-on-citizenship-law-in-swiss-cantons-conceptualisation-measurement-aggregation/. For all mobility-migration indicators, see: https://indicators.nccr-onthemove.ch.

Source: nccr on the move – Migration-Mobility Survey

advantage of reducing its workload; for the cantons, the advantage lies in controlling their own program priorities and being able to adapt federal policies to local contexts. These aspects of the Swiss federal state also affect citizenship policies. In this case, the central actors are the cantons and the municipalities. In particular, cantons have room to maneuver when it comes to the promotion of provisions as recommended by federal institutions. In terms of implementation, this executive federalism is the cornerstone of the Swiss political system. Although the legislative authority lies with the federal government, its implementation is entrusted to the cantons. For the cantons to fulfil this role, they need a margin of appreciation in the application of federal laws. This allows the adaptation to local conditions, which leads to a higher legitimacy of the decisions. Therefore, federal states are sometimes 'laboratories' in which different models can be experimented and good practices developed. On the other hand, federalism can lead to structural discrimination and problematic unequal treatment of migrants depending on their place of residence within a canton (Manatschal 2013). But what exactly explains the variation among cantons?

7.3 Measuring inclusivity in Swiss cantons

In a recent study which examined the cantonal margins of maneuver in applying migration law, the authors wanted to understand the contextual factors that explain the inclusivity (or restrictiveness) of cantonal practices (Probst et al. 2019). They analysed these factors with regard to citizenship. In order to do this, they created indexes that were able to measure the degree of inclusivity of different migration policy fields. Inclusivity refers to a practice which—in contrast to a restrictive understanding—seeks to achieve integration through a low-threshold to participation and rights, and thus relies on low requirements and a broad access to funding opportunities. In short: it defines a varying degree of ease or difficulty for immigrants to gain full access to citizenship. Inclusivity and restrictiveness are two poles in a range of possibilities which cantons guide in designing integration policy.

The context of the cantons was described by appropriate indicators: among others, the demography index, the policy index and the inclusivity index. Each index is composed of several variables.

- *Demography index*: This index provides information about the level of diversity among the cantons' populations through population growth, proportion of foreigners, proportion of people with migration background, proportion of urban population, standardized naturalization rate, unemployment rate, proportion of mixed marriages and proportion of tertiary educated among Swiss citizens.
- *Policy index*: This index combines information about the voting results concerning migration issues, migration orientation of the legislature and migration orientation of the executive. The voting results concern four voting incidences between 2009 and 2017.
- *Inclusivity index*: This index is based on four indexes that are the asylum index, the naturalization index, the integration index and the admission index. Each of these indexes are themselves composed by various variables covering cantonal practices in the four domains mentioned. It provides information about the institutional context within the cantons regarding the same four domains.

The analysis shows that the political positioning of the canton's authorities influences the inclusivity of its naturalization practice. An inclusive practice is closely related to a liberal position on migration, which is reflected in the votes and in the composition of the Parliament. This statement corresponds to that of Helbling (2010), who concludes that the rejection rates towards naturalization applicants are higher where the local population has a restrictive attitude towards naturalization (or the granting of civil rights).

The analysis also shows that the composition of the cantonal population is related to inclusivity with regard to naturalization. Cantons with a high proportion of persons with a migrant background tend to implement inclusive practices. These are typical features to cantons with a strong urban population. These elements thus confirm the hypothesis that less urbanized cantons are usually stricter with regard to naturalization.

The study analysed the different contexts and came to an assessment of different indicators regarding inclusive practices. The political and demographic indicators have strong positive correlation with inclusivity. Cantons with a high level of migration and an urban population prefer inclusive migration policies. This statement refers to the conclusions of the study by Wichmann et al. (2011, 97), according to which the degree of urbanity best explains cantonal differences in terms of inclusivity. The analysis of the individual variables (aggregated in the demography index) shows a particularly strong influence of the proportion of foreigners and persons with a migration background. This observation can be interpreted in the light of the 'contact theory' dating back to Allport (1954). This theory states that openness towards immigrants increases with intensive contact with the resident population (see also Hewstone and Swart 2011). A higher concentration of migrants, which is characteristic of urban centers, does not necessarily mean more intensive contact with the resident population, but it does increase the possibility of such encounters.

In addition to the demography index, the context analysis takes into account the political orientation of the cantons, more precisely the more or less liberal attitude of their Parliament, government and the voting population to migration. The policy index has the strongest and most secure connection with inclusivity, in the expected direction: if the political forces display a liberal attitude to migration, the canton in question is likely to implement a more inclusive practice than a canton in which the political landscape is more conservative with regard to migration.

7.4 Attitudes towards diversity: weight of institutional context, demography and individual factors

To what extent is the described Swiss context also supported by attitudes among the population? Is there a relation between the institutional context—defined in terms of cantonal practices—and the population's attitudes towards diversity, particularly if we take into consideration the direct democratic political system providing veto-power to citizens? The following part of the chapter intends to analyse the complex link between institutional context and attitudes.

Box 7.2: Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland
In the context of diversity, the FSO Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland aims to present an accurate picture of the issues raised by the coexistence of different groups currently living in the country. Every two years since 2016, it collects information on the acceptance, rejection and integration of certain groups. The survey allows monitoring of trends in society in several areas such as racism, xenophobia and discrimination. The data collected are used to observe social change and help to guide policies on integration and anti-discrimination.

The already mentioned demography and policy indexes were able to explain the variations between cantons with regard to inclusivity. In a next step, the study of Probst et al. (2019) is combined with data from the FSO Survey on diversity and coexistence (see Box 7.2 'Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland'), in order to understand to what extent the constructed categories of inclusivity and restrictiveness may be confirmed. This process should also allow us to see if a link exists between the institutional context—grasped through cantonal practices—and attitudes of the population. The attitudes subject to examination are the attitudes towards diversity and 'others' such as migrants, specific ethnic groups or religious minorities (see Box 7.3 'Attitudes towards diversity').

Box 7.3: Attitudes towards diversity
Attitudes towards diversity can be observed through various indicators, which, to some extent, all refer to the process of othering and construction of otherness. In our case, this type of attitudes is measured through the sense of discomfort felt by a given population when facing perceived differences in people in everyday life. The feeling of unease is linked to five key criteria or causes of discomfort, which are differences in skin color, nationality, language spoken, religion and way of life (itinerant vs. sedentary).

7.4.1 Attitudes and institutional context

Since the Swiss context assigns an important political weight to the population's attitudes, their potential relation with cantonal policies is analysed using the inclusivity index of Probst et al. (2019). This approach allows to detect if people living in cantons defined as inclusive by the index show more openness towards diversity than people living in cantons that are at the other side of the spectrum of inclusivity.

To some extent, the link between the inclusivity of a canton and the attitudes of its population towards 'others'[2] tends to be validated. Graph G7.2 shows that there is an almost linear relation between the sense of discomfort towards diversity and the level of inclusivity of each Swiss canton. Basel City is the canton where the inclusivity index is the highest (0.91) and the attitudes towards diversity are on average the least negative (16% of the population with negative attitudes); Uri is the canton where the inclusivity index is the lowest (0.23) and the attitudes are the most negative (79%). In grouped cantons considered inclusive in terms of their administrative practices[3], a bit less than 30% of the population feel a sense of unease when meeting with someone perceived to be different; in grouped cantons described as restrictive[4] and in cantons between inclusivity and restrictiveness[5], this proportion is higher—between 34% and 37%. It is regarding the issue of the rights of non-nationals that the strongest differences occur between the groups of cantons ranked according to their level of inclusivity. In regions where cantonal practices are inclusive, two-third of the population think that foreign nationals born in Switzerland should benefit from an automatic naturalization process. In less inclusive cantons and in restrictive ones, the proportion drops to, respectively, 57% and 53%. The same applies when it comes to allowing political participation to non-nationals and granting them the right to vote: 55% of the population in inclusive cantons agree, whereas, in more restrictive cantons, only 42% of the population agree. As expected, cantonal practices and attitudes match when it comes to issues of the rights of non-nationals.

Even though differences according to level of inclusivity of cantons occur, the relation between the inclusivity index of Probst et al. (2019) and the attitudes indicator based on the data of the FSO Survey on diversity and coexistence (2018) is rather weak (see Table T7.1 in the Appendix). Since the study of Probst et al. (2019) detects a strong positive impact on inclusivity of the demographic index, the link between demography and attitudes can then be analysed more thoroughly.

[2] Cantonal averages from the Survey on diversity and coexistence

[3] Basel-Stadt, Jura, Neuchâtel, Valais, Vaud, Solothurn

[4] Aargau, Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Appenzell Innerrhoden, Basel-Landschaft, Fribourg, Graubünden, Nidwalden, Schwyz, Ticino, Uri, Zug

[5] Bern, Geneva, Glarus, Lucerne, Obwalden, Schaffhausen, Saint Gallen, Thurgau, Zurich

Attitudes towards diversity according to the level of inclusivity of Swiss cantons[1], 2018 **G7.2**



[1] The cantons GL and AI are excluded because they contain less than five observations.

Sources: FSO – Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland; Probst et al. 2019 © FSO, authors 2020

7.4.2 Demography and attitudes

According to previous conclusions, cantonal practices are related to the population's attitudes towards diversity, but they are not closely linked. Inclusivity of cantons and openness of the population can thus be thought of as rather distinct features. But can demography be a common factor which relates to both cantonal practices and individual attitudes?

Demography index

The next step allows us to observe if people living in cantons considered as diverse by the demography index show more openness towards diversity than people living in cantons at the other side of the diversity spectrum, as defined by Probst et al. (2019).

As it was the case with inclusivity, to some degree, the link between the diversity of a canton in terms of its demographic composition and the attitudes of its population towards 'others' can be confirmed (see Table T7.1 in the Appendix). The demographic factor is more correlated to the sense of discomfort than the inclusivity factor. The more diverse the canton is—meaning high proportion of foreigners, high proportion of people with migration background, high proportion of urban population, etc.—the more positive the attitudes towards the above mentioned issues are. Graph G7.3 shows the linear relation between the sense of discomfort towards otherness and the level of diversity among each Swiss canton. As seen through the linear display of the dots, the correlation between the variables are rather strong: the less diverse the canton, the more negative the attitudes are. For example, in cantons listed as demographically diverse[6], the sense of unease felt by the population when facing someone perceived as different is weaker (on average 30% of the population feel discomfort) than the one felt in cantons listed as semi-diverse[7] (37%) or as non-diverse[8] (48%). Attitudes towards foreign nationals are also more positive in the diversified group of cantons than in the semi- or non-diversified cantons. In diversified cantons, the majority of the population would agree to grant more rights to non-nationals, namely the right to vote, the right to family reunification, the right of automatic naturalization for the second generation and the right to stay in the country even when jobs get scarce; in non-diversified cantons, only a minority would agree to grant such rights. The biggest difference between the cantons occur regarding the right of political participation: 51% of the population are in favor of this in diversified cantons, 44% in semi-diversified cantons and 30% in non-diversified cantons.

Attitudes towards diversity according to the level of diversity among Swiss cantons[1], 2018 **G7.3**



[1] The cantons GL and AI are excluded because they contain less than five observations.

Sources: FSO – Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland; Probst et al. 2019 © FSO, authors 2020

As shown, differences in attitudes according to the demographic composition of cantons occur. For some indicators such as the sense of discomfort, the variations in percentages are important. Compared to the index of inclusivity based on cantonal practices, the demography index explains the attitudes towards 'others' better (see Table T7.1 in the Appendix). Nevertheless, when tested against other aggregated or contextual factors built with the data of the FSO Survey on diversity and coexistence, such as the language region or the degree of urbanization, the relation between the demography index of Probst et al. (2019) and the attitudes towards diversity is rather weak. An element which could explain the limited impact of diversity on attitudes is again the differences in sample composition of both data sets; another is the composition of the demographic index developed by Probst et al. (2019). This index includes different variables

[6] Aargau, Basel-Stadt, Geneva, Neuchâtel, Schaffhausen, Ticino, Vaud, Zug, Zurich

[7] Appenzell Ausserrhoden, Basel-Landschaft, Bern, Fribourg, Glarus, Jura, Lucerne, Schwyz, Solothurn, Saint Gallen, Thurgau, Valais

[8] Appenzell Innerrhoden, Graubünden, Nidwalden, Obwalden, Uri

suitable for the analysis of inclusivity; urbanity is only one of its components. Regarding attitudes, it seems that the weight of urbanity alone should be more thoroughly examined, since it tends to best explain the concept of inclusivity (Wichmann et al. 2011).

Degree of urbanization

With regard to its composition, the demography index of Probst et al. (2019) does not sufficiently explain the attitudes towards diversity and otherness. Focusing on urbanity alone allows to propose an evaluation of the impact of this factor.

Compared to the inclusivity index and the demography index, the FSO constructed urbanity factor identifies three types of regions based on their density—densely populated zone, intermediate zone and sparsely populated zone—which best explain attitudes. In urban and densely populated areas, opinions on diversity are positive, while they are less positive or even negative in sparsely populated areas. For example, the proportion that feels unease when facing someone with a different nationality, language, and religion or skin color is higher in non-urban areas (40%) than in urban areas (26%). Attitudes towards foreign nationals are also more positive in densely populated regions than in intermediate zones or in sparsely populated regions. This is also observable through an indicator measuring the sense of threat felt by the population: 22% of the population of non-urban areas feel threatened by non-nationals, whereas in urban areas only 12% feel this way.

As previously developed, differences in attitudes occur according to the degree of urbanization of Swiss regions. This result tends to confirm the contact theory from Allport (1954) and Hewstone and Swart (2011) according to which openness towards immigrants increases with intensive contact between 'inside groups' and 'outside groups'. Since urban centers increase the possibility of encounters with 'others', and taking into account the results presented above, urbanity can be considered as a good substitute variable for contact.

7.4.3 Attitudes and individual factors

Having discussed the role of aggregated factors such as cantonal practices and demography on attitudes towards diversity in Switzerland, and having observed weak to medium force relations between those factors and attitudes, as a next step, the focus shifts on the weight of individual factors. This broader analysis first tries to understand the role of individual factors, then the role of the institutional context *among other factors*.[9]

More than for any other contextual factors discussed earlier, the link between individual factors and attitudes towards 'others' tends to be confirmed (see Table T 7.2 in the Appendix). Except for gender which is not strongly associated with the analysed attitudes, all of the other individual factors show strong correlations. Overall, three factors stand out from the rest: living conditions, nationality and political affiliation regarding the left-right spectrum.

Living conditions

The living conditions (see info Box 7.4 'Living conditions'), understood here as the financial situation of households, are a factor which explains strongly attitudes towards 'others'. Persons living in poor conditions tend to have more negative opinions of diversity and non-nationals than persons living in rather good and good living conditions. For example, the proportion of the population feeling discomfort in everyday life when meeting someone perceived to be different is higher among those having poor living conditions (49%) than among those having good ones (31%). In the same idea, persons with a bad financial situation are less prone to grant more rights to non-nationals than persons with a good one. Regarding the right to family reunification, 49% of the first group would agree to grant such right, against 63% of the second one.

Box 7.4: Living conditions
The factor related to the living conditions is based on a question about the perceived level of difficulty, for a household, to make ends meet at the end of the month. The question can be answered with four categories going from 'very easy' to 'very difficult'. The answer should reflect the level of income of household in which a person lives.

Nationality and experience of naturalization

Nationality and naturalization are two close factors that explain the attitudes towards 'others'. When it comes to grasping diversity, attitudes of Swiss nationals differ from attitudes of foreign nationals regardless of issues raised. Whatever topic, foreign nationals show more openness towards non-nationals and Swiss more closure. On the topic of rights, a majority of Swiss citizens are prone to extend the rights of foreigners living in the country when considering family reunification, automatic naturalization or the right to vote. The attitude is positive, but the level of agreement is always lower among Swiss than among foreign nationals. For example, regarding political participation, especially the right to vote at communal and cantonal level, a big difference between the two groups can be observed: 39% of Swiss nationals think that foreigners should be allowed to express their political opinion through their vote on current issues, against 72% among foreign nationals.

Naturalization, understood here as an experience separating those who are Swiss by birth and those who became Swiss after a naturalization process, is also a key factor linked to attitudes towards diversity. It shows similar trends with the nationality factor. Attitudes of naturalized Swiss differ from the attitudes of

[9] Among different variables available in the FSO Survey on diversity and coexistence, sex, age, nationality, educational level, labor market status, living conditions, political affiliation left-right and spirituality were tested as additional explanatory factors.

Swiss-born and from the attitudes of the foreign nationals. In general, non-nationals remain those who present greater openness towards 'others' and the Swiss-born those who present greater closure; the naturalized Swiss are between those two groups, presenting attitudes between inclusivity and restrictiveness according to the issue raised. For example, among Swiss-born, 41% feel a sense of unease during an encounter with someone perceived to be different and, among naturalized Swiss, it is about 26%. It is among those who are foreigners that the sense of unease is the lowest—in this case 20%. Naturalization can be related to the imagined rights of non-nationals and the way the population thinks they should be granted. A striking example is the opinions regarding the right to vote at cantonal or communal level. Among Swiss-born, 37% think that such a right should be granted to non-nationals, while among naturalized Swiss the proportion is 51%. Again, the non-nationals themselves would be more prone than any other group to extend this right—with a share of 72%.

Whatever topic, a link between citizenship or naturalization experience and attitudes towards the 'others' is visible, as proved by the consistent differences in opinions among the groups. The nature of the relation between citizenship and attitudes is highly significant and can be considered strong.

Political affiliation left-right

Overall, among all the factors analysed, the political affiliation between left and right is the factor which best explains the attitudes towards diversity. Political views can then be considered as a key factor explaining attitudes towards 'others'. The model analyzing the attitudes towards diversity (see Table T 7.2 in the Appendix) shows that people at the right side of the political scale are 2.2 times more likely to have negative opinions towards diversity than those at the center. Close to the far right of the same scale (level 9), the estimate reaches 8, meaning that people with this political stance are 8 times more likely have those opinions, compared to those at the center. In detail, we see that the sense of discomfort when facing diversity is the lowest among the most left (16% feel discomfort) and the highest among the most right (56%) with, in between, the centrist (36%). Concerning the matter of rights, the trends in attitudes are the same: people on the left side of the scale are more prone to extend the rights of foreign nationals (agreement at 73% for the right to vote; 79% for the right to automatic naturalization of second generation; 83% for the right to family reunification), while those on the right side are less prone to doing so (agreement at 23% for the right to vote; 31% for the right to automatic naturalization of second generation; 37% for the right to family reunification).

7.4.4 Attitudes and individual factors impacted by the institutional context

The separated evaluation of the weight of institutional, demographic and individual factors showed that the last of these has a closer relation to attitudes towards diversity and otherness, in contrast to the two first elements, which were both aggregated. In order to take into account both individual factor and contextual factors in the same analysis—basically proposing a combined evaluation of different types of factors differentiated by their level—the weight of each individual factor can be analysed for different groups of cantons. As has been done previously, each group of cantons is created based on the level of inclusivity of their cantonal practices (Probst et al. 2019). Considering which factors best explain the attitudes *within each group of cantons* also provides another way of looking at the relation between the attitudes towards diversity and the inclusivity of the cantons and their practices.

Interestingly, the cantonal situation impacts the ranking of factors explaining the attitudes towards diversity or 'the others'. In cantons considered as non-inclusive in terms of their administrative practices political affiliation, nationality, age, and living conditions are the three key criteria linked to attitudes. The situation found in restrictive cantons comes close to the general situation in Switzerland (see Section 7.4.3). In cantons described as inclusive, others variables beside political affiliation and living conditions come to the forefront: the labor market status—namely being employed or unemployed—and the level of education are the first explanatory factors of the observed attitudes. Nationality does not appear to be closely linked to attitudes toward diversity in this type of cantons. The role of citizenship and its potential in shaping attitudes can be relativized at this point: it plays an important role, but only in specific restrictive cantonal settings.

7.5 Conclusion

Migration has been, in Switzerland as in many other Western industrialized countries, a fundamental social fact (Sayad 1991) that has changed the composition and path of modern societies. The challenge to societies, particularly after 1945, was to find a new societal compromise in order to adapt institutions to the societal transformation driven by migration. A state interest is to synchronize the imagined community with the empirical one and prepare nations for future challenges. In this respect, citizenship could be one of the societal leverages used to foster institutional adaptation. Its management may vary with regard to different traditions and dimensions: access may be attributed by birth or by family lineage, naturalization may be handled liberally or restrictively. The effort of political systems to successfully contour their citizenship policies to newly arrived inhabitants can be read as an indicator that is addressing the capacity to adapt institutions to new societal realities. But such change may not happen if the political culture of a polity or the attitudes of its citizens are averse to inclusion. Change may only be sustainable if approved and supported by the current citizenry.

In Switzerland, the cantons and municipalities have a large say on the access to citizenship and institutional opening. As an example, the political culture of cantons and the attitudes of its citizens are central to understanding the inclusivity or restrictiveness of citizenship policies. The standards governing citizenship vary widely according to cantonal patterns. Executive federalism, the cornerstone in the Swiss political system, gives the cantons a margin of appreciation in applying federal laws, and transforms cantons in laboratories to experiment different practices. When it comes to inclusivity, the political positioning of the canton's authorities influences naturalization practices. Moreover, a high proportion of persons with a migrant background also favours liberal naturalization practices.

In order to understand the complex nexus between the institutional context and attitudes within the citizenry, we combined an existing FSO survey and a recent study of Probst et al. (2019), differentiating inclusive from less inclusive cantons and correlating this information with positive or negative attitudes towards diversity at an individual level. Citizens living in cantons with a more inclusive political culture and practice demonstrate more openness towards other people, independently if they are immigrants or minorities. Moreover, combining both studies, the citizens living in cantons with a stronger diverse population showed a more liberal attitude towards different others. On the other hand, the less diverse a canton is, the more negative attitudes are present in its population. The political practice of a canton and the composition of its population have therefore an impact on liberal attitudes, but the relationship is statistically weak.

A more valid result stems from focusing at the individual level and measuring attitudes in relation to a more precise category: urbanity, referring to individual data. Compared to the political and demographic index, we came to stronger relations: indeed, in urban and densely populated areas, opinions on diversity and non-nationals are positive, while they are less positive or even negative in sparsely populated areas. This confirms the assumption that openness towards others increases in dense areas, where intensive contact between 'inside groups' and 'outside groups' are more probable.

A turn of the focus to individual factors confirmed its strong relationship to attitudes towards migrants or minorities. Good living conditions and the experience of migration in the family predict strongly liberal attitudes towards others, favoring the opening up of access to institutions for migrants and minorities. But the strongest relation to positive attitudes stems unsurprisingly from the political orientation: radical right sympathizers have largely more negative opinions on diversity than left-liberals and centrists who are more positive towards others.

Conclusively, the more cantons are politically and demographically diverse, the more experienced the population is with diversity the more open institutions become. Indeed, the path to inclusion is not one-way: institutions impact opportunities, however, they are conversely influenced by attitudes. Therefore, in a direct democratic polity such as the Swiss one, both levels must always be considered, the institutional and the individual, when inclusion or exclusion is at stake.

Appendix

Logistic regression about negative attitudes towards diversity, 2018 T 7.1

Explained variable 1 = Negative attitudes towards diversity 0 = Other attitudes		Odds Ratio Estimates				Explained variable
		Estimation	Confidence interval of 95%		P-Value	
Inclusivity of cantonal practices						
Reference modality	inclusive cantons					176
	cantons between inclusivity and restrictivness	1.13	0.88	1.44	0.34	311
	restrictive cantons	0.97	0.74	1.28	0.83	582
Diversity among population's cantons						
Reference modality	diverse cantons					517
	semi-diverse cantons	1.71	1.13	2.59	0.01	494
	non-diverse cantons	1.14	0.96	1.35	0.13	58
Degree of urbanisation						
Reference modality	densely populated zone					605
	intermediate zone	1.43	1.18	1.74	0.00	262
	sparsely populated zone	1.63	1.31	2.04	<.0001	202
Language region of Switzerland						
Reference modality	German- and Romansh-speaking					819
	French-speaking	0.68	0.53	0.86	0.00	179
	Italian-speaking	0.74	0.53	1.05	0.09	71

Effects of variables on model	Degree of freedom	Wald Chi²	Pr > Chi²
Inclusivity of cantonal practices	2	2.38	0.30
Diversity among population's cantons	2	7.32	0.03
Degree of urbanisation	2	25.57	<.0001
Language region of Switzerland	2	12.04	0.00

Testing Global Null Hypothesis	Degree of freedom	F Value	Pr > F
Likelihood Ratio	8	20883.1	<.0001
Score	8	9.24	<.0001
Wald	8	8.8	<.0001

To know the degree of significance of a variable's modality, the P-value is considered. If it is less than 5% (0.05), the modality is considered sufficiently significant.
Considering the likelihood of having negative attitudes towards diversity for a group compared to a reference group, an odds ratio approaching 1.0 indicates that there is no difference between the two groups in terms of this likelihood.
An odds ratio of less than 1.0 indicates that the study group is less likely to have negative attitudes towards diversity than the reference group.
An odds ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that the study group is more likely to have negative attitudes towards diversity than the reference group.

Source: FSO — Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland

Logistic regression about negative attitudes towards diversity, 2018 T7.2

Explained variable 1 = Negative attitudes towards diversity 0 = Other attitudes		Odds Ratio Estimates				Explained variable
		Estimation	Confidence interval of 95%		P-Value	
Sex						
Reference modality	women					549
	men	1.00	0.84	1.18	0.99	520
Age						
Reference modality	40–54					271
	15–24	0.78	0.59	1.04	0.09	115
	25–39	0.95	0.75	1.21	0.69	232
	55–64	0.99	0.76	1.29	0.95	179
	65+	1.39	1.05	1.85	0.02	272
Nationality						
Reference modality	Swiss					937
	foreign	0.45	0.35	0.57	<.0001	132
Educational level						
Reference modality	upper secondary level					516
	compulsory school	1.09	0.86	1.39	0.48	180
	tertiary level	0.81	0.67	0.98	0.03	369
Labor market status						
Reference modality	economically active					769
	unemployed	0.37	0.18	0.79	0.01	11
	economically inactive	0.74	0.59	0.93	0.01	283
Living conditions						
Reference modality	good					526
	rather good	1.43	1.19	1.72	0.00	407
	rather poor	1.56	1.15	2.12	0.00	86
	poor	2.87	1.75	4.71	<.0001	38
Political affiliation left-right*						
Reference modality	center (levels 4–6*)					324
	left (levels 0–3*)	0.33	0.25	0.44	<.0001	102
	right (levels 7–10*)	2.23	1.79	2.78	<.0001	351
	no political affiliation	0.79	0.61	1.01	0.06	169
Spirituality						
Reference modality	rather spiritual					443
	spiritual	0.95	0.72	1.25	0.71	119
	rather not spiritual	1.02	0.83	1.25	0.89	272
	Not spiritual	1.22	0.98	1.54	0.08	232

Source: FSO — Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland

Logistic regression about negative attitudes towards diversity, 2018 (end) **T 7.2**

Effects of variables on model		Degree of freedom	Wald Chi²	Pr > Chi²
Sex		1	0.00	0.99
Age		4	13.77	0.01
Nationality		1	42.93	<.0001
Educational level		3	6.36	0.10
Labor market status		3	12.84	0.01
Living conditions		4	30.14	<.0001
Political affiliation left-right		4	185.89	<.0001
Spirituality		4	11.76	0.02
Testing Global Null Hypothesis		**Degree of freedom**	**F Value**	**Pr > F**
Likelihood Ratio		24	36 118.30	<.0001
Score		24	16.13	<.0001
Wald		24	12.50	<.0001

To know the degree of significance of a variable's modality, the P-value is considered. If it is less than 5% (0.05), the modality is considered sufficiently significant.
Considering the likelihood of having negative attitudes towards diversity for a group compared to a reference group, an odds ratio approaching 1.0 indicates that there is no difference between the two groups in terms of this likelihood.
An odds ratio of less than 1.0 indicates that the study group is less likely to have negative attitudes towards diversity than the reference group.
An odds ratio greater than 1.0 indicates that the study group is more likely to have negative attitudes towards diversity than the reference group.
* On a scale of 0 to 10 where 0 means 'far left' and 10 'far right'.

Source: FSO — Survey on diversity and coexistence in Switzerland

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